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Abstract 
Sustainable development has become a widely acclaimed objective in the global 
policy arena, but its operational principles have not yet been established. The main 
objective of this thesis is to contribute to operationalising the concept of sustainable 
development through conducting quantitative analysis of sustainable development 
policies. A special attention is paid to water crisis in water-stressed developing 
countries and a case study of Morocco is conducted. 
Before developing an applied model for policy simulations, an analytic model 
based on Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans type growth model is constructed. The analytic 
model not only serves as a model platform of the applied model but also provides 
crucial insights to solutions of the applied model. The analytic model is studied 
both analytically and numerically and important policy insights are obtained. In 
addition, this combined analysis highlights the importance of following up 
qualitative analysis by quantitative simulations. 
Based on the implications provided by the combined analysis, the applied model is 
constructed by incorporating various stylised facts observed in water-stressed 
developing countries. This model is calibrated based on the Moroccan data for the 
year 1994, and also dynamically validated with time-series data of selected 
endogenous variables. The validation has been successful. 
Numerical simulations of sustainable development policies are conducted on the 
validated model. Due to stochastic elements in agricultural production and foreign 
exchange rates there exist gaps between expectations and realised outcomes. The 
policy simulations explicitly deal with these gaps and provide interesting policy 
insights. Major findings include (i) importance of public investment in both safe 
water access provision and the irrigation sector, (ii) impacts of exogenous drivers 
on sustainable development policies, and (iii) importance of international aid flows 
to implement sustainable development through mitigating severe water 
consumption suppression caused by optimal pricing schedules. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Motivation 
This thesis is an attempt to operationalise sustainable development in the spirit of 
the Brundtland Report (WCED 1987). 
Sustainable development has been widely celebrated as a common orientation of 
the global community for more than a decade. This wide consensus across rich and 
poor countries largely stems from the Brundtland Report in which sustainable 
development is defined as "development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs" (WCED 
1987; p. 43). 1 
The Brundtland Report explicitly recognises the reciprocal linkages between 
environmental problems and poverty in which poverty is "a major cause and effect 
of global environmental problems" (WCED 1987; p. 3). Sustainable development 
There are criticisms against vagueness of this definition of sustainable development (e. g. 
O'Riordan 1988, Daly 1990, L616 1991). These criticisms appear to underestimate the fact that 
the Brundtland Report was a political document at high level of international politics where 
nothing can be approved without political compromise. See the next subsection 1.1.2 for more 
discussion on this issue. 
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in the Brundtland Report primarily signifies prompt actions of all members of 
global community to alleviate poverty all over the world. At the same time, it 
imposes a restriction on the solutions such that the future generation should not be 
deprived opportunities to meet their own needs. 
The appeal of this concept was demonstrated by the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 
1992, which mobilised 172 countries with 108 leaders of these countries and 
managed to produce Agenda 21, a blueprint of promoting sustainable development 
(United Nations 1997). It was an aspiration encouraged by the Brundtland Report 
that enabled such huge attention to be drawn to this summit and official 
commitment to pursue sustainable development. 
A remarkable feature of Brundtlandian sustainable development is its recognition 
that the poverty alleviation (intra-generational equity) is not only an end but also a 
means (or more precisely a precondition) of sustainable development. 
Unfortunately, the correctness of this recognition has been proved by rapidly rising 
security concern in many parts of the world. People start recognising the present 
gross global inequity as the principal threat to global security. 
These facts indicate that the concept of sustainable development established by the 
Brundtland Report is not only the right direction of the global community but also a 
precious political asset in terms of global consensus. The necessity to implement 
sustainable development is thus high, but there seems a significant gap between 
necessary information to operationalise this concept and what the previous 
sustainable development studies have provided. 
Most of the previous studies concerning sustainable development interpret 
sustainability as some variation of non-declining conditions such as maintaining 
capital intact, non-declining per capita consumption, and so on (e. g. Pezzy 1992, 
Solow 1993, Toman et al. 1995). The basic principle underlying various 
sustainability indicators is the same, except for Ecological Footprints (Rees 1992) 
Chapter 1 Introduction 17 
that are based on the ecological carrying capacity concept. 2 These works are 
designed to tell us whether the current situation is sustainable or not in a narrow 
sense, but they are not designed to tell us whether the current situation is worth 
sustaining or not. We must keep in mind that "development that perpetuates today's 
inequalities is neither sustainable nor worth sustaining" (UNDP 1996; p. 4). 
The danger of narrowly interpreting sustainable development as maintaining the 
current situation is real. We must draw a lesson from the Johannesburg Sustainable 
Development Summit in 2002. What rich countries wanted to discuss there were 
issues of global warming or biodiversity loss directly affecting sustainability of the 
current situation of these countries, while poor countries strongly demanded to 
discuss poverty alleviation issues. The Summit was destined for failure when the 
global community could not be united in committing to the Brundtlandian 
sustainable development. 3 The Summit was not able to produce an equivalent of 
Agenda 21, and people realised that both the misery of poverty and the threatening 
environmental degradation have continuously worsened since the Rio Summit and 
that the global community has failed to tackle these urgent problems effectively 
despite of the official commitment made in the Rio Summit. 
The lesson is clear. We must urgently articulate and operationalise the concept of 
sustainable development in the spirit of the Brundtland Report, and try to provide 
information necessary to implement it. This is a tough challenge but the way 
forward for the global community. The motivation of this thesis is to contribute to 
this challenge through establishing a relevant policy analysis framework consistent 
with Brundtlandian sustainable development. 
2 The most well known sustainable indicators include Genuine Savings (Pearce and Atkinson 
1993) and Green National Accounting (Asheim 1994, Hamilton 1994). 
3 Immediately aller the Johannesburg Summit, the special envoy of the UN Secretary General to 
the Johannesburg Summit told to BBC that the summit was "close to collapse" and that "There's a 
huge gap between what the delegates have managed to achieve and people's expectations of 
them" (BBC online, 11 September 2002). 
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1.1.2 Articulation of the concept of sustainable development 
The definition of sustainable development in the Brundtland Report is deliberately 
phrased and in a sense vague. 4 It worked out to achieve the primary task of the 
Brundtland Report; the task to establish a worldwide consensus on basic principles 
to deal with poverty and environmental issues, which can be summarised that the 
global community is neither sustainable nor worth sustaining unless 
intragenerational equity is achieved. More rigorous and narrow definition of 
sustainable development could not have gained such a success in this challenging 
task (Lele 1991). 5 
The operational definition of sustainable development must be a subject of political 
consensus of stakeholders and it has a case specific nature. For instance the 
operational definition of needs for a whole nation may differ from that for one local 
community. Thus, the task to establish the operational definition must be, by nature, 
undertaken by individual projects/researches. 
This task requires clarification of both the meaning of `needs' and the necessary 
conditions not to `compromise the ability of future generation to meet their own 
needs', for which one cannot avoid making one's value judgement explicit. 6 
Implementation of sustainable development without such clarification may allow 
persons who actually do not care sustainability to abuse it (O'Riordan 1988). 
This thesis articulates the study-specific concept of sustainable development as 
follows. 
4 My position does not contradict L616's (1991) that "clarification and articulation is necessary if 
SD [sustainable development] is to avoid either being dismissed as another development fad or 
being coopted by forces opposed to changes in the status quo" (p. 618). I believe that such 
clarification and articulation must be done at a project level, based on a fundamental consensus 
achieved by more vague concept presented by the Brundtland Report. 
5 Jacobs (1991) pointed out that sustainable development is a contestable concept such as liberty, 
social justice and democracy which `9have basic meanings and almost everyone is in favour of 
them, but deep conflicts remain about how they should be understood and what they imply for 
policy" (p. 60). 
6 Common (1995) emphasises the importance to make one's value judgement explicit in order to 
make the sustainability debate more productive. 
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(1) The meaning of needs 
Two different approaches to human needs may be useful to understand and 
operationalise sustainable development; one is the basic human needs approach and 
the other is the fundamental human needs approach. 
Basic human needs approach is widely adopted by international developing 
agencies. Basic human needs are defined as food, clothing, shelter, safe water 
access, primary education, and so on. Poverty is defined as lack of opportunity to 
meet these basic human needs. This approach is conceptually simple and easy to 
operationalise when these needs are not satisfied, because both the ends and the 
means of development are visible. 
Fundamental human needs approach views human needs from broader perspectives. 
Among others, Max-Neef (1992) proposes an interesting and powerful theory of 
fundamental human needs. He classifies ten fundamental human needs by 
distinguishing needs from satisfiers that are means to satisfy the needs. 7 He argues 
that fundamental human needs do not have hierarchical structure except for the 
situation where subsistence needs are insecure, and that they are common in all 
cultures and in all historical periods, with exception of evolutionary change of 
human species. Consequently, "any fundamental human need that is not adequately 
satisfied reveals a human poverty"(p. 200). On the other hand, selection of satisfiers 
varies across cultures and historical periods. He classifies five types of satisfiers of 
which three types (violator, pseudo-satisfier, and inhibiting satisfier) do not satisfy 
the needs. 
Max-Neef's theory helps us to distinguish satisfaction of needs from material 
consumption. Jackson and Marks (1999) argue that a large part of the current 
prodigal consumption in the rich nations is likely to be associated with satisfaction 
of non-material needs, and "material consumption may offer at best a 
pseudo-satisfaction of non-material needs and at worst may actually inhibit or 
' He classifies ten fundamental human needs, i. e. subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, 
participation, creation, idleness, identity, freedom, and transcendence. 
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violate the satisfaction of those needs" (p. 439). They refer to mismatch theory 
proposed by evolutionary psychologists that the mismatch between material 
consumption and the nature of human needs satisfaction may account for the 
symptom of poverties in rich countries such as high incidence rates of suicide and 
depression. 
The fundamental needs approach helps to recognise that poverty exists in both rich 
and poor countries whenever any fundamental human needs, either material or 
non-material, are not satisfied. This recognition is crucial for sustainable 
development in rich countries where overconsumption is one of the principal 
threats to sustainable development and shifting social values is urgently called for 
in order to fill the gap between current prodigal consumption patterns and the 
nature of fundamental needs satisfaction. Sustainable development policy in rich 
countries must primarily address this challenge to make consumption patterns be 
consistent with fundamental needs satisfaction (Ekins 1992, Dodds 1997, Jackson 
and Marks 1999). In addition, the established consumption patterns must be such 
that all members of global community can pursue them without compromising 
ability of future generations. 
On the other hand, in underdeveloped countries where subsistence needs are not 
adequately satisfied, the basic human needs approach seems effective and 
operational. Moreover, it is recognised that in developing countries the connection 
between material consumption and satisfaction of needs is more direct than in rich 
countries (Ekins 1992, Jackson and Marks 1999). The conventional idea of 
economic growth oriented social welfare improvement seems still relevant to 
developing countries to a certain extent. 
(2) Constraints not to compromise ability of future generation 
Many sustainable development studies interpret sustainability constraints imposed 
by sustainable development as non-declination of either proxies of welfare or 
determinants of welfare such as per capita consumption, production capacity or 
capital stock. For example, increase of Genuine Savings is interpreted as 
sustainability of the current development path. It is obvious, however, that it cannot 
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be true if the needs of the present generation are not satisfied currently. To 
operationalise sustainable development in the spirit of Brundtland, another way 
must be sought. 
Recall that the Brundtlandian sustainable development employs a negative form of 
constraint: `without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their 
own needs'. It is apparently more natural to define sustainability as a negative form, 
in which sustainable means `not unsustainable' (Becker et al. 1999). This negative 
form definition of sustainability is easily associated with the resilience of a dynamic 
system. 
Holling (1973) defines resilience as the propensity of a system to retain its 
organisational structures after perturbations. Based on this concept, Perrings and 
Dalmazzone (1997) define the resilience of a system as the maximum perturbation 
of the system that does not cause the system to leave the original stability domain. 
According to this definition, resilience at time t is determined not only by system 
parameters but also by distance between the system's location at time t and the 
boundary of the stability domain. Once dynamic behaviour of a system is modelled, 
sustainability constraints can be represented by the condition that the perturbations 
caused by development should be less than the system's resilience at any t. 
Rigorously, loss of resilience is not equal to unsustainability of the system, since 
leaving the original stability domain does not necessarily mean collapse of the 
system. Nevertheless, the fact that the system outside the original stability domain 
is associated with high degree of uncertainty makes sense of employing resilience 
conditions as sustainability constraints. 
It is apparently nonsense to impose sustainability constraints on all the systems 
surrounding us. It seems reasonable to confine the scope of sustainability 
constraints to the ecosystems functioning as life-support systems, e. g. hydrological 
cycle, atmospheric constituents stabilisation, oxygen cycle, nutrient cycles, soil 
regeneration, food chains, etc. There may be no objection against the fact that the 
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loss of resilience of these life-supporting ecosystems will compromise future 
generation's ability to meet their needs. 8 
Implementation of sustainability constraints based on the resilience concept is not 
an easy task due to non-linearity, path-dependence, discontinuity, and uncertainty 
associated with ecosystems (Perrings et al. 1995). The extreme difficulty to predict 
outcomes of irreversible environmental changes requires a precautionary approach. 
It might be realistic to establish safe minimum standards for each target ecosystem 
based on precautionary principles with the currently available scientific 
knowledge/information. 9 This is what this thesis assumes. 
(3) Operational principles of sustainable development in this thesis 
Based on the above discussion, this thesis articulates the study-specific operational 
principles of sustainable development as follows: 
(a) The primary task of sustainable development is to meet the basic human needs 
all over the world, particularly in poor developing countries. This task requires 
coordination between adequate domestic policies of poor countries for poverty 
alleviation and proper international aid policies. 
(b) In most poor developing countries economic growth towards higher material 
consumption is required to meet fundamental human needs including basic 
human needs. 
(c) In rich developed countries sustainable patterns of consumption must be 
realised both for meeting fundamental human needs and for mitigating 
environmental impacts of the current prodigal material consumption patterns. 
Developed countries have to seek patterns of consumption that all members of 
8 My definition of sustainable development is close to Choucri's (1999): "Sustainable 
development means meeting the needs and demands of human populations without undermining 
the resilience of life-supporting properties" (p. 143-144). Also see Common (1995) for this 
definition. 
Any costs accrued by adopting safe minimum standards should not be regarded as unacceptable 
in this case, because keeping resilience of ecosystem underpinning life-support systems is a 
precondition of human well-being and must be prior to anything else. 
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global community can pursue without loosing resilience of ecosystems 
underpinning life-support systems. 
(d) Resilience of ecosystems underpinning life-support systems must be kept as a 
precondition of sustainable development. For this purpose, sustainability 
constraints must be set and observed. Determination of sustainability 
constraints must follow the precautionary principle and scientific uncertainty 
cannot be an excuse not to implement them. Sustainability constraints may be 
imposed on, e. g., water withdrawal, pollutant emissions, fish catch, forest 
clearance, etc. 
(e) When sustainability constraints are irreconcilable with consumer sovereignty, 
consumer sovereignty must be restrained (cf. Common and Perrings 1992). 
Suppose that meeting basic human needs all over the world without violating 
sustainability constraints requires massive capital transfer from rich to poor 
countries, and that its implementation and consumer sovereignty of rich 
countries are incompatible. According to the operational principles of 
sustainable development in this thesis, the rich countries are still responsible 
for implementing such capital transfer. 
1.2 Basic methodology 
1.2.1 Study scope 
(1) Focusing on the water crisis 
This thesis exclusively focuses on the water crisis in water-stressed developing 
countries. The choice of water crisis is motivated by the recent growing concern of 
the global community over this issue, which is symbolised by the famous statement 
of Ismail Serageldin, then vice president of the World Bank; "the wars of the next 
century will be about water". The same concern urged the United Nations to 
declare the decade from 2005 to 2015 as the `International Decade for Action - 
Water for Life'. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 24 
Water is essential for meeting basic human needs through various pathways. First 
of all, clean water is indispensable for drinking, cooking, and hygiene purposes. 
The reality is, however, that 1.1 billion people all over the world do not have access 
to clean and safe water (WHO and UNICEF 2000). The lack of safe water access 
causes various waterborne diseases, which account for around 80 % of infections in 
developing countries. It is estimated that nearly 4 billion cases of diarrhea cause 2 
million deaths each year in developing countries, and most of the victims are young 
children under the age of five (WHO and UNICEF 2000). 200 million people are 
infected with schistosomiasis, and 10 % of the people living in developing 
countries are infected with intestinal worms. Moreover, it is estimated that 
trachoma blinds 6 million people and risks sights of 500 million people each year 
(Hoffman 2004). 
Food production requires adequate amount of water at the adequate point of time, 
which can be achieved only by introducing irrigation in many water-scarce regions 
around the world. It is acknowledged that global food demand cannot have been 
satisfied without drastic increase of irrigated area, nearly a fivefold increase during 
the last century (Rosegrant et al. 2002a). On the other hand, this rapid irrigation 
expansion results in massive water consumption that often accounts for around 80 
to 90 percent of total water consumption (Rosegrant et al. 2002a, 2002b). 
Water is essential for industrial production as well. Various industries, in particular 
energy, textiles, and paper industries, require a vast amount of water, and their 
products constitute a part of subsistence goods. 
Lastly, but surely not least, the hydrological cycle forms the backbone of 
ecosystems. Its disruption often triggers irreversible collapse of life-supporting 
ecosystems. Desertification might be the most conspicuous case. 
Against increasing water demands for meeting basic human needs, the available 
amount of water per person is decreasing. During the period between 1970 and 
1990 the average water supply worldwide per person dropped by a third, and this 
tendency is expected to continue for the future due to world population growth 
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(United Nations 2003). This means that water-stressed developing countries will 
face further difficulty in pursuing sustainable development. 
The costs of exclusively focusing on the water crisis must be mentioned. Recently 
integrity between water and energy has been recognised. In his opening speech to 
the International Conference on Freshwater held in Bonn in 2001, the Executive 
Director of UNEP asserted: "there are only two issues that are so intensively 
interrelated and important for development and they are water and energy". 
Hoffman (2004) describes various direct and indirect linkages between water and 
energy. As direct linkages, extraction, treatment and transportation of water 
requires large quantities of energy inputs, while energy production requires large 
quantities of water such as cooling water for thermal power plants, water injection 
to oil wells, and so on. As indirect linkages, he counts water pollution caused by 
energy production and use. In addition, Rosenfeld (2000) warns that emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion may suppress precipitation. All of these linkages 
reveal the importance of addressing water and energy issues in an integrated 
manner. Nevertheless, it is likely that inclusion of energy into the study scope 
would make the problem intractable. I leave this challenge of dealing with water 
and energy issues in an integrated way as an important future research topic. 
(2) Focusing on economic aspects 
This thesis assumes that sustainability constraints necessary for keeping resilience 
of ecosystems underpinning life-support systems are given. This does not mean 
that I underestimate importance or difficulty to formulate them. On the contrary, I 
believe such an important and difficult task must be rendered by proper 
interdisciplinary collaboration across ecology, environmental science, engineering, 
and economics, at least. Moreover, a high degree of uncertainties and severe 
knowledge limitation concerning this issue may rule out clear-cut solution. Instead, 
it might be necessary to establish them in an operational way to prepare several 
alternative versions of sustainability constraints and to build political consensus on 
the choice among them. 
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This thesis sets aside this genuinely interdisciplinary task and focuses on economic 
aspects of sustainable development. Instead of asking what are sustainability 
constraints or how they are formulated, this thesis asks how they can be 
incorporated and utilised in sustainable development policies. It is also expected 
that answers to the latter question will be helpful to address the former questions. 
Nevertheless, it must be re-emphasised here that best efforts to establish 
appropriate sustainability constraints through both interdisciplinary collaboration 
and adequate political process are essential to operationalise sustainable 
development. 
(3) Single country framework 
This thesis adopts a single-country framework due to its advantages in both 
modelling and data collection. Although the policy analysis in a multi-country 
framework has recently attracted research interests, the complex nature of problems 
imposes severe restrictions on selection of analytical methods. 1° It seems wiser to 
establish a policy analysis framework relevant to the Brundtlandian sustainable 
development in a single-country framework focusing on developing countries, and 
to extend the scope in future. 
On the other hand, a severe drawback of the single developing country framework 
is that actions of developed countries cannot be properly incorporated. In this 
regard this thesis simply assumes that developed countries can afford significant 
amount of capital transfer if it is required to implement sustainable development of 
the case study country. Although the volume of international aid flows is currently 
reducing, I hope that demonstration of positive impacts of such capital transfer on 
sustainable development could help to convince developed countries to increase 
international aid flows. 
10 For multi-country policy analysis, sec Turnovsky (1995,1997). 
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1.2.2 Adoption of quantitative policy analysis 
This thesis adopts the method of quantitative policy analysis based on scenario 
simulations. The notion of policies in this thesis is thus narrowly referred to as 
government quantitative policies defined as "the changing, within the qualitative 
framework of the given structure, of certain political parameters or political 
instruments" (Tinbergen 1952; p. 2). 
Focusing on quantitative policies does not mean that qualitative policies are less 
important than quantitative policies. Ciriacy-Wantrup (1967) argues that water 
policy is better defined as "a set of decision rules in a multistage decision process" 
consisting of three different levels of decision-making (p. 179). At the lowest level 
decisions mean choosing proper values of control variables such as amount of water 
withdrawal. At the second level the decision process controls the institutional 
framework within which the lowest level decisions are made. For example, 
selection of property right regime or type of water management organisation might 
be the subjects of decision at this level. At the highest level the second level 
decision-making process itself is the subject of decision. 
The rationale of his argument is that the institutional conditions are rather the 
subjects of decision than the given constraint in social decision-making. He claims 
that "the second level is the most significant one for the study of water policy" and 
that it is necessary to seek "criteria that could serve as conceptually and 
operationally meaningful proxies for the functional construct of optimizing 
welfare" (p. 183). From this stand the most relevant analysis is not quantitative 
optimisation itself but comparative analysis of institutional setting in which such an 
optimisation is pursued. 
Nevertheless, the benefits from applying quantitative policy analysis seem to fully 
compensate the costs. Government policies to be studied in this thesis, such as 
setting the rates of water charges and the levels of public investments, will have the 
complex and often interdependent direct and indirect effects on the various sectors 
of economy. Quantitative policy analysis provides the most effective way, and 
often the only way, to reveal overall consequences with reasonable accountability 
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(Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). When the policy target consists of multiple 
objectives that cannot be aggregated in any unique objective function, quantitative 
policy analysis enables policy makers to understand tradeoffs between each 
objective associated with each policy scenario. Obviously, the sustainable 
development policy is the case. 
1.2.3 Policy analysis procedure 
Quantitative policy analysis consists of two steps; model construction and policy 
simulation (Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). 
Before explaining each step, it is useful to classify models into analytic models, 
stylised numerical models, and applied models (Robinson 1989). 
Analytic models help to extract important assumptions and causal mechanisms that 
can rarely be revealed by more realistic and complicated models. 
Stylised numerical models are a generalised version of analytic models in terms of 
relaxing strong assumptions that enable analytic models to have closed form 
solutions. Stylised numerical models contribute, through numerical simulations, 
both to quantifying various complicating effects and to investigating causal 
mechanisms of which implications depend on functional specification or parameter 
values. 
Applied models are designed to conduct policy simulations. Although the final 
goal of model construction is to construct an applied model, starting from an 
analytic model or a stylised numerical model facilitates model construction and 
improves usefulness of the analysis. 
Construction of an applied model is further divided into three parts, i. e. 
specification, calibration (or estimation, in case of econometric models), and 
validation of the model. Successful validation is essential for applied models to 
generate reasonably realistic base run results that can be used as a benchmark for 
policy evaluation. As a part of validation process, sensitivity analyses help to 
clarify important assumptions and parameter values that severely affect outcomes. 
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Policy simulations start from preparation of alternative policy scenarios by 
combining relevant policy instruments with particular values. An applied model 
then simulates each policy scenario. 
Hence, the study procedure of this thesis consists of the following steps; 
- to construct an analytic model, 
- to conduct numerical simulation of the analytic model, 
- to construct an applied model, 
- to calibrate and validate the applied model with sensitivity analysis, and 
- to conduct policy simulations. 
1.3 Research objectives 
The research objectives of this thesis are twofold. One is to establish a new policy 
analysis framework with the capablity to implement sustainable development. The 
other is to clarify policy implications of sustainable development policies by 
conducting quantitative policy analysis based on the proposed framework. These 
two aspects seem to be equally important to fill the existing information gap in 
implementing sustainable development. 
For the former aspect, the basic requirements for the proposed framework are as 
follows: 
- Performance of sustainable development policies can be evaluated in terms of 
both social welfare and poverty alleviation. 
- Sustainability constraints can be anchored in resilience of ecosystems essential 
to maintain life-supporting systems. 
- Multi-dimensionality of water crisis can be represented. In particular, various 
pathways through which water affects basic human needs can be modelled. 
For the latter aspect, interesting research questions are as follows: 
- What do sustainable development policies look like? 
- Are sustainable development policies feasible? 
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- How does exogenous environment affect sustainable development policies? 
- What would be the expected role of international aid flows in implementing 
sustainable development policies? 
1.4 Overview of this thesis 
This introductory chapter formulates the research objectives to be addressed in the 
remaining chapters, which consist of literature review (Chapter 2), model 
construction (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), data description and model calibration 
(Chapter 5), policy simulations (Chapter 6), and conclusions (Chapter 7). 
Chapter 2 establishes the basic analytical framework of this thesis through literature 
review. This chapter reviews various alternative analytical frameworks from the 
viewpoint of compatibility with the articulated concept of sustainable development. 
Further, relevance of several original ideas is examined by locating them in the 
existing literature. 
The policy simulation models are constructed in two steps described respectively in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 3 an analytic model for investigating interactions between water and 
economy is developed. Policy implications obtained by theoretical analysis based 
on the analytic model are summarised in propositions. These policy implications 
are further investigated through numerical simulations. The analytic model 
constructed in this chapter provides model platform of an applied model 
constructed in Chapter 4. Moreover, some insights obtained in this chapter are 
indispensable to solve the applied model numerically. 
Chapter 4 presents the applied model for policy simulations. The applied model is 
developed by incorporating stylised facts commonly observed in water-stressed 
developing countries, such as vulnerability of rainfed agriculture, high incidence of 
lack of safe water access, etc. into the analytic model. The applied model departs 
from deterministic world of the analytic model by introducing several uncertainties 
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such as production risks. Furthermore, tax and trade issues are incorporated in 
order to accommodate empirical data such as an existing social accounting matrix 
descried in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 reports calibration and validation of the applied model along with data 
description. In addition to detailed description of datasets, general features of 
Morocco, the case study country, are also described in this chapter. A detailed 
explanation of calibration procedure, which seems useful but rarely found in the 
existing literature, is also provided. 
Chapter 6 reports policy simulations. Since the model involves uncertainty, policy 
planning and policy implementation must be clearly distinguished. This chapter 
addresses this issue in detail, and establishes simulation procedure and policy 
evaluation criteria. Policy scenarios cover not only policy alternatives but also 
alternative environment (or exogenous drivers) such as tax regime, climate change, 
and so on. In particular, different levels of both a society's safe minimum standards 
and international aid flows are represented as policy scenarios. This wide coverage 
of policy scenarios demonstrates applicability of the applied model developed in 
this thesis. 
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with both assessing how properly the research 
objectives are fulfilled and pointing out future tasks. 
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Chapter 2 
Formulation of Basic Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to establish a basic analytical framework through 
reviewing the existing literature. Literature review in this chapter means two 
processes; one is to seek useful prototypes of the framework in the existing 
literature, and the other is to elucidate original and novel elements of my framework 
with assistance from the existing literature. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In the next Section 2.2 several candidates for 
the framework are reviewed with the main focus on studies directly relevant to 
either water problems or sustainable development. In Section 2.3, the basic 
analytical framework of this thesis is developed. The reviewed literature in this 
section covers broader scope than that in the previous section in order to connect 
innovative elements of this thesis with the existing literature. Lastly, the 
established analytical framework of this thesis is summarised in Section 2.4. 
2.2 Review of existing analytical frameworks 
Among the vast literature dealing with either water or sustainable development 
issues, the following four models seem to provide highly relevant analytical 
frameworks for this thesis: i) hydrology-based optimum allocation models, ii) 
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growth models, iii) linear multisector models, and iv) computable general 
equilibrium models. This section reviews these models in this order. 
2.2.1 Hydrology-based optimum allocation models 
Economists have regarded the optimum water allocation as one of the central 
objectives of water policy. Development of proper analytical frameworks for this 
purpose, in particular for the applied purpose, has been associated with several 
difficulties. Among such difficulties the multi-objective nature of water resources 
management and the complexity of hydrological systems might be the most 
important ones. The former issue is real when non-commensurability exists among 
the objectives. Though there are some optimising techniques to deal with this case, 
for example goal programming and method of constraints (cf. Dauer and Krueger 
1980), a more common treatment is to make objectives commensurable by 
translating them into net benefits. The calculation of net benefits requires a set of 
production functions and damage functions which increases model complexity 
further. Only the recent rapid improvement in computational capacities enabled 
hydrology-based optimum allocation models to be applied to empirical water 
policy analysis at basin-wide or nationwide scale. 
McKinney and Cai (1997) develop an integrated economic-hydrologic model for 
Amu Darya and Syr Darya river basins in Kazakhstan. The hydrological 
component is a node-link network model in which nodes represent physical entities 
such as rivers, reservoir aquifers, irrigation fields, industrial plants, etc. This 
hydrological model and a crop-water simulation model are incorporated into the 
economic optimisation model in which net benefits derived from each water use are 
maximised. This model has also been applied to the Maipo river basin in Chile 
(Rosegrant et al. 2000). 
Bouhia (1998) proposes a further integrated framework for analysing links between 
sustainable water management and socio-economic development, the potential of 
which is demonstrated by a case study in Morocco. Her analytical tool integrates 
McKinney-Cai type hydrology-based water management model and an input- 
output type economic model. The former component maximises the discounted 
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sum of aggregate net benefits of water use by allocating water resource to river 
basins and economic sectors under a set of political and sustainability constraints. 
The economic component evaluates nationwide economic impacts of the optimal 
water allocation, which is the output of the water management model, based on the 
water-extended input-output table. This general equilibrium setting makes it 
possible to capture interdependence among institutions that is a source of 
externality. The limitation of this approach is, as pointed by the author herself, 
inability to accommodate the dynamic nature of development. Furthermore, a 
linearity assumption of the input-output model precludes substitutability between 
water and other production factors, which plays a key role in welfare analysis. 
The hydrology-based optimum allocation models have ability to capture detail of 
water resources systems. As Bouhia (1998) suggests, combining a 
hydrology-based water management model and a computable general equilibrium 
model seems a promising approach. 
2.2.2 Growth models 
An extensive body of economic growth literature has proved the congeniality of 
growth models to the sustainability issue. ' 
(1) The first generation sustainable growth models 
The pioneering works of this literature are those of Dasgupta and Heal (1974), 
Mäler (1974), Solow (1974), and Stiglitz (1974a, 1974b) all of which apply the 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK) growth model (Ramsey 1928, Cass 1965, 
Koopmans 1965). It is by no means coincidence that all of them appeared in 1974. 
The research motivation shared by these authors was to challenge the doomsday 
prophecy of the `World Model' in which resource depletion causes an economic 
catastrophe (Meadows et al. 1972). Except for the model of Mäler (1974), which 
will be separately reviewed in the next section due to its particular importance to 
this thesis, all of their models, for convenience labelled as `neoclassical sustainable 
1A review article of this literature by Beltratti (1997) contains useful references. 
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growth models' in this thesis, have very similar specifications, such as adoption of 
an infinite time horizon and CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production 
technology, in particular Cobb-Douglas production technology, which allow them 
to draw their main conclusion that it is possible for an economy to have an infinitely 
sustained optimal growth with the existence of exhaustible resources. To borrow 
Romer's words as to his celebrated endogenous growth model, their main 
conclusion seems "more like an assumption than a result of the model" (Romer 
1990; p. S84). Nevertheless, the neoclassical sustainable growth models have long 
served as a solid point of departure for this literature. 
As a direct extension of Solow (1974), Hartwick (1977) shows that the necessary 
condition to achieve constant consumption over an infinite time horizon in the 
Solow model is to invest all scarcity rents from exhaustible natural resources, so 
called the Hotelling scarcity rents (Hotelling 1931), into manmade capital. This 
condition is often called Hartwick's rule. 
Following this work many researchers have investigated analogues of Hartwick's 
rule with more general assumptions. For example, Hartwick (1978) introduces 
CES production technology with many exhaustible resources, and Dixit et al. 
(1980) investigate the case of further generalised economy of which production 
possibility is assumed to be stationary and convex. This line of research helps to 
clarify the working of the neoclassical sustainable growth models but does not 
provide additional insights about the importance of environmental aspects in the 
sustainability issue. 
(2) Environment-extended models 
Another strand of this literature has incorporated various environmental aspects 
into the neoclassical sustainable growth model. This strand can be regarded as an 
amalgam of the neoclassical sustainable growth models and the model of Mäler 
(1974) in which environmental quality constitutes an argument of utility function. 
Krautkraemer (1985) introduces natural resource stock as an argument of utility 
function to the neoclassical sustainable growth model in order to investigate 
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sustainability implications of including amenity aspects of natural resources that 
were first discussed by Krutilla (1967). He shows that permanent environmental 
preservation could be compatible with constant growth in consumption only if (i) 
substitutability between manmade capital and natural resources is high enough, or 
(ii) individual preference is sufficiently environment-oriented. 
Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991) investigate simultaneous optimal control of 
renewable resources, pollution emission and capital accumulation based on a 
generalised version of the neoclassical sustainable growth model with an equation 
of motion of pollution stock and a regeneration function of renewable resource, 
which employs a weaker assumption of production function than CES. They show 
that sustainable optimal solution exists only if the government can set the rate of 
emission tax at the social optimal. 
(3) Environment-extended endogenous growth models 
The emergence of endogenous growth models in late 1980's further boosted this 
literature. Among many, the work of Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) seems to 
exemplify this literature. 
Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) introduce two-sector endogenous growth model 
developed by Rebelo (1991), which consists of a final-goods sector and an 
environmental R&D sector, into this literature. Their model employs the Tahvonen 
and Kuuluvainen type equation of motion of pollution stock in more general form 
but it lacks a regeneration function of renewable resource. It should be noted that 
Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) regard environmental quality as renewable 
resource while Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991) deal with environmental quality 
(pollution stock) and renewable resource separately. The key issue of Bovenberg 
and Smulders (1995) is simultaneous optimal control of knowledge accumulation 
in the environmental R&D sector, pollution emission and capital accumulation. 
Their main conclusion, which is analogous to Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991), is 
that a sustainable optimal solution can exist only if the government sets both the 
2 Influential pioneering works in this literature include Romer (1986,1990) and Lucas (1988). 
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rate of emission tax and the subsidy to the environmental R&D sector at the social 
optimal, on condition that the production function of each sector satisfies several 
requirements. They also show that both the social optimal emission tax rate and the 
social optimal subsidy to the environmental R&D sector must grow at positive 
constant rates but the growth rate of the former must exceed that of the latter. 
(4) Stylised numerical growth models 
Oueslati (2002) examines both the short-run and the long-run effects of 
environmental policy on economic growth by endogenising labour-leisure choice in 
a variant of two-sector endogenous growth model in which human capital is 
produced by schooling. The constructed model is used as a stylised numerical 
model rather than an analytic model, with two-stage calibration based on the 
average environmental protection expenses in OECD countries. It allows 
investigation not only of the optimal steady-state but also of transitional dynamics 
in spite of relatively high complexity. Her main conclusion is that a sharp rise of 
environmental tax rate results in net welfare costs in the short-run due to negative 
crowding-out effects on consumption and investment, but in the long-run it will 
turn to overall welfare benefits because of neutralised crowding-out effects owing 
to factor substitution and positive effects of time allocation shift from leisure to 
schooling time. 
This conclusion gives an interesting contrast to that of Bartolini and Bonatti (2003) 
who also introduce endogenous labour-leisure choice into a similar growth model. 
The major differences of their model from Oueslati's model are absence of human 
capital production process and introduction of substitutability between manmade 
goods and natural resources in household production of `satisfaction' embedded in 
utility function. Their main conclusion is that the optimal steady-state under 
laissez-faire is characterised by an inefficiently high level of production with an 
excessively high proportion of labour hours relative to leisure hours, and an 
inefficiently low level of environmental resource stock, which collectively reduce 
households' welfare. 
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Anderies (2003) provides another very interesting example of a stylised numerical 
growth model. He investigates dynamic interactions between population dynamics, 
changes in renewable resources, and economic growth simultaneously based on a 
model in which endogenous population dynamics is incorporated into a two-sector 
version of Solow-Swan growth model (Solow 1956, Swan 1956) with a fixed 
saving rate, consisting of agricultural and manufacturing sectors. It means that the 
optimisation process of this model is not dynamic optimisation but a sequence of 
static optimisation interlinked by equations of motion. This specification reflects 
his choice of dynamical systems approach. ' Anderies (2003) advocates that a 
dynamical systems approach with computer-based bifurcation analysis has strong 
advantages in studying qualitative properties of growth paths over simulation 
analysis or optimal control based dynamic optimisation analysis. Obviously a 
two-sector version of RCK model with endogenous fertility is intractably complex 
with six endogenous (i. e. three state and three control) variables. Further, he claims 
that policy analysis based on RCK growth models has limited applicability in 
practice because the policy implication of RCK growth models "rests on many 
assumptions including omniscient households with perfect foresight" while the 
dynamical systems approach rests on less assumptions (Anderies 2003; p. 238). 
This important point will be discussed in the next section. His analysis starts from 
obtaining the optimal steady-state solution numerically given the base run 
parameter values. Then effects of changing parameter values on the qualitative 
properties of growth paths, either converging on an optimal steady state or 
oscillating indefinitely (overshoot and collapse), are depicted in bifurcation 
diagrams. His main conclusion is that the overshoot and collapse type trajectories 
become more likely when the rate of resource regeneration is lower than that of 
economic growth, and that demographic factors seem relatively more important 
than technological factors in avoiding undesirable overshoot and collapse 
trajectories. 
3 For dynamical systems approach based on bifurcation analysis, see Kuznetsov (1995). 
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(5) Water-economy growth model 
Recently Barbier (2004) proposes a growth model addressing the interaction 
between water scarcity and economic growth. This work is, according to him, the 
first attempt to deal with water crisis issue in this literature. His model is developed 
based on congestible public good models proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992,1995) in which aggregate public services subject to congestion are equal to a 
share of aggregate economic output. 
Barbier claims that utilised water itself is a public good subject to congestion and 
that aggregate amount of utilised water is equal to "a share (... ) of aggregate 
economic output that is specifically devoted to water supply (e. g. dams, irrigation 
networks, water pipes, pumping stations etc. )" (Barbier 2004; p. 5). As Barbier 
himself notes in his footnote 3, however, the analogue of aggregate public services 
in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) is not water itself but `water system' in terms of 
water supply facilities. If one attempts to sort out this confusion without changing 
the model specification, it is necessary to assume equality between water supply 
facilities and utilised water, or at least constant marginal product of water with 
respect to water supply facilities. 4 This assumption is not only rejected by 
empirical evidence suggesting a diminishing marginal product of water production 
(Rosegrant et al. 2002a) but also inconsistent with his own statement; "as water 
becomes increasingly scarce in the economy, the government must exploit less 
accessible sources of fresh water through appropriating and purchasing a greater 
share of aggregate economic output" (Barbier 2004; p. 2). 
Even if this constant marginal product assumption were accepted, his main 
hypothesis, an inverted-U relationship between growth and water utilisation, could 
5 not be derived from his theoretical model. 
In theoretical work measurement unit can be freely chosen. Thus any linear relationship in the 
real world can be transformed into equality in theory by choosing proper measurement unit. 
He derives this hypothesis by applying the first order conditions, which are valid only along the 
optimal paths, to sub-optimal paths. Along the optimal paths, his model predicts a unique 
combination, depicted as a point on graph, of economic growth and water utilisation rates. 
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Although this work contains interesting discussion and information relevant to 
sustainable water policy issue, his main conclusions that his theoretical model 
predicts an inverted-U relationship between economic growth and water utilisation 
and that it is consistent with cross-country data have no foundation. 
(G) Towards sustainable development growth model 
It has been seen that growth models have high relevance to the sustainability issue, 
in particular to sustainable growth. In order to apply the growth models to 
quantitative policy analysis for sustainable development, however, it seems to be 
essential to tailor them for this particular purpose. 
The vast majority of the existing growth model literature has almost exclusively 
focused on finding the first-best optimal outcomes without scrutinising their 
feasibility. In fact, all of the reviewed RCK models assume perfect foresight of 
households that can hardly be assumed in the real world. From the policy 
perspective, the first-best outcomes are important only if they are achievable by 
some policies, for instance Pigouvian tax. Finding such a policy requires analysis 
in the second-best world representing the reality. 6 If there is no such a policy 
available, the first-best outcomes are meaningless not only in practice but also in 
theory due to the fact that they are surely not generated by key mechanisms 
underlying the real economic phenomena. 
This `first-best world bias' of the literature does not necessarily mean that growth 
models have limited applicability as tools of quantitative policy analysis. 
Considering its high ability to conduct dynamic analysis it is worth trying to tailor 
the growth models applicable to quantitative policy analysis rather than to seek a 
new analytical framework. 
6 The word `second-best' was first coined by Meade (1955) in which the problems of second-best 
optimality were discussed in empirical background. Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) investigate 
theoretical implication of this issue. 
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2.2.3 Linear multisector models 
Multisector models play an important role when structural changes in production 
and consumption activities matter (Robinson 1989, Duchin 1998). 
Early linear multisector models, static and dynamic input-output models, have 
provided useful analytical frameworks mainly in development economics where 
the main research subject is development policies that induce structural changes 
(Robinson 1989). These models are also widely used in environmental economics 
literature mainly because of their ability both to capture externalities related to 
interdependence of sectors and to accommodate material balance analysis. 
In this literature, one of the most relevant studies to this thesis is Duchin and Lange 
(1994) in which policy implications of sustainable development proposed by the 
Brundtland Report are investigated based on a dynamic input-output model and 
database of the world economy constructed by Leontief et al. (1977). They 
conclude that the key policy recommendations of the Brundtland Report (WCED 
1987) such as more extensive use of environmentally friendly technologies or 
recycling could not achieve the environmental objectives required for sustainable 
development. 
Another major linear multisector model is a social accounting matrix (SAM), which 
was developed as an integration of the national income and product accounts into 
the input-output model (Robinson 1989). The SAM is an extension of the 
input-output model in which all transactions among institutions such as households 
and firms are described. 7 The SAM provides not only an analytical framework 
particularly suitable to deal with distributional issues but also an input database for 
computable general equilibrium models. 
Keuning (1994) proposes an integrated data framework of economic, 
environmental and social statistics by combining a SAM and the environmentally 
For the detail of social accounting matrix, see the revised 1993 System of National Accounts 
(United Nations 1993). 
Chapter 2 Basic Framework 42 
extended national accounts so called NAMEA (Keuning 1993), as a useful data 
framework for sustainable development studies. 
Xie (2000) proposes an environmentally extended SAM (ESAM) and illustrates 
how to construct ESAM as well as how to use ESAM for structural path analysis 
(Defourny and Thorbecke 1984) with an ESAM compiled for the Chinese economy. 
The SAM has recently attracted significant attention in sustainable consumption 
literature as well. 
These linear multisector models provide a suitable analytical framework to capture 
economic structures and direct and indirect linkages among activities of each 
constituent institute. On the other hand, their inherent linearity severely limits their 
applicability as an analytical framework to price-incentive type policy analysis 
where price adjustment mechanisms through substitution are important (Robinson 
1989). For this kind of analysis computable general equilibrium models are 
regarded as a standard tool. 
2.2.4 Computable general equilibrium models 
Along with the rapid expansion of computational capacities as well as development 
of handy modelling packages over the last few decades, computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models have become the most popular tool for applied work on 
a wide range of issues, such as tax/subsidy policies, public investment policies, 
changes in economic and social structures, terms of trade and exchange policies, etc. 
In particular, when the economic policies subject to analysis involve inter-sectoral 
or macroeconomic effects and income redistribution, CGE models are often 
regarded as the most powerful analytical framework. 
CGE models require specifications of (i) behavioural rules of all the relevant 
economic agents such as households' utility maximisation, (ii) institutional 
structures of economy such as a perfect capital market, and (iii) equilibrium 
conditions (Robinson 1989). 
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The simplest CGE models are static neoclassical CGE models representing 
numerical solution of Walrasian general equilibrium. Static neoclassical CGE 
models are rarely applicable to developing economies because of their inability to 
incorporate reality of developing economies. Most of the applied CGE models for 
developing countries, in which `applied' means that they are designed for policy 
analysis in practice, incorporate both microeconomic constraints such as imperfect 
markets and macroeconomic constraints such as balance of payments in a rather ad 
hoc manner. 8 
Treatment of dynamics in applied CGE models is far more problematic than that in 
theoretical works. Recall that most RCK growth models employ a strong 
assumption of households' perfect foresight. Although this assumption seems 
justifiable in the first-best optimal policy analysis, it seems too unrealistic for 
applied purposes (Robinson 1989). It is thus much common for applied CGE 
models to accommodate economic dynamics as a succession of temporary 
equilibria, which are solutions of static optimisation, linked by dynamic adjustment 
mechanisms such as exogenous growth of capital and labour supply, etc. These 
types of CGE models are called recursive dynamic models, or sometimes called 
quasi-dynamic models because of their lack of dynamic optimisation. 
For analysing policies in which intertemporal aspects are essential, we may need 
dynamic optimisation CGE models rather than recursive dynamic CGE models. 9 
Sustainable development policy is certainly in this category. 
(1) The first generation water policy CGE models 
Despite the rapidly growing number of CGE studies, there are not many works in 
this literature dealing with either water policy or sustainable development. 
$ Dervis et al. (1982) and Robinson (1989) provide a detailed account of this topic. 
The model of Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) exemplifies this line of works. Devarajan and Go 
(1998) provide a simplified version of dynamic optimisation CGE model. 
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A pioneering work in this regard is that of Berck et al. (1991). They construct a 
static regional CGE model for the purpose of demonstrating applicability of CGE 
models for regional water policy evaluation. With this model they simulate the 
hypothetical reduction of available water quantity for agriculture in the San Joaquin 
Valley, California. An important drawback of their model is lack of substitutability 
between water and other factors such as fertilisers and pesticides. Further, it is 
assumed that only the agricultural sector uses water. 
Goldin and Roland-Holst (1995) investigate the effects of irrigation water pricing 
and trade liberalisation on sustainable water use and macro indicators such as GDP, 
government budget balance, etc. based on a static nationwide CGE model of 
Morocco. Their model consists of four production sectors (rainfed agriculture, 
irrigated agriculture, manufactures, and services), two types of households (urban 
and rural) and the government. Publicly supplied water is a factor input for all the 
production sectors other than rainfed agriculture but is not consumed by households. 
It is assumed that water demands at any given water price are met by public water 
supply with fixed unit supply costs and that water transfer between rural and urban 
areas as well as between rainfed and irrigated agriculture is determined by relative 
water prices fixed by the government. Based on this model Goldin and 
Roland-Holst conducted policy experiments with three policy scenarios, i. e. 
doubling irrigation water price, complete removal of nominal tariffs, and a 
combination of both, and showed that the last scenario results in higher GDP with 
less water use than the base run. In `Discussion' as a part of this work, Jaime de 
Melo argues that the assumption of infinitely elastic water supply at a fixed price 
cannot capture implications of water shortage, which is one of their research 
motivations. De Melo also suggests inclusion of water in the utility function with 
further disaggregation of households to capture effects of water pricing policies on 
economy wide income distribution. 
(2) More sophisticated water policy CGE models 
Löfgren et al. (1997) construct a recursive dynamic CGE model to analyse rural 
development of Morocco. This model is characterised by highly disaggregate 
agricultural sector with 33 activities, Harris-Todaro type rural-urban migration 
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mechanism (Harris and Todaro 1970) which allows urban unemployment to persist, 
potential excess supply of water with zero rent, quality differences between exports, 
imports and domestic commercial outputs as well as between the outputs of 
different domestic activities such as irrigated or rainfed agriculture, and various 
policy targets with corresponding policy instruments, all of which contribute to 
capture stylised facts of the Moroccan economy. Most of parameter values are 
derived from either a disaggregated SAM for the year 1994 or data available from 
the other existing studies on Morocco, and only the total factor productivity is 
calibrated to generate the target level of real GDP. The policy scenarios cover 
major water policies such as irrigation water pricing, tradable water rights, and 
irrigation expansion by the government investment. Based on the simulation 
results several candidate win-win scenarios for rural development are proposed. 
This work exemplifies capabilities of applied CGE models for quantitative policy 
analysis. 
Decaluwe et al. (1999) demonstrate another usage of CGE models. They use a 
static CGE model to study irrigation water tariff reforms of Morocco, incorporating 
inter-sectoral impacts of such reforms on resource allocation and social welfare. 
The most interesting feature of their model is its elaborate treatment of water 
production that explicitly reflects the water scarce situation of Morocco. They 
distinguish two types of water production technologies; one is water production 
using the existing reservoirs which is characterised by decreasing marginal costs, 
and the other is that by pumping groundwater or by retrieving surface water with 
more sophisticated technology which is characterised by increasing marginal costs. 
The whole country is divided into two regions, i. e. the relatively water rich northern 
region and the and southern region. The model is calibrated based on a SAM for 
the year 1985. Water pricing scenarios are a combination of alternative water 
pricing, i. e. Boiteux-Ramsey pricing, marginal cost pricing and an arbitrary 10% 
increase in irrigation water price, with several tax policies. Their simulation results 
show that a combination of Boiteux- Ramsey pricing with a reduction in production 
taxes generates the most desirable outcome associated with less water consumption 
and higher social welfare measured by equivalent variation without subsidising the 
water producer. 
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(3) Towards sustainable development CGE models 
CGE models have an immense ability to investigate a wide range of issues across 
not only economic but also social and environmental problems in a coherent way. 
On the other hand, incorporating various problems in a model makes interpretation 
of output intractable (Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). The following conventional 
wisdom holds for CGE models as well; the success of the model depends upon a 
balance between realism and analytical tractability. 
Successful application of CGE models to sustainable development issues requires 
adequate treatment of dynamic elements. Recall that the currently available options 
are either recursive dynamic models that are criticised for lack of dynamic 
optimisation or forward looking dynamic optimisation models that are criticised for 
the unrealistic perfect foresight assumption. I wonder why there is no forward 
looking dynamic optimisation CGE model without the perfect foresight assumption. 
If we could liberate RCK growth models from the perfect foresight assumption, 
constructing such a CGE model as a generalised version of the RCK growth model 
would be rather straightforward. This modelling strategy seems worth pursuing in 
this thesis. 
2.3 Development of analytical framework 
2.3.1 Necessity of dynamic models 
The choice between the static and the dynamic models seems a useful first step 
towards selecting the analytical framework. Mäler (1974) illustrates their 
comparative advantages by locating each model in a general analytical framework 
for investigating interactions between the economic system and its environment. 
First he sketches a general equilibrium model incorporating both the flows of 
materials and energy, which play a central role in the material balance approach 
(Ayres and Kneese 1969, Kneese et al. 1972), and the intertemporal aspects such as 
capital and waste accumulation, population growth, exhaustion of non-renewable 
resources, and so on. Because such a model is too complex to obtain useful 
Chapter 2 Basic Framework 47 
implications, Mäler constructs two models, i. e. a static general equilibrium model 
with materials balances approach and environmental effects of waste discharges, 
and a highly aggregate RCK growth model for a finite time horizon. 
In the former static model he introduces several assumptions, e. g. convexity of the 
production possibility set and consumer preferences, such that the model becomes a 
special case of Arrow-Debreu type general equilibrium models, and the existence 
of a unique equilibrium that is at the same time Pareto optimal is proved by 
appealing to the proof of Debreu (Debreu 1959; p. 19). For the latter dynamic 
model he studies four variations of an aggregate RCK growth model that 
incorporates environmental quality as an argument of instantaneous utility function 
and exhaustible natural resources as a material balance constraint. Four variations 
differ each other in controllability of population, number of environmental qualities 
(single or multiple), and possibility of recycling. He proves that all of four variant 
models are associated with the turnpike property, with which the optimal 
trajectories tend to approach the optimal steady-state and stay most of planning 
period at the optimal steady state if the time horizon is enough long (Samuelson 
1965). This turnpike property enables the optimal trajectories to be approximated 
by the optimal steady state. Hence, Mäler claims that the former static general 
equilibrium model could be regarded as a good approximation of the dynamic 
general equilibrium model along the optimal growth path. 
This might not be the case, however, for economies away from the optimal growth 
path, which many developing countries are often assumed to have. In addition, an 
absolute speed of convergence towards the optimal steady state matters from the 
practical viewpoint. If it takes, say, decades for an economy to realise the optimal 
steady state, such an approximation would provide misleading information. 
Because my main concern is sustainable development of water-stressed developing 
countries where optimality can hardly be assumed, I choose the dynamic 
optimisation models in this thesis. 
2.3.2 Necessity of decentralised setting 
One very important aspect of Maler's dynamic optimisation models, which 
differentiates his models from other neoclassical sustainable growth models of 
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Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow (1974) and Stiglitz (1974a, 1974b), is the explicit 
role assigned to the government. In his models aggregate social preferences are 
"represented by the government" (Mäler 1974; p. 60). Introduction of the 
government as a decision maker makes it more plausible that the decision maker 
controls aggregate pollution discharge. On the other hand, it is less convincing that 
the decision maker can control individual consumption levels. It is impossible for 
the government to freely control individual consumption levels, except for the case 
of totally centralised economy where a central planner can dictate everything. 
It must be emphasised here that an unrealistic hypothetical setting itself is not 
necessarily a weakness of models. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) succinctly state 
that this setting, they call "a benevolent social planner" setting, is "useful in many 
circumstances for finding the economy's first-best outcomes" (p. 71). Nevertheless, 
when we go further to seek optimal policy that is effective and feasible in the real 
world, as this thesis attempts, this setting is of little relevance. 
The importance of decentralised setting in seeking public policy is clearly 
recognised by Arrow and Kurz (1970). They argue that the government in a 
decentralised society does not have discretion to make all allocative decisions but 
"has the choice of values of a limited range of instruments" (p. 115). This 
understanding, which they regard as the dynamic version of the theory of economic 
policy proposed by Tinbergen (1952), leads them to set out a theory of 
controllability of public policy of which a central issue is the necessary conditions 
for the government to achieve the publicly optimal path, and a dynamic theory of 
the second-best policy which is defined as the best policy in noncontrollable 
situations with the given set of instruments. 
In order to study these issues, Arrow and Kurz (1970) formulate dynamic 
optimisation models in which private sector optimisation and that of public sector 
are separately dealt with. In the private sector optimisation, the representative 
individual maximises the total net present value of all individuals' welfare in an 
economy, taking the government policy such as tax rate and stock of public capital 
as exogenously given. In the public sector optimisation, the government selects 
only the rates of public investment, taxes and government borrowing subject to a 
budget limitation. It is assumed that the representative individual who lives forever 
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and "looks ahead infinitely far with perfect foresight" and that the `felicity function' 
and the rate of time preference of the government are different from those of the 
representative individuals (Arrow and Kurz 1970; p. 153). '° 
Because their main interest is to investigate general properties of controllability and 
stability of the public fiscal policy, they do not explicitly solve the public 
optimisation problem. Instead, they introduce several boundedness assumptions on 
convergence of variables and show the implications of controllability and stability 
with different combinations of policy instruments of the government. The 
decentralised setting investigated by Arrow and Kurz, in more general form, can be 
formalised as follows. 
Let VP and VGdenote the objective functions and fp and f° denote the constraint 
sets of the private and the public sectors, respectively. Each sector maximises (or 
minimises, depending on model specification) its objective function by choosing 
the values of its instruments (control variables) subject to the given constraint sets. 
Let vectors x, xG, / and yG denote the control variables and the state variables of 
the private and the public sectors, respectively. 
The private sector problem is 
MaxVP(x', y"; x°, y°) subject to fý(x', /; xG, yG)=0. " (21) 
X 
The private optimal solution can be described as functions of exogenous variables, 
which are denoted as xP 
(xa, 
ya) and yP 
(xa, 
ya). 
Now the public sector problem can be expressed as 
Max V°((P(xG, ya), Y(xa, ya), xß, yG) subject to 
x 
G(xP(XG, yG), 3'p(xG,. Yo), xG, yG) = 0. (2.2) 
10 Arrow and Kurz (1970) attribute the terminology `felicity function' to Gonnan (1957). I 
deliberately adopt this terminology instead of more common term `instantaneous utility function'. 
See the next subsection for more discussion on this issue. 
The semicolon in the argument of functions separates the endogenous (left) and the exogenous 
variables (right). 
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Note that the optimal solution of this public sector problem is in general the second 
best policy, which is the optimal policy from practical viewpoint. If we insist on the 
first-best policy, first we need to set up the following benevolent social planner 
problem in order to find the first best outcome. 
Max Va (xP, yp, xa, ya) subject to z,. ß 
J (x , 
/' 
xG, yG) =0 and f G(X ,yp, xG, y) =0 (2.3) 
Then, we have to find the solution of Eq. (2.2) resulting in the first best outcome. 
Whether there exists such a solution or not depends on the controllability. 12 In any 
case we need to employ such a decentralised setting, if we want to find the feasible 
optimal policy. This thesis adopts the Arrow-Kurz type decentralised setting, 
which is referred to as `two-stage optimisation' setting. 
2.3.3 Objective function of the private sector 
Arrow and Kurz (1970) advocate that even if the decision-making unit is the single 
representative individual the objective function has to include population, i. e. 
VP _ (o c-PtL(t)u(c(t))dt, (2.4) 
where p: rate of pure time preference, L(t) : population at time 1, c(t) : per capita 
consumption at time t, and n() : the felicity function. " 
They show that if population is not included in Eq. (2.4) the optimal solution 
requires allocating less per capita consumption to the more populous generations. 
It is, however, not clear why the representative (average) individual, who is 
assumed to be `selfish', has to care such social equity issue. In this respect their 
treatment of private setting is not fully convincing. 
12 More precisely, t is is the definition of controllability (see Arrow and Kurz 1970; xv). 
13 Distinction between felicity and utility in this thesis is analogous to that between ophelimity and 
utility in the works of Pareto. The assumption that u() solely depends on consumption is nothing 
controversial but the very definition if it is corresponding to `ophelimity' a la Pareto of which 
meaning is satisfaction derived from current activities. For further discussion of ophelimity/ 
utility distinction in Pareto, see Tamscio (1969). 
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The specification (2.4) is widely adopted in the recent growth literature, but from 
different perspective. In this regard Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) provide the 
following lucid explanation. It is assumed that the decision-making unit is not the 
representative individual but the representative household, and that the population 
growth takes the form of increase of the household size. Then the household 
felicity is assumed to be the sum of each household member's felicity. 
This reasoning is simple and intuitive if we accept the underlying assumptions that 
a household is the basic decision unit and that the number of households in the 
economy is constant during the whole time horizon. Though it is a standard 
approach in microeconomics literature to regard the household as a single decision 
making unit, it has been pointed out that this approach violates the basic rule 
underpinning neoclassical microeconomic theory. Bourguignon and Chiappori 
(1992) argue that aggregating individual preference "within the ad-hoc fiction of a 
collective decision unit" cannot meet the principle of individualism (p. 356). 
Moreover, it is claimed that incorporating intra-household decision-making process 
in policy analysis gives us significantly different implications concerning 
individual's welfare from those provided by the standard approach. 14 
Nevertheless, I follow the standard approach in this thesis, mainly because it 
provides suitable framework to address chronic high urban unemployment rate 
induced by rural-urban migration, which is explained in Chapter 4. The latter 
assumption of constant household number is clearly a fiction for the analytical 
purpose but it seems quite harmless and useful to clarify the main issue. This thesis 
employs the specification (2.4) for the private sector objective function in line with 
reasoning provided by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
Now let us investigate the meaning of the specification (2.4) in more depth. First 
question is what VP means for the representative household. It is common practice 
to call V" as utility function, which is defined as a measure of personal `happiness'. 
The question is whether this utility function represents lifetime utility or utility at 
14 Haddad and Kanbur (1992) list up the empirical evidence of this claim. 
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the particular moment of planning. 15 My interpretation is the latter. Notice that we 
are not talking about social welfare but about utility of a private agent. It is highly 
likely that our current happiness is affected not only by the current felicity that is 
solely determined by the actions or situations at this particular moment but also by 
the expected felicities in future or even by the expected felicities of our 
descendents. 
Based on my interpretation, VP is utility function of the present generation at the 
present moment, which is in a sense `instantaneous' despite its involvement of 
intertemporal components. This is why I prefer the terminology `felicity function' 
to more common `instantaneous utility function' as the notation of the integrand no 
in Eq. (2.4). In this thesis V' represents the household's utility of the present 
generation, which is denoted by U(0). 
In light of the above interpretation of VP, the choice of the rate of time preference 
for researchers is far less controversial and basically a matter of observation. The 
rate of time preference is nothing more than a psychological parameter (or a 
personal taste) in transforming the expected flow of future felicities into the utility 
at the present time, which is not necessarily purely inherent but could be formulated 
by economic and social contexts as well as by education to a certain degree. 16 
2.3.4 Objective function of the public sector 
One of the advantages of two-stage optimisation setting would be its capacity to 
accommodate both the positive and the normative approaches in harmonised way. 
In this setting the modelling of the private optimisation is positive task in the sense 
that its success depends on how well the private sector's response to the 
government policy can be predicted, while modelling of the public optimisation is 
essentially normative task in the sense that its success depends on how well 
15 A celebrated book by Aghion and Howitt (1998) explicitly define I? as "lifetime utility function" 
(p. 18). Arrow and Kurz (1970) also interpret in this way. Majority of the literature does not 
seem to have considered this issue carefully. 
16 For the roles of economic/social contexts and education on time preference formation, see Becker 
and Mulligan (1997). For general debates on time preference issues, see Arrow et al. (1996). 
Chapter 2 Basic Framework 53 
collective general interests can be represented in the objective function VG as well 
as the constraint sets. 
This normative aspect means on the one hand some freedom from representing 
`reality' but on the other hand the lack of operational principles in order to have 
convincing model of the public sector's problem. 
In his famous paper on the social welfare function, Bergson states that 
"The number of sets [of value propositions which is sufficient for the 
evaluation of all alternatives] is infinite, and in any particular case the 
selection of one of them must be determined by its compatibility with the 
values prevailing in the community the welfare of which is being studied. For 
only if the welfare principles are based upon prevailing values, can they be 
relevant to the activity of the community in question" (Bergson 1938; p. 323). 
To capture "the values prevailing in the community" in economic models is 
obviously far from easy. Nevertheless, there seems to be an agreement, at least in 
the growth literature, to adopt utilitarian social welfare functions for this purpose, in 
which social welfare is defined as an aggregate of individual utilities. 
It seems highly interesting that it has been proved that Bergson-Samuelson social 
welfare function must have, with some additional, assumptions, the form of 
weighted mean of all members' individual utilities (Harsanyi 1955) or of 
unweighted sum of them (Ng 1975), though Bergson explicitly disfavours 
unweighted sum of individual utilities as the social welfare function with claiming 
that it "is not a useful tool for welfare economics" (Bergson 1938; p. 327). 17 As 
there is no a priori reason to deny the claims of Harsanyi and Ng, I follow the 
tradition of the literature to adopt the social welfare function defined as arithmetic 
mean (or unweighted sum) of all members' individual utilities as the maximand of 
the public sector. 
" In Harsanyi (1955) the expected utility property is the key assumption, while finite sensibility of 
individual and the Weak Majority Preference Criterion are the key assumptions in Ng (1975). 
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Now let's consider the following social welfare function. 
00 VG = -ýru'(0)=ýrfo e-pt L1(t)u`er(t))t, (2.5) 
in which the same notation as in Eq. (2.4) holds with the superscript i denoting 
the i`h household. 
It represents the social welfare of the present generation at the present moment, 
which can be referred to as `intra-generational' social welfare function of the 
present generation. Mäler (1974) has correctly pointed out that this social welfare 
specification "reflects the choices of the present government and does not involve 
those of future generations (whose preferences we obviously do not know)" (p. 61). 
This is strength, not weakness, as a social welfare function, because it avoids 
unsolvable problem of representing welfare of the unborn future generations. I 
adopt this intra-generational social welfare function as the public sector objective 
function since it is perfectly consistent with my definition of sustainable 
development of which main goal is improving intra-generational social welfare in 
terms of poverty alleviation without violating the given sustainability constraints. 
Inter-generational aspects of sustainable development are represented by the 
sustainability constraints in my framework, not by the social welfare function. '8 
It does not seem worth trying to incorporate intergenerational aspect into the social 
welfare function itself in a way logically consistent with my approach, which would 
take the following form. 
VG -fT e-T' 
O'(s)}ds 
=fT e"Tst 
[0e-l"L'(t)u(cr(t))dtIds, (2.6) 
oo+: 
in which T. the time horizon of the public sector, s: generations, and y: the 
discount rate of future social welfare. '9 
1$ Toman et al. (1995) argue that it would be desirable to incorporate "sustainability function" into 
the social welfare function on the ground that sustainability constraint approach does not allow 
"tradeoffs between intergenerational concern and other social goods" (Toman et al. 1995; p. 142). 
In my opinion, the benefit from allowing such `substitutability' is not enough to compensate the 
difficulty in representing social welfare of unborn future generation. 
19 Note that both the `normative' and the `positive' discount rates of Arrow et al. (1996) coexist as y 
and p, respectively, in Eq. (2.6). Ramsey's famous aphorism that any nonzero discount rate is 
"ethically indefensible" sounds persuasive in case of y (Ramsey 1928; p. 543). 
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This specification might be helpful to sort out the controversy over choice of 
discount rates in the social objective function, but might not be applicable to 
practical policy analysis due to the real difficulty in representing social welfare of 
the unborn future generation. 
2.3.5 Expectation formation 
One of the strong assumptions widely employed in dynamic optimisation models is 
perfect foresight of the households (or the individuals) in forming their 
expectations of time paths of price variables such as rental rates of capital, wage 
rates and exogenous prices. 
Analogous to the benevolent social planner setting, this apparently unrealistic 
assumption is helpful and justifiable to seek the first best outcomes. It is, hence, not 
very surprising that the existing RCK growth model literature, which seems to 
focus exclusively on the first best world, tends to take this assumption as granted. 
When one goes further and seeks the optimal policy feasible with the given sets of 
instrument, however, a careful reconsideration of the expectation formation process 
becomes necessary. 
A systematic investigation of alternative rationality concepts in economic theory 
was started by Simon (1955). He defines his task as replacing omniscient 
rationality, as often assumed in economics, with "a kind of rational behavior that is 
consistent with the access to information and the computational capacities that are 
actually possessed by organisms, including man" (Simon 1955; p. 99). He suggests 
the concept of `bounded rationality', a kind of conditional rationality given the 
limited ability of decision makers to gather and process information. It seems an 
adequate concept consistent with my modelling approach taking into account the 
fact that any information is not enough for the households to perfectly predict entire 
time paths of exogenous prices unless the households themselves make public 
decisions as in the benevolent social planner setting. 
It is important to notice that the implication of bounded rationality is not confined 
in the way of information processing, such as selection of input information. 
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Rather, awareness of bounded rationality would urge decision makers to tailor 
decision-making procedure itself to fit their cognitive ability. 20 For instance, recall 
that the existing RCK growth model literature assumes that households make a 
decision only once, since unbounded (omniscient) rationality enable them to find, 
with full of confidence, the first best optimal consumption path for entire period at 
the beginning of the planning period. Intuitively, replacing unbounded rationality 
with bounded rationality in this framework would likely introduce frequent 
monitoring-feedback process in the decision procedure. In fact, if we assume that 
monitoring-feedback process is costless, as assumed in this thesis, logical 
consequence of bounded rationality will be continuous monitoring-feedback for 
entire planning period. 
Now let's turn to investigate decision input with bounded rationality. In the 
two-stage optimisation setting the central issue is how well the government can 
approximate the households' expectation in a way that the government can predict 
the response of the households to policies with adequate accuracy. The task is not 
to model the actual expectation formation mechanisms of the households in detail 
but to assume some simple but `reasonable' approximation of the households' 
expectation based on which the government can predict the household response to 
the policy reasonably accurate within its cognitive limitation. 
Stiglitz (1974b) identifies basic properties necessary for expectation formation 
models to be `reasonable'. He expresses, in discrete time, the expectation 
formation as 
Pt+t =4t, Pt-1, """, Pr-n, """; 1 l (2.7) 
where p, +1 
is expected price at period t+1. 
Stiglitz claims that this function must satisfy (i) linear homogeneity with respect to 
all arguments, (ii) stationarity (or time independency), and (iii) convergence of the 
expectation into the real price at the steady-state. Even after screening candidates 
20 The tailored decision procedure is not necessarily `optimal'. Lipman (1991) points out logical 
inconsistency to assume optimal decision procedure in modelling bounded rationality. 
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based on these three conditions, there still exist numerous valid alternatives of 
expectation formation process. 
The final selection of decision input from these alternatives has to rely on one's 
intuition of which correctness can be judged only by empirical tests. In his 
pioneering work of rational expectation hypothesis, Muth (1961) compares his 
rational expectation model with other alternatives such as cobweb type models 
(Pii = Pr) and adaptive expectation models by testing proximities of model 
prediction to the observation of pig price cycle between 1911 and 1931. His 
conclusion is, with a caveat of potential bias due to serial correlation, that the 
rational expectation model, which is equivalent to perfect foresight in the 
deterministic world, would have relative advantages over its rivals. Although his 
empirical test is too sketchy to guide the choice of expectation formation process in 
this thesis, its implication that highly unrealistic hypothesis could generate better 
proxies of real phenomena is important. 
The expectation formation process assumed in this thesis is a combination of 
continuous monitoring-feedback embedded decision procedure and the simplest 
decision input that requires the current values only, which means that the 
households expect that the future trajectories of exogenous variables are constant at 
the current values but next moment they update this expectation based on realised 
values of exogenous variables. It can be easily seen that this expectation process 
satisfies three necessary conditions of Stiglitz (1974b). Furthermore, this 
specification can be regarded as an example of "consistent planning" strategy of 
Strotz (1956) which he defines as the strategy "to find the best plan among those 
that he will actually follow" (p. 173). Note that the estimated optimal consumption 
path at each moment in my specification is not a plan but mere decision input for 
households to find the best plan of instantaneous consumption at that moment 
which households actually follow. 
Chapter 2 Basic Framework 58 
2.4 Established analytical framework 
This thesis adopts quantitative policy analysis based on policy simulations because 
of its capability to reveal overall consequences of complex and often inter- 
dependent effects of sustainable development policy. Due to the significance of 
dynamic aspects in sustainable development, the RCK growth model is chosen. 
The existing economic growth literature tends to focus on the first-best optimal 
outcomes without considering their controllability or achievability in the 
second-best world. Although the first-best optimal studies have contributed not 
only in establishing theoretical framework but also in providing useful benchmark, 
it might be misleading to apply these outcomes directly to policy analysis. Their 
usefulness is maximised when they are utilised as intermediate knowledge inputs to 
establish proper analytical framework for studying the second-best optimal world. 
I tailor the RCK growth model to analyse the second-best policy by introducing two 
novel features. Firstly it employs two-stage optimisation consisting of the private 
and the public optimisation processes. Secondly, it employs continuous 
monitoring-feedback in the household expectation formation process instead of the 
perfect foresight assumption. Liberating the RCK models from the perfect 
foresight assumption, which is criticised by proponent of static or recursive 
dynamic CGE models as unacceptably unrealistic, facilitates development of 
dynamic CGE models based on the RCK growth model. 
In sum, the established analytical framework consists of an analytic model and an 
applied model. Note that this thesis aims at providing not a fully applied model 
ready to conduct policy analysis in practice but a prototype based on which such a 
fully applied model can be developed. The analytic model is a stylised RCK 
growth model with two-stage optimisation and continuous monitoring-feedback in 
households' expectation formation. Based on the analytic model, the applied model, 
a highly aggregate dynamic CGE model, is developed by incorporating key stylised 
facts of water-scarce developing countries. 
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Chapter 3 
Analytic Model of Water-Economy Interaction 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter a stylised Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK) growth model is 
developed as an analytic model. The analytic model provides a model platform 
based on which an applied model for policy simulations is constructed. 
Furthermore, it helps to clarify impacts of supply constraints of water on 
sustainable development by abstracting from other stylised facts commonly 
observed in water-stressed developing countries, such as vulnerability of rainfed 
agriculture and high incidence of lack of safe water access, particularly in the rural 
areas. These stylised facts will be incorporated into the applied model as explained 
in Chapter 4. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 explains general features of 
the analytic model, in particular the specification of two-stage dynamic 
optimisation without perfect foresight assumption. Section 3.3 shows the results of 
the first-stage optimisation in which households and private firms optimise their 
objective functions. Section 3.4 shows the results of the second-stage optimisation 
by the government. Section 3.5 presents the qualitative analysis of the predicted 
optimal time paths. Section 3.6 shows the numerical simulation of the analytic 
model, which not only provides further insights regarding to the results of 
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qualitative analysis but . also clarifies the properties of the optimal trajectories. 
Section 3.7 provides conclusions of this chapter. 
3.2 Outline of the analytic model 
The analytic RCK growth model is designed so as to be compatible with the applied 
model described in Chapter 4. Like the applied model, the analytic model solves 
for the optimal consumption levels of the market good and domestic water for the 
household, factor inputs including water for the private firms, public investment 
and the water price for the public water producer. 
The analytic model assumes a closed economy consisting of numerous identical 
households and identical competitive firms of which output is the numeraire of the 
economy. The population grows at a constant rate v and capital depreciates at a 
constant rate S Further, it is assumed that a budget neutral government provides 
water to households and private producers and collects a volumetric water charge. 
The social optimisation process consists of two stages. At the first stage, 
households maximise utility by choosing consumption levels and private firms 
maximise profits by choosing the amounts of factor inputs taking the rate of water 
charge as given. At the second stage, the government maximises social welfare by 
choosing the rate of water charge and by investing the collected water charge in 
public capital that is the sole factor input of water supply service. In addition to the 
rationales mentioned in the previous chapter, this specification allows government 
intervention to be dynamically efficient. 
Households form expectations without perfect foresight. The conventional RCK 
growth models assume that households determine the optimal consumption 
trajectory by deriving optimal conditions of instantaneous rates of change of 
consumption, with determining the optimal initial consumption. The latter is 
determined based on the consumption function derived from the intertemporal 
budget constraint, with an assumption that households can precisely predict the 
trajectories of the wage rate, the water price, and the interest rate. In this model 
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households make their decision of consumption level based on their expectation of 
the future trajectories of those exogenous variables, but they continuously modify 
their expectation based on the realised levels of the exogenous variables. The 
realised consumption trajectory satisfies the second-best optimality discussed in 
Chapter 2. At the optimal steady state the second-best outcomes coincide the 
first-best outcomes derived from the perfect foresight assumption. 
3.3 First-stage optimisation 
The first-stage optimisation consists of households' utility maximisation and firms' 
profit maximisation taking government policy in terms of water price as 
exogenously given. 
3.3.1 The household's problem 
(1) Problem formulation 
It is assumed that households hold assets as equity shares of the private capital 
stock. Population is defined as the labour force population and each person 
supplies one unit of labour services per unit of time. l Households earn wage and 
capital income, purchase publicly supplied water and manufactured goods for 
consumption, and invest in private capital stock. As a result the per capita budget 
constraint of the representative household is w+ rm = cm + pqH + I, where w is the 
wage rate, r is the real rate of return to equity shares, m is the household assets, cm is 
per capita consumption of the manufactured good, qHis per capita domestic water 
consumption, p is the rate of water charge (water price), and Iis the household 
investment in equity shares. 2 
1 It means that we assume the same proportion between consumption of labour force age person 
and that of his/her dependents such as young children and elderly people throughout time horizon. 
In other words, a person in our model consists of one labour force age person and his/her 
dependents. In empirical analysis this assumption is important. 
2 All variables are time variant, i. e. w(t), r(t), etc., but time is omitted for notational simplicity. 
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The equation of motion of per capita equity shares owned by a household is 
m =I-m. 3 The latter term corresponds to "dilution" due to growth of household 
size (Aghion and Howitt 1998; p. 14). 
These two equations merge into 
m=w+(r-v)m-cM-pqH. (3.1) 
It is assumed that households' utility at time t is determined by the discounted sum 
of felicities for certain length of period T. 4 The felicity function is assumed to be 
CIES (constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution) type. 5 
U(t) =f 
t+Te (P-V)su(c(s))ds+V(t+T), u(c(t))= 
{ 
lt)l 
where c(l): the consumption of flow of satisfaction produced by the household 
itself at time t, T. the length of planning period, p: the rate of pure time preference, 
or: the elasticity of marginal felicity with respect to consumption, and V(t + 7): 
the value of the household assets at the terminal time. 6 
The underlying assumption is that an immortal household consists of continuously 
distributed age groups and that the terminal time of planning horizon continuously 
shifts forward. This is a straightforward extension of the utility maximisation 
problem of an individual. We have little idea about the length T that might be 
formed by economic and social circumstances as well as education in the real 
world. When we employ a finite T, say 20 years, we have to specify the value ? 
function V as well. Both the choice of T and that of the value function are of quite 
arbitrary nature. As Aronsson et at. (2004) have done, we specify V(I + 7) as the 
3 Superimposed dot means time derivatives. Note that the equity shares do not depreciate though 
the corresponding private capital does. 
4 The common notion of `instantaneous utility' is avoided. See Footnote 13 in Chapter 2. 
$ CIES functions are functionally identical with CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) functions. 
This specification is advantageous since later risks will be introduced in the applied model. 
6 In this thesis p- v> 0 and o-> 1 are assumed. Arrow et al. (1996) report that majority of studies 
use values in the range of 1 to 2 for a. 
Perrings (1989) argues that poverty may drive up poor farmers extremely myopic such that "all 
that matters is consumption today" (p. 20). 
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discounted utility that the household can derive from those assets. This 
specification makes the utility function take the form 
U(t) =f 
re-(P-V)Su 
(c(s))ds 
. 1 
It is assumed that households produce a flow of satisfaction by consuming the 
manufacturing good and water. 
c(cm, qx 
)- cM9'gHI_9', 0< (0< 1, (3.2) 
where cp is a weight of manufacturing good in this household production process. 
Each household maximises its utility subject to budget constraint taking the water 
price as given. The representative household's optimisation problem at time t is 
Max U(t)=- f me_( _')s e(cM(s 
), q (s))(1-a) ds, subjectto 
CM, qH t 
m =w+(r-v>n-cM - pqH, and 
the initial assets m(t) is historically determined at time t. 
(2) Optimal growth rate of consumption 
The current value Hamiltonian of this problem is 
c(cM, 9H)(1 a) 
+2{w+(r-V>f-CM - PqH}, 1-v 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with household assets m, i. e. the 
marginal utility of those assets. 
Assuming an interior solution, the necessary and sufficient conditions are as 
follows. 8 
ax c'-a 
M CM 
(3.3a) 
$ Since each of the objective function and the constraint is a concave function associated with a 
negative semidefinite Hessian matrix, the Mangasarian Sufficiency Theorem (Mangasarian 
1966) holds for this problem. 
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äH =o = PA=(1-P) 
-Q -' 
am 
In addition, the transversality condition is um [e-(P-V)(s-`). gi(s)" m(s)J= 0.9 
From (3.2), (3.3a) and (3.3b) we derive 
9x =I1°J p-Pc, and cM = 
(1 p) 
p1-Pc 
64 
(3.3b) 
(3.3 c) 
(3.4) 
By putting (3.4) into (3.3b) we have A_ rP (1- ßp)1-" p-11-Plc-°. By taking time 
derivatives of both sides with logarithmic transformation, we obtain 
4_ -(1- rp) p From this equation and Eq. (3.3c) we derive the optimal 
growth rate of consumption as 
p} 
(3.5) 
The difference between this result and that of the standard RCK model lies in the far 
right term. There exists some negative effect of the water price rise on the 
consumption growth. The larger the weight of water consumption in household 
production (1-rp) is, the larger this effect is. It might be plausible that developing 
economies would be more sensitive to this negative impact of water price rise on 
consumption growth, due to higher share of water expenditure among the total 
household expenditure. 
(3) Optimal consumption level 
In order to determine the optimal consumption level, we need to construct the 
consumption function based on the intertemporal budget constraint. With the 
9`A9 denotes the first stage solution. 
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optimality conditions (3.4), the equation of motion of the household's assets 
becomes m= iv + (r - v)m - bl p l-ý'c , where bl = p-9(1 - rp)-ýI-ýý >0 
10 
The solution of this differential equation for the period between t and t+T is 
m(t+Tý -f1+T{r(r -v)ck =m(t)+ 
It+T [w(s)-b1 {p(s))I-'c(s)]e-(i {r(r)-v)drds 
. 
When we take the limit as T approaches infinity, the left hand side becomes zero 
from the transversality condition. Thus, the intertemporal budget constraint 
becomes 
bi f `°{p(s)}I-pc s) e-f! {. (t)-v)drds _ m(t)+ f 00 w(s) e-nt 
{r(r)-, )aids 
. 
The left hand side is the present value of the household's total spending, while the 
right hand side is wealth defined as the sum of the disposable assets and the present 
value of wage income. The following expression of consumption is obtained by 
solving Eq. (3.5) for the period between t and s. 
c(s)=c(t J p(t) b2exp[- j" {r(T)- p)dzl where b2 = 1-P > 0. AS) LJ 
From these two equations we derive the following consumption function of the 
`clairvoyant' household who can predict the future trajectories of w, r, and p 
perfectly. 
c(t)=i7(t 
f 
m(t)+ { W(s)e-r1 {, (z)-P}atds], where 
17(r) - 
[b1 
{p(t)}b2 ft' 
U'(s))63 e 
(t (b4-bSr(r))drdsl -1' 
in which b3- 0- -1 
1-Tp 
>0 and b4-v-P and b5-cr-1>0. 6QQ 
The term ra(t) is the propensity to consume out of wealth at period t. It is noted that 
the clairvoyant households need to use the consumption function only once when 
10 These abridged constants (bi's) are listed in Appendix A0. 
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they choose the initial consumption at t=0, then they just need to change the level 
of consumption based on the optimal consumption growth rate expressed as Eq. 
(3.5) in order to achieve the first-best outcome. 
Now let's relax the perfect foresight assumption. Instead, it is assumed that the 
households' expectation about the trajectories of exogenous variables is that they 
are constant at their current values. 11 With this assumption the following 
proposition is derived. 
Proposition 3.1: Optimal consumption level 
If r(t) > vis satisfied, the optimal consumption is given as 
j 
1ý ýý {r(i)_v_ rýtý lfm(t)+ 
rt 
(t)v} 
. 
Otherwise, 3(t) diverges towards either negative or positive infinity. 
Proof : See Appendix Al. 
In the following analysis, the real rate of return is assumed to be strictly greater than 
the population growth rate (r > v). Now c(t) is determined solely by the 
contemporaneous values of exogenous variables. Note that this optimal 
consumption coincides with the first-best optimal consumption derived from the 
conventional RCK model with perfect foresight assumption, provided an economy 
is at the steady-state. Otherwise, c(t) is larger or smaller than the first-best optimal 
solution depending on the differences between the steady-state values and the 
realised values ofp, r, and w. For instance, if the actual wage rate is higher than the 
steady-state value and other prices take the steady-state values, c(t) is 
11 It is also possible to incorporate past information in the expectation formation process. For 
instance, the expected trajectory might grow at constant rate estimated based on the past growth 
rates. I feel, however, that this kind of sophistication is of ad-hoc nature anyway and its rewards 
might not be enough to compensate its costs. Also see Subsection 2.3.5 in Chapter 2. 
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unambiguously greater than the first-best solution. Nevertheless, it is the 
second-best optimal consumption given the expectation formation process. 
3.3.2 The firm's problem 
We assume that the representative firm's production technology may be described 
by the following Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale. 
Y=F(K, QAI, L)=K/PKQMPQLPL 
where Y. output, K. private capital stock, and QM: water input, L: labour input, 
and, QK, ßQ, and ßL: factor shares of private capital, water and labour with , 6K, , ßg, 
, 
8L E (0,1) and ßK+ßQ+ßL = 1. 
The constant return to scale assumption enables us to express the above production 
technology in the following intensive form. 
y=f(k, gM)=kPKgMPQ, 
where y: per worker output, k: per worker private capital stock, and qm: per 
worker water input. 
The firm's per worker profit is . ir =y- (r + (5)k - pq, - w, where ;r is per worker 
profit and p is the water price. '2 
The representative firm maximises per worker profit by setting the partial 
derivatives of r with respect to k and qm at zero, taking r and p as exogenously 
given. Thus the optimality conditions are 
O'T 
ök =0 = 
/3KY=(r+8)k, and ý°r =0 
ßQY=PR'M" 
AIM 
From the per worker production function and the above optimality conditions we 
can express y and qm as a function of k and p. 
12 See Footnote 3 of this chapter. To compensate the depreciation of capital the rental price of 
capital must be r+S (see, e. g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995: p. 69). 
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1 
y= (ßQ/p) 
bb kb' , and qM = 
(/3,2/p)1=PQ k"' 
, 
(3.6) 
where b6 = 
8c? 
>0 and b7 _ 
8K 
>0. 1-ßQ 1-ßQ 
By putting the optimality conditions into the per worker profit function with 
Eq. (3.6), we obtain the optimal per worker profit function as a function of wage rate 
w and capital stock k, i. e. ; r* = /3Ly` -w = ßLßQb6 p-bbkb' -w . Thus w determines 
the sign of per worker profit as 
g bb 
< if w> NL 
(, 
Q kb7 
P 
(3.7) 
The optimal capital input is also derived from the optimality conditions and 
Eq. (3.6) as 
_ 
ßx Pý Qg PL (3.8) k- 
(r+6) 
P 
3.3.3 Market equilibrium 
Equilibrium in the labour, capital and goods markets is achieved by a set of prices r* 
and w' such that these markets clear. 13 
The competitive firm assumption drives the optimal profit towards zero, which 
results in the equilibrium wage rate w* = ßL 
(ßQ 1 p)b6 kb' from Eq. (3.7). With this 
equilibrium wage rate the labour market clears such that total labour force 
population equals number of total workers, which means per capita values and per 
worker values coincide. Under this circumstance the capital market clearance 
condition is given as k* =m. From Eq. (3.8) this equality is realised only if the rate 
of return to private capital r takes the value 
b6 
-J, where b= 
fiýQ 
> 0. r# = ßK 
pQ I! 18 
m) 1- 
13 Since the market good is numeraire its equilibrium price is always unity. 
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With this equilibrium rate of return r* the equilibrium per worker stock of private 
capital is given ask = m, and we can finally express the equilibrium prices as 
w =fL Q 
b6 
kb7 and r`= ijx 
pQ bb 
lk) -8. 
3.3.4 First-stage solution 
By putting w` and r* into the optimal consumption level (Proposition 1) and by 
substituting m with k, the optimal consumption can be expressed as follows. 
k ýbio -b9Pbbk ' 
)(ßK + ßL -bi1Pbbký) ) 3.9 c 
1ý1-ý blpb6k'd (ßx -bilpb6kb' 
) 
IJQ 
where b9=, 5+v-S+P, blo -ýv-1)QKQQ1-IJQ >0, and 
0' v 
QQ 
bll . (8 + v)ßQ7i ,>0. 
The following equation of motion of the private capital is derived from equations 
(3.1), (3.4) and (3.7). 
k= (1-ý3Q)y-(s+ý)k-blp'-ýc, k(0) =ko (=mo, given). 
From the above equation of motion with the equations (3.8) and (3.9) the optimal 
growth rate of private capital is as follows. 
6 bs 
Y 
-bi3pbekN 1ýj 
bk A_ b12 +b14 
_ bk(kp, 
), k(0) = ko, (3.10) N)k kK -biipb6k pb6k 
l 
PQ 
where b12 = (8 + v)(ö + p), 3Q7Q-i >0, 
IJQ 
b13 =(3+v)f3K +(5+P)(1-ßQ)>O, and b14 =Pxý1-ý3g)ßQi=/ýQ >0. 
Taking the trajectory of the water price as exogenously given, the private firms 
determine the optimal stock level of private capital based on this equation. It is 
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convenient to introduce pb6 k? and rewrite Eq. (3.10) as 
Oký 
b12ý2 
-b13ý+b14 
0'(ßx - bl leg 
Q¢ 
The condition r>v and r* =&&)i RQ ý-' -ö determine the domain of 
e(ý) as 
PQ 
0<ý< 
[S -I- V 
PQ 1-iý¢ = max . 
14 
Within this domain, the following lemma holds. 
Lemma 3.1: 
The sign of growth rate of capital is determined by the following rule. 
Ok() = 0, if and only if ý _ö P, 
3Qf J. 
Moreover, lim Ok(()=oo, and lim Ok()=_co. 
, 
f-+0+ ý->fmax- 
Proof : See Appendix A2. 
Now we examine the effects of the water price on the trajectory of k. Recall that 
p(t) does not affect k(t) although p(t) does affect the growth rate of k(t). It means 
that we can change fi(t) by setting p(l) regardless of the level of k(t), providing 
there is no supply side constraint which means physical and financial constraints 
imposed on the government in providing water and setting rate of water charge. 
Based on this fact, we derive the following two propositions from Lemma 3.1. 
Proposition 3.2: Operational principle of controlling ivaterprice 
If there is no supply side constraint, the government can achieve any desirable 
growth rate of the private capital stock by controlling the water price based on the 
following operational principle. 
14 We exclude 4=0, which requires either k or p is zero, from the domain. 
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k(t) 
_ 0, if and only if p (t) 
< ýQ 1 PC, 
k(t) <> k(tý 
Proof : Since we can freely change 4(t) by setting proper p(t) regardless of the 
level of k(t), Lemma 3.1 guarantees that we can control the growth rate of k(t) 
from negative infinity to positive infinity by choosing ý (t) by setting p(t), 
regardless of the level of k(t). 
Q. E. D. 
Proposition 3.3: Stability of the optimal steady-state without supply side 
constraint 
The optimal steady-state in a world without supply side constraint is globally stable 
within the domain of ¢k()), i. e. once any constant water price is set, k(t) and c(t) 
always converge towards the steady-state. 
Proof : Assume that the constant water price is such that fi(t) < F. Then Lemma 
3.1 tells us that k(t) grows at positive rate and consequently '(t) increases towards 
F, and vice versa. Thus the steady-state is globally stable within the domain of 
e(). Since c(t) is a function of k(t) and p(t) only, at this steady-state c(t) 
becomes constant. 
Q. E. D. 
Proposition 3.2 means that if the water price p is very low then the household 
expenditure is small enough for the household to increase its assets by investment 
(saving), in spite of a relatively high optimal consumption induced by the low water 
price. Proposition 3.3 is an interesting result of no-perfect foresight assumption. 
Recall that the optimal growth rate of consumption (3.5) is rewritten by 
incorporating the equilibrium real rate of rental as 
c_ 1 ßQ b1 b$ p b 
cQ 
ßK 
1ý `, -(S+P)_(1-P) P 
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This expression tells us that in the standard RCK model with perfect foresight 
assumption, a constant water price can drive an economy towards a steady-state 
only if the optimal capital stock converges on the steady-state value corresponding 
to Intuitively this happens only if the water price takes a certain particular 
value, if any. By contrast, Proposition 3.3 implies that any constant water price can 
drive an economy towards a steady-state in the second-best world under the 
no-perfect foresight assumption. 
Finally these two propositions establish the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.4: Steady-state optimal consumption without supply side constraint 
If there is no supply side constraint, the government can induce any desirable level 
of steady-state optimal households' consumption by setting the water price. 
Proof : Recall that the steady-state level of the optimal consumption is given by Eq. 
(3.9) as 
c- 
k ýblo-b9 )(ý3K+ý3L-bpi )-b 
FZ 
where 
PI-ý blF (ßK -b, IF) 
15 
ýP) 
pi &K PQ b15 _ýý(1_ý)ý-ý(s+p)#L ßK6LJ6QflL {(P-V)! 3K +(8+P)ßL}>o. 
Since the exponent of I/p is strictly positive, any positive steady-state optimal level 
of 6 can be induced by setting a constant price for water. 
Q. E. D. 
These three propositions are of policy interest. For instance, if the economy is free 
from supply side constraints in water provision and the government has discretion 
in setting the water price, Proposition 3.4 tells us that the government can induce 
any desirable household consumption level by setting the water price based on this 
proposition. Needless to say, these `desirable' results are largely due to strong 
assumptions such as no supply side constraint, full employment and full market 
equilibrium. These assumptions are rarely found in the real world, and never in 
developing economies. Nevertheless, these propositions provide a useful 
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benchmark against which we can investigate the implications of relaxing each 
assumption. Moreover, they facilitate analysis of supply side problems that are 
particularly important in the water-stressed developing economies. 
3.4 Second-stage optimisation 
3.4.1 Water production 
As in the case of private goods production, we drastically simplify the actual 
processes consisting of water production, e. g. harnessing raw water from the 
natural hydrological cycle, water purification, transmission, and so forth into the 
aggregate water production function Q= FW (G), where Q is an aggregate water 
production and G is an aggregate public capital stock. 
Weitzman (1970) argues that social overhead capital including sanitation facilities, 
irrigation and drainage facilities, and water supply facilities belong to `the ßsector' 
characterised by very high capital intensity. 15 This might justify the above 
specification. Note that here we use an aggregate production function because the 
water constraint is manifested not in per capita but in absolute terms. 
Another basic feature of the 8 sector discussed by Weitzman (1970) is substantial 
economies of scale due to indivisibility and cost lumpiness in this sector. This is 
perfectly relevant to the case of water production, which is often associated with 
large-scale facilities such as dams, treatment plants and pipelines (Young and 
Haveman 1985). Hence the shape of the water production function might not be 
smooth but kinked at several points as illustrated in Figure 1. 
15 World Bank (2004) reports that "the fixed costs of water supply are typically high relative to 
variable costs, more so than for other utilities such as electricity. For example, fixed costs 
account for more than 80 percent of water supply costs in the United Kingdom" (p. 223). 
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Figure 1 Conceptual illustration of water production function 
Here some clarification may be necessary. In our model setting it is necessary to 
interpret this function as the relationship between public capital stock and capacity 
to produce clean water on condition that water production and consumption do not 
endanger suslainability. As discussed in Chapter 1, I define sustainability as 
keeping resilience of ecosystems underpinning life-support systems. This 
sustainability condition prohibits, for instance, exploiting surface water or 
groundwater more than its sustainable yield and discharging pollutants or 
wastewater to water bodies more than their assimilating capacities. Consequently, 
the technological choice in `sustainable production function' is limited and the 
required amount of public capital covers not only narrowly defined water supply 
costs but also wastewater treatment costs. 16 
When the supplied amount of water is smaller than Q1, harnessing water from 
hydrological cycle is technically easy and water related capital might be divisible. 
To supply more than Ql we might need to install some large-scale facility, e. g. a 
large dam, construction of which requires certain amount of capital corresponding 
to G2 - Gl. Only after the installation of this facility it is possible to increase water 
supply capacity up to Q3 by further capital accumulation (section between G2 and 
G3). In other words, the marginal product of water with respect to G is zero 
between G1 and G2 (i. e. dFiv/dG =0). After repeating this process several times we 
will reach certain upper limit of water quantity (Qs) harnessed from natural 
hydrological cycle without violating sustainability of ecosystem. Though it is 
possible to increase water supply capacity above this quantity by introducing water 
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recycling, desalinisation of sea water, water import, and so on, it is highly likely 
that the marginal water product of these technologies be very low, as is shown in 
Figure 1. Note that we assume the water production function is twice continuously 
differentiable, at least from left side, at any point. 
The water balance constraint can be expressed as 
Noe `t (q + CAM) 5F (G), where No is the initial population. (3.11) 
The left hand side is an aggregate water demand, while the right hand side is the 
water supply capacity. 
3.4.2 The government 
It is assumed that the budget neutral government collects volumetric water charges 
from both households and firms and it spends all the collected charges on public 
capital investment (n. 
p(9x +9Nr)Noeº? -I°. (3.12) 
The assumption that the government undertakes water service is not only justifiable 
considering the natural monopolistic feature of water provision but also realistic in 
most developing countries. In the context of closed economy assumption the 
assumption of budget neutral government is sensible. From this assumption the 
equation of motion of the public capital becomes 
G=IG -SG=P(qH+q'M)Noe" -6G. (3.13) 
The aim of the government is to maximise the `intra-generational' social welfare of 
the current generation by choosing a water price whilst observing the sustainability 
condition. 17 Since we assume identical households, the government problem can 
be expressed as 
16 The concept of this `sustainable production function' approach will be discussed later in Section 
5.6 of Chapter 5. 
17 See Subsection 2.3.4 in Chapter 2 for the specification of the social welfare function. 
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Max fo e-_(P_')' 
kl pý di , subject to P 
k= k0k (k, p), k(0) = ko, and 
P4^H(k, p)+4Nr(k, p))Noeºr _SG, G(0)=Go, 
T- W (G) - 
4H (k, 
p) + 9Nt 
(k, 
p)}No e hr >_ 0. 
(3.14a) 
(3.14b) 
(3.14c) 
(3.14d) 
The corresponding Lagrangian consisting of the current value Hamiltonian and the 
water balance constraint is 
(1-°) 
ckp 
1-Q 
+, Ukkok(k, P)+IU 
[P{qH (krn, )+ý (k, P)}Noe' - 5G] 
+O[FW (G) - lqx 
(k, 
P)+R'm(k, P)}Noe'r], 
where /?, i and 0 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with G, k and the 
water constraint, respectively. 
Assuming an interior solution, the necessary conditions are as follows. 18 
DLO 
=0=cQ 
öc 
+ 
{PG(+)+(PGPo)[H+MJ}Nevt 
ap ap ap aP 
k 
+ ICkk 
P=0 (3.15a) 
1 
k 
k _(p _v)ýk 
öLß 
ik =, U p-v-Ok-kör _ý Q 
öc 
ök ök ök 
_ 
(Ua p_oQ x+ 
aqýr 1NoeIr (3.15b) 
ka J 
äG 
u dGw 0 (3.15c) 
The Kuhn-Tucker condition for the water constraint is 
Oz0, FW_(41, +4M)N0e" >0, O{W -(R'H+R'M)Noe`r}=0. (3.15d) 
18 This problem does not satisfy the Mangasarian Sufficiency Theorem. 
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Note that Ois zero only if the water constraint is satisfied with strict inequality. The 
transversality condition is 
1im[e-(P-1)r pa (1) . G(t )] = 0.19 t--*co 
3.4.3 The optimal trajectories 
(3.15e) 
It is known that each Lagrange multiplier represents the shadow price of its 
corresponding constraint. Since G and k are the same good, the ratio of their 
shadow prices in aggregate term is unity along the optimal trajectories. Otherwise 
it is possible to achieve higher social welfare by allocating more capital good to 
invest in either capital with higher shadow price. Hence the optimality requires AP 
k 
Noe" 
The necessary conditions for the optimal trajectories are depending upon whether 
water supply capacity exceeds water demand (i. e. 0= 0) or not. These two cases are 
separately analysed. 
(1) Case 1: 0= 0 (Water supply capacity exceeds the demand) 
In this case the optimality condition (3.15c) determines the optimal value of u 
as , u(t) =, i(O)e('5-" 
P)` 
. 
This provides the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.5: Violation of transversality condition when 0=0 
The transversality condition (3.15e) is not satisfied when 0=0. 
Proof : By taking integral of the both hand sides of the equation of motion of public 
capital, we obtain 
G(t)= Goe-a + Noe-& jo p(s)( H (s)+ 9m(s)}e(s+V)sds 
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Putting this andp(t) =, u(0)e(a-"P)` into the transversality condition, we have 
1 m[p(0)e 
+Oe-'+N"e-'f 
P(RH +9M (5+')ds1l 
=1u(0)Go + p(0)No 1imr 
[AH P(9'H + 4m ý(s+v)sdsý = 0. t-ºý 0 
As the integrand is always non-negative, this condition cannot be satisfied unless 
ßt(0) is zero which requires either zero consumption or zero marginal consumption 
with respect to price from (3.15a). The former cannot be the socially optimal while 
the latter case seems a trivial exceptional case where water pricing does not affect 
water demand. On this rationale the case , u(0) =0 is precluded from the analysis. 
Q. E. D. 
Although Proposition 3.5 rules out the possibility of satisfying the transversality 
condition under 0= 0, it might be of practical interest to find the trajectories 
satisfying the remaining necessary conditions (3.15a) - (3.15d), which could be 
regarded as a candidate of the optimal trajectories. Recall the fact that the 
transversality conditions are derived from the assumption that the value function at 
the terminal point T takes the particular form, that is discounted utility at time T. If 
we employ some alternative assumption about the value function, optimality does 
not require the transversality condition. Such a candidate of the optimal trajectories, 
which I referred to as `the excess-supply trajectories', is summarised in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 3.6: The excess-supply trajectories 
The excess-supply trajectories are determined by the following system; 
f (i )=a-p(4H +4M)_(Ok +CS+VyC=O, 
G_ pG OYcls (G, k, p), and 
19 Another transversality condition 
t 
ism [e (P-v)t k (t)" k(r)] =o is automatically satisfied because 
the optimal household consumption c is derived such that this condition is satisfied. 
Chapter 3 Analytic Model 79 
k= ok 
k 
In addition, the rate of change of water price along the trajectories is given as 
ö+ p+QEkok P 
P ýýp 
Proof : See Appendix A3, 
Proposition 3.6 tells us that there always exist such trajectories. Notice that the 
excess-supply trajectories do not necessarily satisfy the sustainability constraint 
(3.15d) which is not used to derive the equations constituting the system. Whether 
the excess-supply trajectories satisfy the sustainability constraint (3.15d) or not can 
be observed only with numerical simulation. 
(2) Case 2: O> 0 (Water supply capacity equals to the demand) 
When O> 0 we have the following equality. 
FW (G) = 
{9H (P, k)+9M (A k)}Noevr (3.16) 
Given the state variables k and G at any moment s, p(s) is completely determined 
by this equation, and p(s), in turn, determines the rate of change of each state 
variables, and so on. It means that the trajectories, which are termed 
`market-clearing trajectories', are completely determined by the sustainability 
condition (3.16). This set of trajectories are summarised in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 3.7: The market-clearing trajectories 
The market-clearing trajectories are determined by the following system; 
fhlc (p; i, G)= F' (G)-{Rx (P; k)+qu (p; k)J Noevr =0 
prrV G_-ö_ OMc (G, p), G(O) = Go given, and 
GG 
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k= 
0k (k, p), k(0) = ko given. 
The rate of change of water price along the trajectories is expressed as 
p_gal'wc-NoeV`{v(9x+RNr)+k(agxlak+8qýr1ak)}O 
k 
c 
(P, k, G), in 
1 
OmP 
p Noevrp(NHIap+NM/aP) 
W 
which s 
dF G: 
an elasticity of water production with respect to public dG Fir 
capital. 
Proof : By putting Eq. (3.16) into Eq. (3.14c) the differential equation of G 
becomes G= PF 
GW -5 . 
Other two equations determining the trajectories are 
self-evident. 
The differential equation of water price is obtained by taking time derivative of Eq. 
(3.16). 
Q. E. D. 
Proposition 3.7 tells us that there always exist such trajectories, as in the case of 
excess-supply trajectories. Obviously it is entirely possible that these trajectories 
may not satisfy either the optimality conditions (3.15a) - (3.15c) or the 
transversality condition (which has not been used to derive them). Still, they are 
always the optimal trajectories that achieve the maximum social welfare with 
satisfying all the constraint, except for the situation where the excess-supply 
trajectories satisfy the sustainability constraint (3.15d) and at the same time achieve 
higher social welfare. Whether the market-clearing trajectories really maximise 
social welfare or not is investigated later using numerical simulations. Our 
intuition tells that having excess supply capacity should not confer any advantage 
on the government in this problem setting. 
For practical purpose it is enough to derive the market-clearing trajectories and to 
confirm whether the attained social welfare is higher than those attained by the 
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excess-supply trajectories. For theoretical purpose, however, it might be interesting 
to derive the `first-best optimal' trajectories as an interior solution of the 
government problem satisfying all the necessary conditions (3.15a) - (3.15e). Such 
an attempt leads me to the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.8: Non-existence of the interior-solution when O> 0 
When sustainable water supply capacity equals to the optimal water demand, the 
government problem (3.14a)-(3.14d) cannot have an interior solution. 
Proof : See Appendix A4. 
It is not clear why the government problem (3.14a) - (3.14d) cannot have any 
interior solution when the sustainability condition is an equality constraint. 
Although this problem clearly has an inherent nature of rigidity due to the budget 
neutral government assumption, still it is surprising that any combination of 
parameter values cannot generate an economically sensible interior solution. 20 
3.5 Qualitative analysis of the optimal trajectories 
Before conducting quantitative analysis with numerical simulation, let us 
investigate qualitative properties of the optimal trajectories such as stability of the 
steady-state and structural stability of the system. 
3.5.1 Optimal steady-state 
The steady-state of each candidate of the optimal trajectories must satisfy 
0? =0a= Ok =0 for i= ES and MC. For any cases the steady-state must be 
associated with zero population growth (v= 0) from the condition 01 = 0. Hence 
zero population growth is assumed throughout Section 3.5. 
20 If it were a pure mathematical problem (without restrictions on signs of marginal felicities, etc. ) 
some combinations of parameter values could generate an interior solution. 
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The results of investigation on the optimal steady-state are summarised in the 
following two propositions. 
Proposition 3.9: Non-existence of the excess-supply steady-state 
The excess-supply trajectories cannot have any steady-state. 
Proof : The condition OES =0 at a steady-state becomes -+p1=0, which 6 
)Ep 
can hold if and only if 1/Ep is zero at the steady-state. Let s. denote the 
steady-state value of Ep. Due to the fact that the steady state value of ý is given as 
! IQ 
ßK 
821 IjQ from Lemma 3.1, we have 
ý+p 
16Qýý-136PJ{(8-P)ßK-(13 +P)ßL} 13Q(p-5) 
Ep=gyp-1+ - (1-PQ) p(pßK +(S+p)ßL) (1-ßQ) p 
Since the denominators of the right hand side cannot be zero, 1/Ep cannot be zero. 
Q. E. D. 
Proposition 3.10: The market-clearing steady-state 
When the population is constant, the government problem (3.14a)-(3.14d) can have 
a steady-state along the market-clearing trajectories if and only if all of the 
following conditions are satisfied; 
1-fig PQ 
(iý k_ KP /JL 
Qg PL 
_k (Pý 
(ii) G= PNo {Ix 
(P, k(P))+ JJ 
(P, k(P))}/S = G(P), and 
(iii) FW (G (P))- N0 {tx 
(P, k (P))+ qM (P' (P))} = 0. 
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Proof : Lemma 3.1 tells that the condition (i) is the necessary and sufficient 
condition to have Ok =0, and it is self-evident that the condition (ii) is the 
necessary and sufficient condition to have Om"c =0 when cbk =0 . Since 
Ok = OMC =0 automatically results in O, pc =0, the market-clearing steady-state 
exists if and only if, o =0 is satisfied along with conditions (i) and (ii), which is 
summarised in condition (iii). 
Q. D. D. 
Propositions 3.9 and 3.10 reveal that if there exists the optimal steady-state it must 
be along with the market-clearing trajectories. Note that non-existence of 
excess-supply steady-state does not necessarily indicate sub-optimality of the 
excess-supply trajectories. If they achieve higher social welfare than the 
market-clearing trajectories whilst observing the sustainability condition, the 
steady-state along the market-clearing trajectories is not optimal. Keeping this 
reservation in mind, I refer to the market-clearing steady-state as the optimal 
steady-state. 
3.5.2 Local stability analysis of the optimal steady-state 
For studying stability of the optimal steady-state, first let us describe the 
market-clearing trajectories by the following vector differential equation. 
G GO& (G, P) 
dt P= Pckc 
(G, 
p, k) ' 
(3.17) 
k kok (k, P) 
G(O) = Go, k(0) = ko, and p(0) is such thatfuc(p(0); Go, ko) = 0. 
Due to nonlinearity of the system defined by Eq. (3.17) it is difficult to analyse 
global stability or instability of the market-clearing steady-state. If it is partially 
stable, which is frequently observed in the optimal growth models, the Liapunov's 
second method does not work (Gandolfo 1997). In fact an application of the second 
method with a Euclidean distance function as a candidate of Liapunov function 
results that the time derivative of this candidate is neither positive nor negative 
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definitive, which is consistent with partial stability. Hence we focus on analysing 
the local stability of the steady state of the original system determined by Eq. (3.17) 
with linearisation method. 
As this system is autonomous, which means that time is not contained as an explicit 
argument, the following linearised system near steady state is certainly a uniformly 
good approximation to the original system around the optimal steady state 
(Gandolfo 1997). 
GG 
A= A(x - xe), where xp, xe =p, and A is the Jacobian matrix of the dt kk 
original system evaluated at the optimal steady state, i. e. 
ÖGOG öG0° öG0° 
öG öp ök 
A =_ 
aP02 ÖP0i äP0ä_ 
öG OP ök 
ökq5k o/Ok ok ' 
öG op ök 
(x=xe 
All A12 0 
= A21 A22 A23 , where 
0 A32 A33 
l 
ý- SG 5(EC, 11 Er, 
(G) FW 
All = öýa 1, A12 = T) , 
Azi =- NoGDI 
ea ýGý 
(F w (_)}Z kD D 
A22 =- NOGDI 
+ b6b16 
PDl 
A23 = -bgbl6 Dl 
Abbk and Abb in which b 
(45 + p){p/3x + (S + p)ßL } 
32 6 16T ý 33 8 16ý 16- 
POi6x 
DI p(4H+9, u)lxe>0, and D2=ak(RH+gM)lxe>O. 
21 
The following proposition summarises the local stability of the optimal 
steady-state. 
21 For the derivation of the Jacobian matrix A, see Appendix A5. 
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Proposition 3.11: Local stability of the optimal steady-state 
If c (G) < 1, the Jacobian matrix A has two stable and one unstable eigenvalues. If 
the economy is enough close to the steady-state and if it is allowed to adjust the 
initial value of either G or k freely, it is possible to put the economy on a stable 
manifold towards the optimal steady-state by adjusting either Go or ko properly. 
If 6G(G) >_ 1, the Jacobian matrixA has one stable and two unstable eigenvalues. If 
the economy is enough close to the steady-state and if it is allowed to adjust the 
initial values of both G and k freely, it is possible to put the economy on a stable 
manifold towards the optimal steady-state by adjusting both of Go and ko properly. 
Proof : See Appendix A6. 
Proposition 3.11 makes a stark contrast to its counterpart in the no supply side 
constraint world, Proposition 3.3. Once supply side constraint in water provision is 
introduced, the global stability of the optimal steady-state in the no supply side 
constraint world is replaced by saddle path local stabilities with which either one or 
both of Go and ko must be properly adjusted to achieve the optimal steady-state, 
even if the economy has reached the neighbourhood of the steady-state. The 
dominance of the water production elasticity ea on the local stability of the 
steady-state makes sense because this elasticity represents the impact of supply side 
constraint on the economy. 
An interesting finding is that an elastic water production with with 
which an increase of water production capacity must be easier, is associated with 
more difficulty in achieving the optimal steady-state. It seems that a combination 
of the water market clearance condition and the budget neutral government 
assumption with which all the water charge revenue must be invested in water 
production makes an elastic water production case more sensitive to the change in 
the level of capital stock. 
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3.6 Numerical simulation of the optimal trajectories 
3.6.1 Model specification 
This section briefly describes the numerical simulation model, a discrete-time 
version of analytic model. 
(1) First-stage optimisation in discrete-time setting 
The representative household's problem in discrete-time becomes 
Max Ul = 
I+ vs1(MH 1'Q 
subject to 
ci qx s-t(1 +p)1 
nls+1 - nl' -1 +v 
{iv, 
+ (rs - v)ms - cm M- ps qH 
), 
and 
the initial assets m, is historically determined at time I. 
The discrete-time version of the optimal consumption, which is corresponding to 
Proposition 3.1 in continuous-time, is as follows. 
Proposition 3.12: Optimal consumption level in discrete-time 
If r> vis satisfied, the optimal consumption is given as 
cý =ýpý 
1-ý l+r -ýl+vý 
l+r 
mt+ 
wl 
pr l+p r-v 
Otherwise, cl cannot have a positive finite value. 
Proof : See Appendix A7. 
The difference between Proposition 3.12 and its continuous version Proposition 3.1 
is the second term from the far right side. Recall that (l+x)` in discrete time 
corresponds to exl in continuous time, or equivalently that ln(l+x) in discrete time 
corresponds to x in continuous time, where x is any constant growth rate such as 
population growth rate, pure time preference, etc. Hence v+ 
r&ý- P in continuous 
a 
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time corresponds to In (1 +v1+r 
1/a 
= ln(1 + v)+ 
ln(1 + r)ln(1 + P) in discrete 
kI+P) - 
time. This fact may illustrate the correspondence between two propositions. 
The firms' problem is, due to its static nature, identical with the continuous-time 
case. To have more flexibility in numerical simulation, however, a technological 
parameter zis introduced into the firms' production function which, in per labour 
unit, is now yt = r(kt )ux 
(qu YQ 
. This modification results 
in a new set of 
equilibrium prices r(* = zßK 
(ßQ /pt )66 (1Ikl )bl -5 and w, = rßi 
(QQ /pr )bb (kr)b' 
j6K 
p)3Qb622 
Without Now the value of becomes r 'P /3 b6 , 
instead of 
introducing rthe steady-state value of rf* has to be p, while it becomes zp+ (r- 1)8 
with r. 
(2) Second-stage optimisation in discrete-time setting 
The discrete-time version of Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 is as follows. 
Proposition 3.13: The excess-supply and the market-clearing trajectories 
The excess-supply trajectories in discrete-time are determined by the following 
system; 
fES (P'; kr) = 
1-P (r` +S)kI +wt A 
pt 
(4tH V 11- _ +(P9(1-ßp)1-`P(I+v) +J 1+v 
0, 
Gr+i - Gr = pt 
(4tH + 4, ) No (1 + v)t -SGG , 
Go given, and 
kr+i -kr =1+v 
t(rt 
-v)k, +wt -b1pr1-ncr}, ko given. 
22 Rigorously, T in discrete-time is a solution of 04ý)= 0 which contains a term associated with 
el' It is numerically confirmed that the error of approximation of this solution to the 
continuous-time version ý is negligible at the order of 10'15. See Simulation 1 below. 
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The market-clearing trajectories are determined by the following system; 
J, Mw (pr; kr, Gr) =- Fw (Gr) -{RM 
(pr; kt)+4H (pt; kr)) N0 (1+ v)` =0 
Gr+l - Gr = p1F"' (G1) - 6G1, Go given, and 
kr+i -kr -1+v 
t`r, 
-v)kr +w; -blprl-"cr), ko given. 
Proof : See Appendix A8. 
(3) Specification of water production function 
Depending on the purpose of the simulation, two sets of water production functions 
are constructed. 
The first set for analysing stability of the optimal steady state is designed such that 
there exist three steady-states, as shown in Figure 2, of which only the middle one 
is associated with an elasticity greater than unity (ca (G)>_ 1). 
Q 
Q=(S/P)C 
3 
------------------- 
_ Q =FW (G) 
0 Gi Gz G3 G 
Figure 2 Water production function for numerical simulation 
From Proposition 3.10 the relationship pQ = pFýý 
(G)= 8G holds at a steady-state. 
It means that once the steady-state water price p is fixed, the line Q= (ö/p)G is 
fixed. Three steady-state points are obtained by changing the population 
size Nf for i=1,2,3, and the water production function Q= F' (G) is calibrated 
such that it goes through these steady-state points. The employed functional forms 
are Fin(G) = a; In G-b; (i = 1,3) for the outer sections and FW(G) = a2 Gb2 - c2 for 
the middle section, in which a;, b1, and c, are production parameters to be calibrated. 
Chapter 3 Analytic Model 89 
The second set is constructed by scaling up the first set such that sustainable water 
supply capacity of the excess-supply trajectories exceeds the optimal water demand 
for a reasonably long period, since the first set with employing the steady-state 
capital stock of each state variable as its initial level is associated with water deficit 
throughout simulation period. The scaling-up factor is set at five. 
(4) Calibration 
Most of model parameters are exogenously given but the technological parameter 
(z), the steady-state private and public capital stock (k and G; ) and parameters in 
water production functions are endogenously calibrated. 
The technological parameter ris calibrated as 
T= 
p+ý 
1 where r is the steady-state value of rg*. 
The steady-state private capital stock k is calibrated as 
T=( /pbo )ý1b8 
, where F= zßK, ßQb6 
1(o + p) is the steady-state value of fit. 
The steady-state public capital stock G, is calibrated as follows. First, the 
steady-state aggregate water demand Q, is obtained as 
Qr=(qH+gM)N,, where 
(82 /p)/('-PQ) and 
1lýa 
q" =1 pý 
l+r +pJ 
F -v) , 
in which 
lv = z3Lkb' 
(Q/P)6 
Then the steady-state public capital stock is calibrated as G; = pQ; /8 . The 
parameters in water production functions are calibrated such that all the 
steady-state points are contained and the steady-state water production 
elasticities have desired values. 
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The following exogenous parameter values are chosen. 
- Population growth rate: v= 0.02 (for Simulation 3, v= 0) 
- Elasticity of marginal felicity: or= 3 
- Weight of market good consumption in satisfaction production: (p = 0.98 
- Depreciation rate: 5= 0.05 
- Rate of pure time preference: p=0.075 
- Factor share of private capital in market commodity production: f3K = 0.5 
- Factor share of water in market commodity production: ßQ = 0.2 
- Factor share of labour in market commodity production: 83L = 0.3 
The population sizes are set at Nl = 1,000, N2= 2,000 and N3 = 3,000. The water 
price and the real rate of return at the steady-state are set at p =1 and r=0.1 in 
calibration process. Calibrated water production parameters are a, = -5,476.4, b, = 
-61,077.8, a2 = 45,526.4, b2 = 0.1, c2 =121,759.2, a3 = 14,400.4, and b3 = 
143,107.1. 
(5) Solution algorithm 
The economic situation to be studied is given as a set of (Ni, Go, ko) in which initial 
capital stock levels are specified as a proportion of their steady-state values, e. g. Go 
= 0.8 G2, ko =1. ik , and so on. Note that k 
is fixed once parameters and the 
steady-state water price p are given. 
Given the initial values of state variables, the equilibrium water price at t=0 is 
obtained for both the excess-supply and the market-clearing trajectories by solving 
the implicit functions f ES(po ; ko) =0 and f Mc (po; Go, ko )= 0, respectively, as a 
static problem. The obtained water price, in turn, determines the capital stock 
levels of the next period (GI, kj) through the equations of motion, andp(pl ; kl) _ 
0 and juc (pl; G1, kl )= 0 are solved for these stock levels, and so on. This solution 
algorithm is specified as a mixed complementarity problem in GAMS and solved 
by MILES solver, and executed for 200 time periods for the most part of 
simulations. The employed GAMS code is attached as Appendix B 1. 
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3.6.2 Simulation results 
Simulation 1: No supply side constraint case 
Simulation 1 tests the validity of Proposition 3.3 (global stability of the optimal 
steady-state without supply side constraints) and the accuracy of the approximation 
of in discrete-time to the continuous-time counterpart. For these purposes 
Simulation 1 covers only the first stage optimisation model in which there is no 
supply side constraints. Figure 3 shows the global stability of the steady-state in the 
no supply side constraint world as Proposition 3.3 predicts, when water price is 
fixed at unity. 
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Figure 3 Global stability of the optimal steady-state 
without supply side constraint 
i-ßQ RQ 
Proposition 3.3 predicts that k always converges to k7=-F N ýßQýp)7 from 
everywhere within its domain kE (0, km. ) which corresponds to ýE (0, m). 
Figure 3 clearly demonstrates this global stability of the steady-state when water 
scarcity is not taken into account. 
The accuracy of approximating discrete-time with continuous-time version is 
tested by setting the initial capital stock at (1+1.0x10-9)k and by simulating 1000 
time periods. The difference between the values of derived from the value of k 
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after 1000 time periods and its continuous-time counterpart becomes 2.22x10-'5 
This illustrates the closeness of the continuous-time version approximation of . 
Simulation 2: Comparison between the market-clearing and the excess- 
supply trajectories 
One of the most interesting questions for the numerical simulation is whether the 
excess-supply trajectories satisfy the sustainability constraint (3.14d), and, if so, 
whether they could attain higher social welfare than that attained by the 
market-clearing trajectories. 
As mentioned in the explanation of the water production function construction, the 
original version of water production function is designed to test the stability of the 
optimal steady-state along the market-clearing trajectories. It is found that it cannot 
have positive water balance along the excess-supply trajectories without significant 
scaling-up. This means that proportion of Q, to G, is one of major factors 
determining whether the sustainability condition can hold or not. Once the water 
production function is specified, the simulation reveals that the initial stock of the 
private capital mostly determines whether the sustainability condition can be 
satisfied or not, and how long this condition can hold. Figure 4 illustrates this 
finding. 
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Figure 4 Sustainability condition of the excess-supply trajectories 
To provide an answer to the latter question, social welfare as a discounted sum of 
felicity is evaluated for the period for which the sustainability condition is satisfied. 
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It is found that the market-clearing trajectories always yield higher social welfare 
than the excess-supply trajectories, and this is consistent with our intuition that 
excess supply capacity has no advantage for society under this problem setting. To 
confirm this finding, Figure 5 shows the comparison between the market-clearing 
trajectories ('MC' in the figure) and the excess-supply trajectories ('ES' in the 
figure) with two contrasting initial conditions of capital stock level, either (Go, ko)= 
(G 
, 0.5 
T), which allows `ES' trajectories to maintain excess water supply for 
entire simulation period, or (Go, ko )_ (10 G, k), which represents more 
`developed' situation in terms of capital accumulation. Note that trajectories are 
depicted only when they satisfy the sustainability condition. 
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Figure 5 Comparison of two candidates of the optimal trajectories 
Figure 5 illuminates two important properties. First, the `MC' paths are always 
more favourable than the `ES' paths. When the `ES' paths approach to or just pass 
over the `MC' paths, the sustainability condition is no longer satisfied. This 
observation leads us to the following corollary. 
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Corollary 3.1: Optimality of the market-clearing trajectories 
The market-clearing trajectories are the optimal trajectories for the government 
problem (3.14a) - (3.14d). 
In the next chapter it will be clear that feasibility of the second-stage optimisation 
of the generalised model is underpinned by this crucial result. 
Second, each `MC' path tends to converge a unique path regardless of the initial 
conditions. This property is further investigated. Figure 6 shows the optimal 
trajectories generated by highly heterogeneous initial conditions. 
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Figure 6 Convergence property of the optimal trajectories 
These simulations clarify that the optimal trajectories has strong convergence 
tendency towards a unique set of paths that clearly reflect positive rate of 
population growth. 
Simulation 3: Stability of the optimal steady-state 
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It is expected from Proposition 3.11 that the optimal steady-state is characterised by 
saddle-path local stability. This proposition also tells us that it is necessary to adjust 
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initial conditions of the both state variables, Go and ko, for putting the economy on 
the stable manifold, when the elasticity of water production at the 
steady-state, a (G) , 
is greater than unity. To investigate this proposition the 
steady-state associated with N2, which is designed to have sG (d) > 1, is chosen and 
wider variety of combination of capital stock levels are given. Note that for the 
steady-state analysis population growth rate is set at zero. The outcome of this 
simulation is shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Stability of the optimal steady-state 
These simulation results reveal that the optimal steady-state is globally stable, at 
least in practical sense. The reservation arises from the fact that convergence to the 
steady-state seems slow comparing with the rapid convergence observed in 
Figure 6. Recall that the steady-state always has at least one zero real eigenvalue 
that functions to keep distance between trajectories and the steady-state constant. 
In this sense it is highly likely that the steady-state observed here is asymptotically 
unstable at the local level, as Proposition 3.11 predicts. Nevertheless, it is clear 
from Figure 7 that the optimal trajectories can be regarded as stable at the global 
level, and exactly at this level policy has a role to bring the economy towards the 
optimal path. 
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At last the difference among three steady-states are investigated. To demonstrate 
the outcome I chose only the water price trajectory which exhibits most interesting 
patterns, as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8 Comparison of the different optimal steady-states 
Contrary to what we may expect from Proposition 3.11, no qualitative difference 
between the trajectories associated with E. <1 and F. >_ 1 is observed. 
Simulation 3 reveals the limited relevance of local stability analysis where the 
non-linear system is globally stable which is not asymptotically stable but stable in 
a sense that any trajectories converge to certain neighbourhood of the steady-state. 
This finding highlights the usefulness and importance of numerical analysis to 
follow up the results obtained from theoretical analysis. 
3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter an analytic model based on RCK growth model is developed. It 
includes two novel specifications for improving applicability of RCK growth 
model to quantitative policy analysis; (i) continuous monitoring-feedback in the 
households' price expectation formation, and (ii) two-stage optimisation in which 
private optimisation and public optimisation processes are separated. This analytic 
model serves as a platform based on which an applied model, a highly aggregated 
dynamic CGE model, is constructed. The applied model is explained in the next 
chapter. 
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The solution of the first-stage optimisation, i. e. the private optimisation, shows that 
if there is no supply side constraint and the government can freely set the rate of 
water charge, then (i) any constant rate of water charge drives the economy towards 
the optimal steady-state (Proposition 3.3), and (ii) the government can induce any 
desirable level of social welfare as the optimal steady-state by setting appropriate 
constant rate of water charge (Proposition 3.4). 
The solution of the second-stage optimisation, i. e. the public optimisation, has 
several policy implications. 
The most important of these is the fact that the government problem cannot have an 
interior solution if water sustainability constraint is specified as a strict equality 
(Proposition 3.8), although it is mathematically possible to construct a system of 
differential equations which determines trajectories. Instead, there are two 
candidate optimal trajectories; one corresponds to an interior solution when water 
supply capacity exceeds the optimal water demand, which is termed as 
`excess-supply' trajectories (Proposition 3.6), and the other is a set of trajectories 
solely determined by water market clearance condition, which is termed as 
`market-clearing' trajectories (Proposition 3.7). Because of the non-existence of 
first-best solution, it is analytically unclear which of two candidates is the optimal 
solution. Although the excess-supply trajectories do not converge on any 
steady-states, this does not preclude the possibility that this set of trajectories yields 
the greater net benefits to society. 
Local stability of the steady-state associated with the market-clearing trajectories is 
studied by linearisation method. The results show that this steady-state exhibits 
saddle-path stability which is commonly observed in RCK growth model literature. 
It is found that the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady-state has either two 
stable and one unstable eigenvalues, or one stable and two unstable eigenvalues, 
depending on whether the water production elasticity is greater than unity or not 
(Proposition 3.11). This is because this elasticity captures the impact of water 
scarcity on the economy. 
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Useful insights for policy are offered by numerical simulations of the analytic 
model. The simulations reveal that for reasonable parameter values the market- 
clearing trajectories do in fact form the optimal solution to the government's 
problem (Corollary 3.1). This implies that the optimal solution for the problem to 
be tackled with policy simulation in the following chapters is likely to be associated 
with market clearance of publicly supplied goods (water). This greatly reduces the 
difficulty in solving the dynamic optimisation problem. Another interesting finding 
is the global stability of the optimal trajectories despite the fact that they are not 
necessarily locally stable. This illustrates the value of numerical simulation. In 
both cases numerical simulations have clarified the policy implications of the 
analytic model. 
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Chapter 4 
The Applied Model 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter an applied model for the policy simulation is constructed by 
incorporating several key stylised facts of water scarce developing countries into 
the analytic model explained in the previous chapter. Furthermore, trade and 
intermediate goods flow are introduced into the model. The applied model can be 
regarded as a highly aggregated version of a forward-looking dynamic computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model without the assumption of perfect foresight. 
Following this introductory section, Section 4.2 describes the main features of the 
model and explains how to incorporate the key stylised facts into the model. 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 explain the first-stage and the second-stage optimisation 
respectively. In these sections basic model set-up and notation are the same as in 
the previous chapter. Section 4.5 explains the issues arising from introducing trade 
and taxes. Although the role of trade and taxes in this research is mainly related to 
calibration and validation of the model, explicit treatment of them certainly widens 
the scope of policy simulation. Section 4.6 summarises the major outcomes and 
concludes this chapter. 
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4.2 Modelling the key stylised facts 
The applied model is constructed based on the analytic model with incorporation of 
the following stylised facts commonly observed in many water-scarce developing 
countries. ' 
- Irrigation accounts for the vast majority of total water use, often reaching 80 to 
90% (Rosegrant et al. 2002b). 
- Production risks in rainfed agriculture are one of the main causes of rural 
poverty and consequently of rural-urban migration (Fafchamps et al. 1998). 
- Urban unemployment is high with considerable rural-urban migration in spite 
of priority public investments in urban modern sectors (Harris and Todaro 1970, 
Beladi and Yabuuchi 2001). 
-A lack of safe water access, which is common in the rural areas or in the urban 
squatter areas, severely undermines the social welfare through various 
pathways, via direct and indirect health risks and higher medical and water 
expenditure, or via depriving children from educational opportunities (WHO 
and UNICEF 2000). 
These key stylised facts are reflected in the applied model as follows. 
Firstly, the single private production sector in the analytic model is disaggregated 
into two rural and one urban production sectors, i. e. the rainfed and the irrigated 
agricultural sectors and the urban modern sector. The outputs of all production 
sectors are assumed to be tradable under the small open economy assumption. On 
the other hand, labour and capital markets are assumed to be domestic. 2 Rainfed 
agriculture is regarded as a household activity that requires only internal resources 
such as family labour, owned machinery and owned farmland. 
1 See Chapter 5 for the relevance of these stylised facts to the case study country, Morocco. 
Z The share of foreign direct investment in gross fixed capital formation was around 3% between 
1960 and 1990 and 9% during 1990's, but the latter high share is largely due to privatisation of 
Maroc Telecom (Bouoiyour 2003). 
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Secondly, a multiplicative risk factor with stochastic distribution is introduced into 
the rainfed production function in order to reflect the high production risks of the 
sector, while production risks in irrigated agricultural and the urban modern sectors 
are assumed to be zero. 3 Although there exists empirical evidence that irrigation 
does not eliminate agricultural production risk in water abundant areas (e. g. rice 
production in Philippines reported in Roumasset 1976), the zero production risk 
assumption in irrigation helps to highlight the vulnerability of rainfed agriculture 
against erratic rainfall patterns in and and semi-arid regions. 
Thirdly, downward rigidity of the urban modern sector wage is assumed, which 
reflects the minimum wage legislation. The irrigated agricultural sector wage 
remains flexible. More precisely, it is assumed that unskilled labour wage in the 
urban modern sector is fixed at the minimum wage rate despite the presence of 
surplus labour, while flexible wage rates of urban skilled labour and of irrigated 
agricultural labour clear these two labour markets. This specification generates 
Harris-Todaro type rural-urban migration in which the wage gap between the rural 
and the urban sectors induces domestic migration (Todaro 1969, Harris and Todaro 
1970). 
Fourthly, it is assumed that some fraction of household members who are allocated 
to rural sectors lacks safe water access and that this fraction is determined by the 
stock level of public capital in water supply sector. 4 Welfare impacts of lack of safe 
water access are represented by `penalty' on household members who lack safe 
water access. In reality this `penalty' might be direct or indirect health risks, some 
additional expenditure for bottled water, medical care, the cost of boiling raw water, 
etc. or a reduction in income due to less time allocation to wage labour or to 
education activity. In the applied model the `penalty' is specified as a reduction in 
total working time that results in a reduction in wage income. 
3 The coefficient of variation for annual rainfall variability of rainfed regions in Morocco is 
estimated at 0.2 while that for cereal production reaches 0.4 - 0.5 (Karaky and Arndt 2002). 
WHOIUNICEF (2001) estimates access to improved drinking water source (including 50% of 
protected spring and well water) at 98% in urban areas and at 56% in rural areas in the year 2000. 
Some other sources estimate rural access to safe water much less due to different definition of 
safe water, e. g. WHO/UNICEF (1996) estimates at 14%. 
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In order to incorporate the latter two stylised facts into the Ramsey-Cass- 
Koopmans (RCK) framework, it is assumed that a household's decision is based on 
household pooled values (pooled income, pooled consumption, etc. ) in spite of 
heterogeneity among its members. For example, if one member earns 10 units and 
the other member earns nothing, the household makes decisions as if two members 
would earn 5 units each. Though this assumption is a straightforward extension of 
the conventional view of the household as a single decision-making unit, it appears 
much stronger in this situation than under an identical individual assumption. 
Nevertheless, if we were to abandon the assumption that the household is the 
decision-making unit, we would be forced into an undesirable model specification 
in which individuals must be indexed based on their migration history and their 
asset accumulation history. 
4.3 First-stage optimisation 
4.3.1 The household's problem 
(1) Problem formulation 
It is assumed that rainfed agricultural sector is defined as households' farm 
activities. There are a fixed number (N) of identical households of which initial size 
(number of members) at t=0 is normalised at unity and grows at constant rate uS 
Each household is endowed with the same amount of rainfed farmland, whose 
productivity is assumed to be fixed at YR .6 More precisely, 
FR represents the per 
household maximum productivity of rainfed farmland with the average rainfall. In 
In the model `one person' consists of one labour force age person and his/her dependents. See 
Footnote 1 in Chapter 3. 
6 Rainfed agricultural production data from Haute Chaouia region in Morocco (de Janvry et al. 
1992) reveal no difference between the small and the medium farms' per hectare crop 
productivity (1,453 Dirham per ha for the former and 1,433 Dirham per ha for the latter) in spite 
of three-fold difference in per labour productivity (1,219 Dirham per labour for the former and 
3,572 Dirham per labour for the latter). Zagdouni and Betanya (1990) found that labour 
displacement due to mechanisation caused high rural-urban migration from Haute Chaouia to 
urban areas such as Casablanca. These empirical data support this assumption. 
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the household farm production an important factor input, water, is exogenously and 
randomly given by rainfall and is represented by a multiplicative risk factor with 
stochastic distribution. The rainfed agricultural production technology is specified 
as a Leontief function of intermediate goods and aggregate input of labour and 
capital, and labour-capital aggregate is specified as a Cobb-Douglas function. 
Hence the per household production function of rainfed agriculture is 
_ 
R! RU 
R, 
Sý St 
RI 
_TR! LRýPu 
(KR)PRx, (4.1) YR =min co 
aRr aRU 
`l 
where Y/ : per household yields in year 1, a: the production risk factor in year t 
with E[wt] =1 and Var[o)t] = Qw , TR: technological parameter 
in rainfed 
agriculture, LR : per household family labour input in year t, KR : per household 
stock of rainfed capital in year t, sR' : input of intermediate goods produced by the 
sector j, aRj : input-output coefficient associated with s11 (sfi =aRjYIR), and ßRL 
and ßRx : factor shares of family labour and rainfed capital with ßRZ, + ßRx = -AR < 1, 
which reflects the suppressed fixed factor input, rainfed land. 
When a household optimises profits, the yield is determined by the term wtYR and 
the household adjusts input level of intermediate goods such that equalites between 
arguments of Leontief function hold. Consequently the per household optimal 
profit from the rainfed agricultural activity is given as 
17, R=PaY- Pt ca a) YR _ PUaRUýtYR -P 
JCJR 
= PRwt 
7R 
- PUcl 
R 
where p RP : the domestic producer price of rainfed products, p" : the domestic 
consumer price of urban products which are used as both consumer goods and 
production capital, p7 : the domestic consumer price of irrigated agricultural 
products, IR : the investment in rainfed capital, and pR : the net producer price 
Rp - pl"aRr - pr , 
"aRU )7 pr 
7 The numeraire of the applied model is not urban products as in the analytic model but local 
currency. Throughout Chapters 4 to 6, p 'O and p'P denotes a domestic consumer price and a 
domestic producer price of good i, respectively. The relationship between producer and 
consumer prices will be discussed in Section 4.5. 
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A household allocates a fraction of its members lr to labour category i where i =R: 
rainfed agricultural labour, I: irrigated agricultural labour, U: urban unskilled 
labour, orS: urban skilled labour, and 1R +1' +l° +ls =I. Further, the fixed labour 
allocation to urban skilled labour, Ts, is assumed. 
To capture the productivity cost of lack of water supply, it is assumed that the 
members without safe water access (public water supply) can supply only 1-z 
units of labour services per unit of time instead of 1 unit with safe water access. 
The coverage of public water supply, which is determined by the level of public 
capital stock in terms of water supply facilities, is B1 in the rural areas and the unity 
in the urban areas. In addition it is assumed that the members without public water 
supply collect an amount of water, q , without any money transaction. Hence the 
per capita average water consumption becomes 
-fin = 
flu' 
+Ts +(1-l° -1 s)e1}qf' +(1-lU -l5)(l-o, ) 
and the per capita average water expenditure becomes 
{1°+ Ts+(1-1°-1 S)Og}p, (itF1, 
where q, " is per `user' water consumption of publicly supplied water. 
From these assumptions with Eq. (4.1), the labour allocation to the irrigated 
agriculture is expressed as 
I PRr 
1ý =(1-1°-1 S)- 
1r11 YR PRL 1 P, ý (4.2) 
11 {1-(I-0, )Fl +V) TR I 
The urban unskilled wage rate is assumed to be higher than that in irrigated 
agriculture, and to be downwardly rigid due to the existence of minimum wage 
legislation. ' 
Morocco has legislated both the urban and the rural minimum wages (Economist Intelligent Unit 
2002). 
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Analogous to the rural-urban migration model of Harris and Todaro (1970), the 
differences of wage rates as well as public water supply coverage between the 
urban and the rural areas induce chronic urban unemployment. I assume that 
households optimise their labour allocation between urban unskilled and irrigated 
agricultural labour such that allocating a member to either labour category 
generates the same level of indirect utility derived from expected income wage. 
This assumption can be regarded as a generalised version of Harris-Todaro model. 
In fact, the Harris-Todaro model corresponds to the special case when all the rural 
area is covered by public water service (8t=1). Let BE denote the probability for 
the unskilled member migrating to urban area to be employed in the urban modern 
sector. The following lemma gives the equilibrium value of 6E as a result of the 
household decision problem. 
Lemma 4.1 Urban unemployment equilibrium 
Assume that O is enough large to satisfy the condition 
ztivi (e )2 + 1-zýºvi - Irrqar - tivU(Br)1 +Prquo ýo, 
where ivf is the wage rate of the irrigated agricultural labour and W' is that of 
the urban unskilled labour fixed at the legislated minimum rate. 
The generalised Harris-Todaro assumption (income-generated indirect utility 
equalisation assumption) gives the equilibrium value of OE as 
- _(or Of - 
w1U wl {1-(1-Bt)z}+ptqo 
Ot1 
Proof : See Appendix A9. 
It is easy to check that the Harris-Todaro employment probability, 0E* is is 
wt 
obtained by setting Of =1 in Lemma 4.1. We expect that the higher B,, ceteris 
paribus, the more favourable is the irrigation sector relative to the urban modem 
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E* 
sector, which results in the higher 0E* O. The expected sign 
aet 
>0 is, however, 60, 
not automatically established but requires ptq-a < 
wtBt [PQ + {8t -( 1-Bt) PQ} z 
{1-(1-et)cQ} 
This is because my model captures the welfare impact of lacking safe water access 
as sacrificed labour hours (represented by z) for fetching subsistence water (qn, ) 
instead of purchasing water at price pt. Hence the utility generated by saved income 
by fetching water ptgno must be smaller than the disutility caused by forgone wage 
income as well as by limiting water consumption at the subsistence level. 
Now, the per capita household income with incorporating Eq. (4.2) is expressed as 
1` rIR +rrp, '°mr +W 1 *OE* +wE TS 
1( 
(1+v 
1 iiRK 
+lvt (1-1u`-15)11-(1-9t)z}-(1+v)t 
zR 
Q, ý 1IRL 
1RJ 
1-1) 
where mt: household assets (equity shares of private capital), and equilibrium 
labour lu* : equilibrium labour allocation to the urban unskilled labour. 
Households purchase and consume market commodities produced by three 
production sectors as well as publicly supplied water and invest the rest of income 
into equity shares of private capital m. The per capita household expenditure is 
ptRcc7R +ptccj + pv°cu +{Bt +(lu* +l skl-9r)}prq' + pvcI,, 
where cc : per capita consumption of commodities produced by the sector i (i = R, 
I, U), and It : per capita investment in the equity shares of the private capital. 
From the above income and the expenditure expressions, the household budget 
constraint in per capita terms becomes 
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PRK 
_I1 
rtp°cml+wf (1-1°*-15)11-(1-O»}- 
wr ; flp 
R (1+VY ZK 
t (ý1PRYR 
_ pUc jR)_ PRcCR +p1cC1 + pUcCU +wt, 
UlU*OE* +WSI S+ 
1+VJ J C 
+$ +(1U* +1 skl-Ot))ptgx +PUcIr 
By incorporating this equation into the equation of motion of rainfed capital 
KR 1- KR =IR- 8KR , in which 8 is the depreciation rate, we obtain 
KR1-KR =(1+v)t 
[im 
l+ 
pýý (1-1°`-1 S){1-(1-0k)z}+ p BE"1°"+ plus 
1 ARK 
_ 
lw: 
'R 1R Rý+ah1)t 
-(l+v)tx TA Kr Pr 
x 
p4 
cR+ 
4 
cý +ct' +4 q' {9t+(lv"+15)(1-Bt))+Ir -BKR . 
(4.3) 
Another equation of motion is for private capital (equity), m, +l - mt =I 
tl 
+tv 
l 
The households' satisfaction depends on consumption as follows. 
cr = lct 1R lc' l' 
(cU yU 
lq H 
yQ 
pE (0,1) for all i and (4.4) 
Assuming a CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) function u(ct) = I- C 
in 
which o is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the representative household's 
problem at time t is expressed as the following utility maximisation problem given 
the household's expectation of exogenous variables. 9 
9 The notation ''' denotes expectation of exogenous variables. 
Chapter 4 Applied Model 108 
Max Uf =1] 
l+v Su(cs), 
subjectto I+p 
S_t 
KR1-KR =(1+v)s rsms + 
±, "- v (1-lv 
-1 S) 
{1-(1-Bsýz) +w of is 
lS 
+ws U i ps` p c 
tivs YR 
vo P T 
I 
Pu 
ßsr 
1 PAL 
li K 
Rp + 
(pa _ Ic Uc wsYR 
- 
fis aRl - 
ps aRU) 
vo p 
s R s s 
- (1 + v)s 
pRc 
uc cR + 
s` 
s Uc cls+ cvs + 
pS 
qH jia + (1sv* + Ts) (I - Is Uc ss 5KR s fi p p 
ms+l - ni, - 
I'1 
+ 
v"s 
, and the given 
initial values KR and mt. 
As before, p is the rate of pure time preference. 
(2) The optimal consumption level 
The current value Hamiltonian of the household's problem is 
-17 
HS _ 
cri 
S+1 
+2S 
(1+vý [ims+ w5 BS. IU* (i -Iu*-1 S)s)+ 
wU 
1-Q 1+P PS c PS 
S- 
+ 
lYs 1S 
+ 
( _ s COsI'R RP 
Q Ic 
(ýs 
RI fis 
IJ I 
uc 
}ys iR ) 
-LS Rufi 
1 Pax 
Pru 1 PAL BKR S Uc Ps Uc 1+v Ps 
s Al zR Ks 
- 
PRc 
CR - s 
Ps 
lc 
cI - cu - 
PS 
q, " 
{ý+( 
s s 
l*+P)(1_ý5)}_I5 n, 
]+25+, IS vi 
PS IS PS S 
p 1+ 
where A! and 2X' are the Lagrange multipliers. 
Assuming an interior solution, the necessary conditions are as follows. 
ÖHs 
=0 Cs1-a 
ÖC' c 
s 
öHs 
=0 l-a 
(PQ 
öqx qH 
(1 + v)s+1 R PS for i=R, I, U. (4.5a) 
1+p s+i pS 
(l + v)S+' As 
` 
(4.5b) 
1+p ps 
aHt 
_ý 'IR ý 
(l + výs+ý _i1 (4.5c) öls 
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l+V 
4R 2R 
OH, 
1+P s+ý -s 3KR s 
ý, L 1 
pay 
A (1-3)(1+v) ws 1+v %j RK 
'7R 
R+ Uc R 
(4'Sd) 
ýs+I 1+P Ps 1+P QRC TR K: 
1+v ým ýM __a', _! _1 +2R 
(1+v)S+1 I: (4.5e) 
1+ p s+i - 
As 
ams A,, "+' 1 1+p ßm1 1+p 
In addition, the transversality conditions are 
lim 1 ýRKR =0 and um' 
1+v is-r As ms -0 
(4.50 
s--'°° (1 + p)S-r 3->ý pJ 
The derivation of the optimal consumption growth rate is similar to the analytic 
model case. From Eqs. (4.5a) - (4.5d) with (4.4) we derive 
ft kc 9+ 1-1 
(C', 
= cs 
ýPc PS PS for i=R, I, U, (4.6a) 
Ps PQ 
k_R IU 
Pk 
cs 
ýQ is cps 
x ýQ P.., PS (4.6b) qs =- - 
A (PQ 
t_R IUA 
By substituting (4.6a) into (4.5a) we have 
s+l a 9' (1+v) 
x uý 1 ýPQ 'pi 
1+p cs P5 PS 
(l + v) (1 +rS) AR 1 
From these two Eq. (4.5c) and Eq. (4.5e) are combined into 2R =l+p 
equations with some algebraic manipulation, we obtain the following equation for 
optimal per capita consumption. '° 
Pr+T Pr 1+ r+l+ý (4.7) 
Uc flito 
T-1 0 
cc 
t+T t ft ý)t+T i=R. I, U j_0 
1+ p 
10 The notation `^` denotes the optimal solution. 
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Similarly, from Eq. (4.5d) and A= 
(1 + v) (1 +i) 2R we obtain S1+p s+ý 
'OR 
PRL 
I QR 
KR _ 
yR ßRKws (4.8) 
S TR NRLPS 
c Qs' +5) 
This equation shows that the optimal rainfed capital stock at time s is solely 
determined by expectations iv., and Y,. This condition can be satisfied by choosing 
the appropriate level of investment in KR for any future time sz1 +1, given the 
value of KR . 
Here the no-perfect-foresight expectation assumption is applied. It is assumed that 
households employ the current value of each exogenous variable in year t as their 
expectation for its future values for all s >_ t+1, e. g. ps =pt, ws = iv; ,i= r1, Br = 
B,, and so on, except for a random variable rvr of which the expected value is some 
constant w. This assumption makes KR constant for all s >_ 1 +1. Therefore the 
optimal level of household investment in KR is given as 
t PRL 
PR tivl PR YR 
U` -(1-5)KR fors=t, and TR %jRLpt r sý 
IR KRt KR = 
t PRL 
1 Px YR PR 
/ý 
J6pxlvt 
uc 
fors>_t+1. 
TR ßRLP(1+CS) 
Moreover, this assumption makes is ` and O constant and equal to 1U' and BE` 
Given the above results, Eq. (4.3) and ms+l - ms = ,, +' 
" produce the following 
equation of motion for the household assets. 
1 PRK 
_ 
1+ r1r1 r+l wl ', TRL 1 Pý 1711+1 
I+V 
iYlr - B1Ct + BZ +1F 
V) 
B3 -(j 
+ V) Uc TR KR pr Rr 
t PRL 
r+t 6 !j lV1 PR 
-r 
11 YR nx `R and 
l+v) zR PRLpt (r +Sý 
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i 't 
vms-B1cs+B2+I--- 
I (B3-B4), fors? t+1, where mS+' - l+ 
_ 
rý 91 
B, u, L'Jr 
I-I 1? t 
' B2 -1 vý 
[w,, (i 
-1 u* -1 s ý1+v)Pr PQ t_R, I, v Pi 
(1+v)Pr 
x{1-(1-0 )z}+iv°BE"1°*+wt 1 S+p1 n,, 
( °`-T3) (1-0, )], 
I 
_ 
pR i? RL 
B ftYn and B_1 
YR I3 : AR ßRLrr +ßn5 
3 (I+V)pv`' 4 I+V ZR QiýtPU`(rt+ QRK 
The derivation of the optimal consumption from this equation is the same as in the 
case of the analytic model in the previous chapter. The result is summarised in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 4.1: Optimal consumption level 
If rt > vis satisfied, the optimal level of per capita consumption at time t is given as 
follows. 
ýg 4! 1/Q 
I cr = 
1ý 
i 1+r-(1+vý 1+p JpUcnir+r - vfx'UB` "lI i=R, I, U 
+wt'1 S+wl (1-11*-15) (1-(1-01)z)+prqo(1-1°`-I s)(1-0v)) 
1 PRC . 8Rx 
ßR wt, RR PU, (rr + 45 
_ 
PR 1r pRYR 1r 18R 
'7R 
+(l+v) 
rr -(l+v r, (1+rr) rR ßRL Ali 
ßRK 
-( 
1 1` YQ1 Aý uK' 
l+v) l+r wr rR KR -(1-8)p t 
Otherwise, ct cannot take positive and finite values. 
Proof : See Appendix A10. 
An important feature of this optimal consumption decision is its independence from 
the realised production risk factor wt. The optimal consumption decision is 
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deterministic, and the gap between planned and realised income due to the 
difference between w and w1 is assumed to be absorbed by investment It. 
To compare Proposition 4.1 with Proposition 3.12, its counterpart in the 
discrete-time analytic model, the following transformation is useful. 
W¢ 41 1/v 
r at = 
ýQ 
ý 
I+ 't -(1+v) 
l+ tx 
pt i-R, I. U pt 1+P 
x pt 1+ 
1 
, total - 
1( 1 
pU`I R where 
rv 1+r l+v) 
Wsotal = wtotal 
vr1ltw 
p'YR , 
in which 
t `l+vJ 
1 QRK 
N, rorar 
t YR QRL 1 ýRz 
-(l+v) 
zR KR 
+1v°9E*It *+wf l s+Cl+v) &PRYR+pr9o(1-1' -1 s)(1-Bt), and 
_1 
QRL 
ýytlr 
IR =1R+ 
YRLrt+ßRs 
YR PR Ii 
rr ßRKrr ZR ßRLA (rr+5J 
In the above expression, W`ot l can be interpreted as the present value of expected 
total per capita labour income, Wt"', including rainfed agricultural profit and 
income saved by fetching water instead of purchasing publicly supplied water. The 
former can be regarded as income from rainfed labour and the latter can be regarded 
as labour income from fetching water. Similarly, p°r'' can be interpreted as the 
present value of rainfed capital investment per household. This transformation 
makes it clear that the analytic model and the applied model share essentially the 
same structure. 
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4.3.2 The firm's problem 
(1) The irrigated agricultural sector 
I assume that the production technology of the irrigated agricultural sector may be 
described by a Leontief function of intermediate goods, and a Cobb-Douglas 
function (with constant returns to scale) of factors of production. Note that a 
Leontief specification is compatible with the social accounting matrix which will 
serve as a database of the applied model. A Cobb-Douglas function, which is a CES 
function with substitution elasticities of unity, is adopted mainly due to its 
tractability. This specification may overestimate substitutability between water or 
land and other factors, but the benefit to employ more elaborate functional 
specification, a CES function with substitution elasticities of less than unity, does 
not seem to be enough to compensate its intractability. The employed production 
function is 
IR IU 
Y' =min TI , 
S`-, S`- 
, 
F' = zl 
(Ar' )p" (Kr f )Ad (Q11 
aIR aiu 
where Y,: nation wide aggregate product from this sector in year t, sf : input of 
intermediate goods produced by the sector j, aij : input-output coefficient 
associated with sl' sjýf = a1 Y1' ), rI: technological parameter in irrigated 
agriculture, Ar : aggregate irrigated land input in year t, Kf : aggregate irrigation 
capital input in year t, 41 : aggregate irrigation labour input in year t, Qt' : 
aggregate irrigation water input in year t, and ßjß : the share of factor inputj (j =A, 
K, L, Q) with ß' E (0,1) for all j and /31f = 1. 
There is a constraint concerning irrigation land capacity. 
Ar 5Ät =Ä 
(G' ), 
where At is the designated land to irrigation in year t determined by the public 
capital stock in the irrigation sector G, '. 
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It means that the aggregate irrigation land use cannot exceed designated land to 
irrigated agriculture developed by the government. In this study it is assumed that 
the government sets the irrigated land charge p, ' such that this condition is 
satisfied. 
Aggregate profits in the sector are defined as 
17; =pip}' -pt At -(r+S)pt`Ki -PrQi -x'iLi-p, St IR _pv`Sýv 
=p'Y'-pNA! -(r+5)Pr'`Ki -PtQt -tiv'L', 
where j3 ps" -a, RpR` -a, up°c, and p' is the irrigation water charge. 
Aggregate profits are maximised by setting the partial derivatives of 171 with 
respect to AI, KI, Q' and L' at zero, taking all prices as exogenously given, i. e. 
P', 6r4Yt = pi Ai , P'NIKYI = 
(r, +5) p 'Kt , etc. 
From the production function and 
the optimal conditions, we can rewrite the optimal aggregate profit function as a 
function of K' and the exogenous variables. 
Pu Pý /eia 
PU, 
[riP: 
J6 ýI Q AI Pr 
ý+ ö l_' _ IA L 
A 
Pr Pt wt 16XK 
Qtx 
This expression is a short-run optimal profit function taking the level of capital 
stock K' and the interest rate r as exogenously given. Whether aggregate profits are 
positive, zero or negative depends on the wage rate of this sector, that is 
I 
, PIA 
P14 ( AQ P' 1 6jx 
17t, * <0 if wi 
> 16IL 
TIA 
PA pw pt 'o (r + 5) 
(4.9) 
(2) The urban modern sector 
The production technology of the urban modern sector is assumed to be described 
by a Leontief function of intermediate goods and a Cobb-Douglas function of 
factors of production with constant returns to scale. 
urt vt 
v sr st U=-rU 1lýac /p \Prn /S 1/iur Yu =min FF zu `Kt J 
(Lt 
J 
(Lt 
J, 
auR au, 
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where YU : nation wide aggregate product from this sector, sui : input of 
intermediate goods produced by the sector j, auf : input-output coefficient 
associated with s°' (s°' = ajY°), Tu: technological parameter in urban modern 
sector, Ku : aggregate urban modern capital, LU : aggregate unskilled labour input, 
LS : aggregate skilled labour input, and ßU1: the share of factor inputj (j = K, L, S) 
with , ßuj E (0,1) for al lj and /3 J=1. 
The sector's aggregate profits are 
I7, ° = p°Yu-(r+S)puK°-w°LL'-iv L 
where 1-5u =p1P-auRpx`-auipý`. 
Aggregate profits are maximised by setting the partial derivatives of flu with 
respect to KU, LU and LS at zero, taking r, wr' and ws as exogenously given, i. e. 
/3uKPUYlu = (rr + 5) puK° , 8uL buYu = WULU and 8usPUYt' = wl Ll . 
From the 
production function and the optimal conditions, we can rewrite the optimal 
aggregate profit function as a function of L' and the exogenous variables. 
ßur 
UU 
vM u i3Ux PUL Pus 1x r 
I'r 
ýr = TvPr lpr(+5)J iv wt' - Qtn 
This expression is a short-run optimal profit function taking the labour inputLU and 
the wage rate W, as exogenously given. Whether aggregate profits are positive, 
zero or negative depends on the interest rate r, that is 
Pua Pus 
I7uF 0 if r= 
ßU 
> 
Tuptu 
(&, ßs 
< pt wt lvý 
4.3.3 Market equilibrium 
In the applied model, the markets for irrigation labour, urban skilled labour and 
private capital (excluding rainfed capital) are closed and perfectly competitive. The 
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equilibrium prices in these markets, r#, wI*and ws`, are determined by three market 
clearance conditions. 
First, competition drives optimal profits of both production sectors towards zero, 
which results in the following equilibrium price relationships from Eqs. (4.9) and 
(4.10). 
irrz Qus ý 
ýr"= 
AU 
TuJýu 
ßÜ Ps 
-r'(tiv! ), and (4.11) 
pt wt IV, ' 
Pu P1¢ PfK Pia 
W1= filc TIPI A 
IQ 
uý "= x'1 
(Wt s) 
. 
(4.12) 
Pt Pr Pý (rt + 8) 
The remaining equilibrium price iv, * is determined by the following market 
clearance conditions along with the equilibrium labour allocation to urban unskilled 
labour 11* . 
(i) Capital market clearance 
Because of the wage rigidity of urban unskilled labour and the existence of positive 
urban unemployment the urban sector has discretion to determine the optimal 
unskilled labour input Lu*. Given LU* the optimal urban capital demand is 
expressed from the optimality condition as follows. " 
1-/7n pux 
wi Lu. Ký _ß 
FvyU 
Lu. 
iv-tu 
1 fiULPU` ('r+ +7) t zuPtu ijuL Qus 
The supply of private capital is historically given by the household assets holding 
m, at time t. Hence the capital market clearance requires K°D +Kt'D = N(1+v)r mt, 
and the equilibrium capital stock in the irrigated agricultural sector is given as 
11 The additional superscript `D' means the optimal demand and `S' means the optimal supply in 
this section. 
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U 1-A, s Aus P 
Kt l* =N (1 +1 Tv 
wl wt LT 
u1t A. Bus 
Recall the relationship e, =N (1 + v)` BE1 ° and the fact that BE* is a function of w! . 
When Lu* is given, the labour allocation to urban unskilled labour is equilibrated 
such that L°* =N (1+ v) ` BE'1°` . With this relationship the equilibrium 
level of 
irrigation capital stock is given as 
U 1-lour 
wrg 
ßw /jux 
KI' =N1+ v)' m-1 
(ft u 
wl. lU. Kt I* 
7- PU 'Bvt 
Pus rý r 
(ii) Irrigation labour market clearance 
From the optimal condition, demand for irrigation labour is given as 
LjD _ 
QILP1 l t1' Kl ", while its supply is 
I 
FR SAL 1 Aas 
Lrs =N(1+v)t(1-IU`-1 S) {1-(1-Bt)z}-N R ZR Kt 
The market clearance condition LP = LAS requires that the equilibrium labour 
allocation to urban unskilled labour must satisfy 
is 
ijiLPU` (r* (wl + iY) 1r yR vRL 
1u1v 
ßIKW', (Wt m`l+v zR KR 
=), 
QuLptc(r*(wt )+e) 1 wU 
1-ß 
lt, s eE"\yvt 
/ ijircwl* (wýý zuPY ßuL ßus 
r, (wi). 
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(iii) Urban skilled labour market clearance 
The supply of urban skilled labour is given as LLS =N (1 + v)` 1S, while the optimal 
UU 
demand is LSD . 
AvsVs U. _ 
AUSFvt 
N(I+v)bOE*Iv` The market clearance /3ULWI iULIV1 
S-S 
condition LSD = Lis requires 1°` _6 -IIS= f2 
(wiý 
. IJuswr e (w ) 
Finally, from two expressions of 1U*, i. e. fl and f2, the equilibrium wage rate of 
urban skilled labour ivy' is obtained as a solution of an implicit function 
pl 
)_0, 
where (wr; mr KR Bt, wv prac' prrc' Irrac prIP' PtUP' pt, ptA, p, 
) f3 
rr' 
13w(Pnr+Pia ) 
{s ý' s{s 
ýr -2 
(1/wr) Puxßa ýjrsws 
J3(Wr 
)-J1(W )-J2(Wr )_ 
-r PusßIK PusPýx 
lp3-04 (1/Wt iPuxP6 07 (wl ))u 
I Pxx 
- 
iR in which o, ' -= 
{1-(1-Bt)z}(1-I s) 11R (1+v) 
zR Kr 
Pir+P« 
r Puz Pd Pur 
ý2 _ 
I--- 11 
1/ýUK%%r 
LPr}vv 
U UL (NUS 
J 
\1+v) fiiK 
x1A 
Pu w 
PJ2 (, 6UK -OX Prl 1? r Iý 
TI NIA NIQ 18IK 
t -(1 -0 
)y I 
A-WAL 
NUL NIK 
Pý PnPuc 
0,4 
AUK (Br)PQ prýlno B1 zupU 
(AuL 
(ßus)A 
AULAx 
rr 
(PtA)PIA 
Ptw 
Pa P. x Pia 
I 
x1 
ijvK 
TI pt 6 /3IQ /'1K 
5= PULL 
s, 
06 _ 
(Bt 
wt)"4 /jusI yr 
prgna 
1 
Br 
1), and 
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P, X 
=ijü 
(0 
r/U 11-(1-Bt)z} 
v 
/'' 
w/ýt 
)A,, 5jpLAX 
ivt ruPu UL 
AUS 
1 
/ý 
Pu ß PI¢ /ý 
Pjx Pic 
X i1 Pt 
Ný rIQ N/K 
t)t A AUK 
4.3.4 First-stage solution 
The first-stage solution of the applied model is optimal per capita consumption as a 
function of the state variables (m and KR) and the exogenous variables, and the 
equations of motion for the state variables. It is summarised below. 
From the proposition 4.1 and the equilibrium values the optimal expected per capita 
consumption is determined as follows. 
9b wQ 
ct = 
ýQ 
1'ý 
1+ r` - ý1 + vý 1+p 
[uc7` 
+ 
r` 
Iv fivUBE"j` ` 
t-R, I, U 
+wi+l S+wl`(1-1°`- Ts)(1-(1-o )z)+prqo(i-1°`-15 (1-e, )} 
1 PRa Pax 
1t 6p RiT ` 18R 
yR pR W; ' PR pv, 
(rt + PR 
+(1+v) 
rt` -(l+v) rr` l+r zR AL fl 
1`1Y pý 1Ä 
-(l+v l+r` 1vl 
[rRJ 
KR -(1-. 5)p°cKR 
in which r`, iv, * BE` and 1°' are determined by iv, *, and wvt + is determined by an 
implicit functionf3 (wf) =0. 
Investment is residually determined by the gap between the planned income and the 
realised income, which is given as 
VQ is Sei 1 
It = r`mr - 
at Pr Pr 
+v [w°BE +1 °* 
%'t (PQ 
i=R IU 
ýi pt 
+tivt'* S+wvr*(l-I°'-T" ) (l-(l-0, ) ) +prqo(I-1°M-Ts )(l-Bt)] 
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_ 
QRZ 
r aR R PR 1 WtJ4 ZR 1t YR NRxtiyt +(l+v) 
p°° -(l+v) 
[rR) ý3RLp°° r'+ý t 
(t* 
t) 
1 PRK 
+ U; RR -(I-J)KR . 
PRZ 
1't TR Kt 
The equations of motion form and KR are 
mt+ý =1ýn: t+1, 
), and 
I PRc 
I" PR 
Kit yR T' ßax wr 
r+i _- TR P Pt' (r' +8ý 
Given the initial values nio and KOR as well as the exogenous variables, the above 
system uniquely determines the optimal trajectories of c, m and KR. The first-stage 
solutions of the remaining endogenous variables necessary for the second stage 
optimisation are as follows. 
ýQ 
Q 
is 
er _at 
ý'1 Ißt fJIJ? L. l , for j=R, I, U, Jtý 
t_R U 
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Considering the structural similarity between the analytic and the applied models as 
seen in Proposition 4.1, it is expected that Proposition 3.3, which tells us that the 
trajectories of the first-stage solution are globally stable under the constant prices of 
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public goods without supply side constraints, is also valid for the applied model. 
Properties of the first-stage solution without supply side constraints are investigated 
using numerical simulation in Chapter 6. 
4.4 Second-stage optimisation 
4.4.1 Outline 
In the applied model it is assumed that the budget neutral government produces two 
types of water, i. e. untreated water R which is used as either irrigation water or raw 
water to the public water supply, and treated water Q. Further, the government 
develops designated irrigation land .4. 
As in the analytic model, each production process is represented by a simple 
production function. The aggregate untreated water production function is R, _ 
FR (GR ) where GR is stock of public capital for this production. The treated water 
production function is Qt = TD(Gt) where G is stock of public capital associated 
with water treatment and distribution. The level of G determines not only the 
treated water supply capacity F° but also the coverage of public water supply in the 
rural area 0. Similarly, the aggregate area of designated land for irrigation is 
represented by Ät = FA(Gt 
). As in the previous chapter these production functions 
are constrained by a requirement that production and consumption of goods do not 
endanger sustainability. All production processes involve large-scale facilities and 
have characteristics of Weitzman's (1970) 6 sector as discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
The government collects irrigation land charge A per unit area and two types of 
volumetric water charges, i. e. p for public water supply and p' for irrigation water. 
All the collected public charges are invested in either G, GR or GI. 
4.4.2 The government problem 
The government revenue from the charges at year t is expressed as 
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uHN(1+v)`{9r+(i1*+1 S)(1-9r)}+Pt Q +p A2. Mrs =Pt 
The government budget constraint at year t is m, " = pr" 
(I' +I, " +I" ), where 
IG, IGR and I°1 are public investment in G, GR and GI, respectively. Let BG and 
OR denote fractions of the government budget invested in G and GR, i. e. 
Ir The public capital accumulation is and 7°I°Rr =r ORMßr ýU°Ia r- =Ballr ra Pr 
described by the following three equations of motion. 
Gr+i - Gr = '-': 
IPU`-5Gt 
GR1-GR =BRM0/PUc -ÖGR , and 
Gl -Gý =(1_O _OR)M°/pU°-SG1. 
The sustainability conditions are 
4t"N(l+v)'{ 
t +(IU* +I 
skl-Br)}ýQr =FD(Gr), 
gf'N(1+v) t +(l 
1* +l skl-B1)}+Qý <_Rr =FR(GR), and 
It =FArGf 
1 12 
Note that the second sustainability condition captures a tradeoff between the 
domestic and the irrigation water demands given raw water production capacity. 
The objective of the government is to maximise social welfare of the current 
generation without violating sustainability conditions by choosing the values of 
policy instruments for the planning period T. In this chapter the policy instruments 
are confined to the rates of three public charges and the public investment 
allocation among G, GR and GI. Other candidates such as the urban minimum wage 
ýv U, tariffs or taxes are exogenously fixed. 13 
12 As in the previous chapter these are sustainability conditions rather than mere supply-demand 
balance. See Section 5.6 in Chapter 5. 
13 These policy instruments will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Social welfare is defined as the net present value of household utility of the 
representative household based on the identical households assumption. '4 
It must be noted that this thesis clearly distinguishes between the decision-making 
process of the government and that of private agents. The government plans 
policies for the entire planning period at the planning moment (t = 0) based on 
expectation of exogenous variables. Households make their consumption plan for 
the planning moment only and their lack of perfect foresight means that their 
consumption plan is determined by currently realised information only. This is an 
important difference. In the government problem, ct for any t>1 contains price 
expectation j and f' from the perspective of the planning moment t=0. My 
assumption is that pi` = pö and pp= po , which 
is exactly the same as the 
private expectation on surface, but its justification is totally different. For the 
household problem this `myopic' expectation is compensated by the 
monitoring-feedback decision-making process with which the decision is made 
based on updated current information. This justification is not valid for the 
government decision for which a commitment of implementation is required at t= 
0.15 
The justification for the government comes from the fact that commodity prices are 
partially controlled by the government through its foreign exchange policy as well 
as import taxation. This control is partial because there exist other exogenous 
external factors affecting the real exchange rates. Hence, the government designs 
policies with the expectation of constant commodity prices since this is one of the 
government policy targets, but there almost certainly exist gaps between planned 
and realised commodity prices. This expectation error will differentiate both 
planned and realised revenue and the planned and the actual budget required to 
implement the investment plan. The policy implementation issues arising from the 
14 Recall the assumption that the household is the decision-making unit despite the heterogeneity 
among its members. See Section 4.2 of this chapter. 
15 Recall that in practice infrastructure development is implemented based on large-scale contracts 
with private constructors, which require the government's commitment. 
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expectation error will be discussed later in Chapter 6. At this moment l focus on the 
optimal policy planning. 
With the assumption of identical households the government problem can be 
formally expressed as 
Tt 1_Q 
Max 11+v, subject to 
{p, pw, pA, ©°, ©R) t=o 
1+p 1-Q 
Gr+l -G, = 0°Ma/pö` - 3Gt, 
GR1-GR =ORMGI po` -SGR, 
G! 1-Gi =(1-Ba-oR)Mß/pöc-oGt, 
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gNN(I+v)t{Br+(lu*+1 s)(1-Br)}5FD(Gr), 
Qt +gHN(l+v)r{o, +(1''+1 S)(1-0t)}<FR(GR), and 
At, 5Är = FA 
(Ge ), together with the initial and the terminal conditions of each 
state variable. 
Due to the existence of stochastic elements, the solution differs between open-loop 
optimisation without feedbacks of the policy outcomes, and closed-loop 
optimisation adjusted for the realised situation at each time. The commitment to 
implement the policies at t=0 implies the open-loop solution. A practical 
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implication of this is that the numerical solution in this thesis is obtained by directly 
maximising social welfare, and not by stochastic dynamic programming. 
4.4.3 Solution of the second-stage optimisation 
The government problem formalised in the previous subsection is structurally the 
same as the one in the analytic model. Its high degree of complexity, however, 
discourages application of the same technique, the maximum principle, to this 
problem. Furthermore, since the analytic model reveals non-existence of interior 
solution of the government problem, as stated in Proposition 3.8, this may also be 
expected in the applied model. 
The employed solution algorithm to the second-stage optimisation of the applied 
model heavily relies on the market-clearing trajectories as stated in Corollary 3.1. 
The sustainability conditions are satisfied as strict equality constraints, and optimal 
public charges and investment can, at least conceptually, be determined as follows. 
At the starting period t=0 each of three types of public charges (no, p', , Pö) given 
initial stock levels of state variables (mo, KRo, Go, GOR, Go) is determined such that 
three `markets' of untreated water, treated water and irrigation land clear 
simultaneously in each period. Note that this price determination process in the 
period 0, which is a static problem, is not affected by the choice of allocation share 
of public investment Bo and OR which determines the levels of public capital 
stock in the period 1. 
To ease explanation let us introduce the vector notation 
Xr = (MI) KR t, Gr, GR, Gt ); a vector of all the state variables, and 
Yr = (pt , Pt, ' pA, wt 
t, ... ) ;a vector of all the endogenous variables. 
Using this notation, the optimal values of endogenous variables can be expressed as 
f 
0(x0)=(P0(X0), 
p (Xo)ý"')16 
16 As before, `A` denotes the optimal solution. 
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Once a set of the rates of public charges as well as other endogenous variables are 
determined, government revenue Mö is determined, and a public investment 
policy (Bo , 
Bö) fixes the level of public capital stock in the next period GI, GR 
and GI. In addition, the level of private capital stock ml is uniquely determined by 
Yo. Given a vector of state variables X1, the above price determination process 
results in Y (X1) and this cycle is repeated for the entire planning period. 
It is also possible to optimise public investment policy Z' = (9G, 9R) for entire 
planning period, at least in theory, using dynamic programming. The solution 
algorithm is as follows. 
Let A = (4,4) denote a vector of the optimal investment policy function for 
the government optimisation problem when the planning period is n. This optimal 
policy function vector is such that Zn = ýlTXý, which mean that Bý (Xe) and 
BR = 17 A (Xr). To illustrate the solution algorithm, let us start from n=2, because 
when n=1, the optimal solution is immediately obtained as Y (Xe) regardless of 
public investment policy. 
The government problem for two periods, subsuming all constraints into the 
relationship f, =Y (XI), is expressed as 
Max V2 = tI+v 
Here a parsimonious notation is employed throughout this explanation, e. g. 
3(x1(Zo; Xo)) stands for 6(Y1(XI(Zo; I'o(Xo), x0)), x1(zo; yo(Xo), x0))" 
If there is an interior solution, the first order necessary condition is obtained as 
ao(x1(z0; xo )) 
- 
ae(x1(zo; xo)) 
=o aeö - aoR 0 
" Superscript T stands for vector transposition. 
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The optimal solutions of these equations are Bo = AZ (X0) and Bo = X1 (X0) , 
thus A2: -- (A2 ) A) 
is obtained. 
Then, let us think about the case n=3. We have 
2 
Max V3= loo+Cl+p)tý`ý(XI(Zo; Xoýý)+(1+p) 11(e(X2(zi; Xi))) ' 
in which uo =u (c (Xo )): a constant. 
Here suppose, for the time being, Xl is given. Since u (c (X1)) is determined, this 
problem is identical to the n=2 case. 18 The optimality condition is 
ae(x2(z1; xl)) 
= 
aö(x2(zl; xl)) 
_ 
-o ae° aoR 
Hence the optimal policy is given as B° = A2 (Xl) and BR = f12 (Xl) , or 
in vector 
notation Zl = X12 (X1) . This corresponds to the principle of optimality 
(Bellman 
1957). With this optimal policy the optimisation problem can be rewritten as 
MaxV3(Zo)= u(ö(Xl(Zo; Xo)))+(l+p)ula(X2(A2(Zo; Xo), Zo; Xo))), in 
whichri(c(X2 (A2(Zo; Xo), Zo; Xo))) stands for 
u 
(ý (X2 (Az (Xi (ZO; XO)); XI (ZO; XO))ll ' 
Since V3 is a function of ZO, we can derive the optimal policy Zo = /13 (X0 ) 
Repeating this algorithm, finally we can transform the original government 
problem corresponding to the case r1= T as 
18 This is so because deleting constant terms and dividing or multiplying by arbitrary positive 
constant do not change the solution of this problem. 
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Max VT (Z) u(°(Xi (Zo; Xo)))+(1+ 
p)u(O(X2 
(AT-i (Zo; Xo)))) 
2 
+(l+v) t{`6(X3(Ar-Z(Ar-1(Zo; Xo))... ý+... 
P 
l T-I 
it 
((XT (A2 (A3... (Ar-2 (Ar-1 (ZO; Xoý)... ) ... +rI+ vPJ ` 
This solution determines AT = (ATO) AT R). The optimal public investment policy is 
sequentially obtained as Z0 = AT (X0), il = Ar-1(X1), and so on, in which Xt is 
obtained as Xl (Ar (Xo ), Xo) , ff2 
(AT_, (Xi etc. As a result, this algorithm 
can find the optimal trajectories of public investment policy { Bo , 
BG, """, BT 1 }, 
( BR BR ... BR 1 01'> T-1I 
This algorithm is a special case of dynamic programming where n-period dynamic 
optimisation problem can be reduced to a static optimisation problem. This 
conceptually feasible solution algorithm is, however, difficult to implement due to 
the high degree of complexity of the government problem. Policy simulations to be 
explained in Chapter 6 thus employ the optimal setting of public charges along with 
exogenously given public investment policy as policy scenarios, and investigates 
whether policy scenarios can satisfy certain policy targets, such as reducing 
unemployment or lack of safe water access as well as growth of income, or not. 
4.5 Trade and tax 
4.5.1 General 
Up to now issues related to trade and tax have been deliberately avoided. This is 
because, as exogenous variables, they do not change the model structure or solution. 
This section incorporates them into the model. 
This study employs an assumption of imperfect substitutability between foreign 
and domestic goods: the so called Armington assumption (Armington 1969), for 
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both imports and exports. This assumption is very widely employed in applied 
studies, particularly in CGE literature. 
In addition to import tax and export subsidy, commodity-specific sales tax z' (i = 
I, U) for producers and income tax rK for households are introduced. 
To facilitate the following explanation, flows of commodity and money in the 
economy are schematically illustrated in Figure 9. The following notation is 
common throughout the remaining part of this dissertation. 
PIP : Producer price of good i in local currency, 
plc : Consumer price of good i in local currency, 
pDi : Domestic wholesale price of good i in local currency, 
p fr : World price of good i in international currency, 
re : Real exchange rate, which is defined as a real price of international 
currency in terms of local currency, 
E` : Exports of good i in physical term, 
tv! : Imports of good i in physical term, 
YD' : Supply of domestic product i to the domestic wholesale market, 
Di : Total demand for import-domestic produced composite good i, 
D1': Demand of institution j for composite good i, in which j=H (household), 
G (government), and S (saving account), 
sik: Intermediate input demand of producers of good k for composite good i, 
r' : Producer tax rate of good i, 
r: Import tax rate of good i, and 
Si : Export subsidy rate of good i. 
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Figure 9 Flows of commodities and money with trade and tax 
Note that Figure 9 does not contain income tax flow from households to the 
government which has no effect on commodity prices. 
4.5.2 Trade and commodity price 
(1) Imports 
Imperfect substitution between domestically produced and imported goods is 
specified as the following CES (constant elasticity of substitution) function. 
,: I' 
1t 
"`-1 (1- 
S' 
Ilý'Dr1Q 
QM-ý 
D' = a' Sr 
(Mf a1 
a if hf M Ar M/ aM , in which 
am : scale parameter, ö: preference parameter of import good, and o: CES 
elasticity of substitution, with respect to good i. 
The solution to the consumer's expenditure minimisation problem given disposable 
income results in the optimality condition 
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Mi S 
QM 
pDi 
yD' 1-lsi 
{(i+r)p1wret 
From the commodity and monetary balance conditions, we have 
D'=Y°i+M', and 
PI`D '- PD` yDJ + (1+ iM) P1WreMl " 
From these four equations, the following relation among prices is derived. 
pr°= pitvre(l+zM)i7M, in which 
((S' )aM 
+(1-! Sj 
f art f (l+zr 1 iWre/ Di) 
M-1 
iM M/ l` MJP 
P1 
ý%M - (, 5 
\am 
+(1-! Si )aM (l+zi 1 iWre Di a'iý M1 M{M JP 
/P } 
(2) Exports 
Similar to the import case, imperfect substitution between export supply and 
domestic market supply is specified as the following CET (constant elasticity of 
transformation) function. 
of 
ap- 
y E BEýEi) . 11 +ýi_ö')(yDi-F-1 ) a8 , in which 
aE : scale parameter, 5: preference parameter of export good, and QE : CET 
elasticity of substitution, with respect to good i. 
The solution to the producers' profit maximisation problem given quantity of total 
product results in the optimality condition 
ri 
El St 
aE Di 
YD' 
1S 
l(1+s1)piwre} 
From thee commodity and monetary balance conditions, we have 
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yi= yDi + E', and 
(1+l)p'PYJ=p DIYDi +(1+s')p'WreE'. 
From these four equations, the following price relationship is derived. 
plp = piwre 
1+ sii7E in which 
1+Ti 
f I1-) S(1 t Sil p1're/p)1 
(5E) 
J 
(\ a 
E 
I5E) -I-ý1-CSE) 
«1 
f Si)piWre/pDi) 
ä 
(3) Determination of domestic wholesale price 
The last element to have operational significance for policy simulation is the 
relationship between domestic wholesale price and world price. The employed 
assumption is that the government subsidises export goods such that the producers 
are indifferent to export their products or to supply them to the domestic wholesale 
market, while the products can be sold in the rest of the world at the world price. 19 
This assumption establishes the relationship 
pD'_(l+s')pi1vre 
With this relationship, consumer and producer prices are determined as 
p; `= piv,. e(1+zmir)r7`, u, in which 
(i+s'){(oiyi1(i+s')rM' 
+(1-(SM)QM(1+TM)au 
rlM ., and (oh) f1 1+s )CI AI +1 1-ýM)aM (1+ZM) CM' 
ipi6V 1+Si 
PP re as 17Ei =1. 
19 This is because my model cannot accommodate multiple products of one industry. See Sadoulet 
and de Janvry (1995; p. 204-205) for the case when differentiation between export goods and 
domestically sold goods is allowed. 
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Optimal imports and exports can then be derived from the optimality conditions and 
commodity balance conditions as 
pE ", in which QE - a$ 
(of, 
, and (ö) 
+(i ö 
)ai 
rr 
Mr =Iq s' 
QM S'ti! aM (1 
_ tZ) Y' . l+zM 1-SM 
The former equation indicates that the proportion of exports to total production is 
constant at Q regardless of tax or subsidy policy. This is an outcome of the 
assumption that jP' = (1 +st) p'iVre, which implies that subsidy rate is automatically 
determined by world and domestic market. The role of the government in this case 
is purely passive as it merely follows the market signal. The reading of the latter 
equation must be, therefore, that the government can control the ratio of imports to 
total production by setting a rate of import tax, but cannot control it through 
subsidies. 
Exports and imports can be simulated based on these equations, once the CES and 
CET parameters have been fixed. 
4.5.3 Income tax 
It is assumed that the government levies a uniform rate tax TH on household income. 
This tax can be incorporated into the household problem by multiplying factor 
(1 - rH) to all wage rates, real rate of return r1, and net producer price of rainfed 
product pR . 
As a result the optimal consumption is modified as follows. 
at _ 
ýQ 1+ý1-zH)r`-ý1+v) 
1+ 
t x[pucnlj 
I)' 
iP 
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+ 
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The equation of motion of private assets is also modified as 
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It should be noted that household decision is summarised in these two equations. 
The effects of income tax are, thus, fully covered by the above modification. 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has addressed a way to incorporate the stylised facts of water-scarce 
developing countries into the analytic model developed in the previous chapter. 
Four key stylised facts are taken into account; (i) dominant water use share of 
irrigated agriculture, (ii) vulnerability of rainfed agriculture, (iii) a high urban 
unemployment rate, and (iv) poor safe water access in the rural areas. For this 
purpose the analytic model is modified in the following way. 
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Firstly, the production sector is disaggregated into three sectors; rainfed agricultural, 
irrigated agricultural and urban modern sectors. This specification allows the 
model not only to address irrigation-rainfed issues but also to pave a way to model 
rural-urban migration mechanism. Production risk is introduced in rainfed 
agriculture only in order to reflect its inherent environmental vulnerability. Note 
that the household problem is specified as a utility maximisation given household 
expectations of specific variables, instead of expected utility maximisation. This is 
because it is difficult to regard household expectations about prices and public 
policy variables as stochastic. The expected utility model is not suitable to deal 
with this case. 
Secondly, labour market equilibrium for unskilled labourers is introduced. 20 It is 
assumed that a household allocates its unskilled members to either irrigated 
agricultural or urban modern sectors such that indirect utility derived from wage 
income is indifferent in either case. The obtained equilibrium can be regarded as a 
generalised version of Harris-Todaro model. Indeed, when public water supply 
coverage is 100% in rural area, my model is reduced to Harris-Todaro model. 
Thirdly, poor safe water access in rural area is modelled through a `penalty', which 
generates disutility for household members who lack safe water access. This 
penalty is represented as a reduction of labour supply which can be interpreted as a 
reduction of net wage income. This reflects the opportunity cost of forgone wage 
income from fetching water and additional expenditures on e. g. medical care 
caused by water-born diseases. An idea to assign higher price of water, such as 
price of bottled water, is abandoned because it requires introducing an additional 
production sector, private water sector, in this general equilibrium framework. 
These modifications are implemented without losing tractability. It should be noted 
that this is underpinned by a crucial assumption that the representative household is 
a single decision-making unit in spite of heterogeneity of household members in 
terms of occupation and safe water access. This assumption is at odds with 
20 Division of skilled and unskilled labourers is purely empirical specification without which model 
calibration has difficulty. 
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distributional issues, which I believe one of key aspects of sustainable 
development. 
It has been confirmed that the applied model maintains essentially the same 
structure as the analytic model despite its drastically increased complexity. In the 
second-stage government optimisation, however, stochastic elements are 
introduced which make much more careful treatment of the government problem 
necessary. In this chapter an explicit treatment of the government expectations is 
introduced. Issues of policy implementation under uncertainty are discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
Insights provided by the analytic model are used to establish a solution algorithm. 
The solution algorithm optimises public charges, but does not optimise public 
investment. Instead, several patterns of public investment policy are exogenously 
set as policy scenarios, and are evaluated to see whether they can satisfy certain 
policy targets or not. 
Issues arising from incorporating trade and tax into the model have also been 
discussed. Obtained results are highly important to calibrating and validating the 
model. Moreover, an explicit treatment of trade and tax enables the model to 
consider more policy scenarios. 
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Chapter 5 
Calibration and Validation of the Applied Model 
5.1 Introduction 
Modelling requires, by definition, abstraction from certain aspects of reality. For 
this purpose some aspects relevant to research objectives are specified in some 
depth while other aspects are rather grossly simplified or ignored by assumption. If 
a model fails to be a useful and relevant tool for addressing research questions, this 
is not necessarily because of the simplification or ignorance of reality itself, as is 
often suggested, but may be because of its inability to replicate those aspects of 
reality relevant to the research. This can be evaluated only by model validation. 
Therefore, conducting simulations without model validation cannot provide any 
reliable answer to empirical questions. 
This chapter reports the results of calibration and validation of the applied model 
along with detailed data description. Section 5.2 introduces Morocco as the case 
study country. Section 5.3 describes the data and explains construction of an 
aggregate version of social accounting matrix (SAM) based on a published highly 
disaggregated SAM. The aggregate version of SAM serves as the principle 
database of the applied model. Section 5.4 explains calibration process and reports 
the results, and Section 5.5 does the same for validation. In Section 5.6 sustainable 
production functions of water and irrigation land are constructed, and Section 5.7 
concludes this chapter. 
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5.2 Case study country - Morocco 
The applied model constructed in Chapter 4 is calibrated and validated based on 
Moroccan data. Morocco is chosen as the case study country for the following two 
reasons: 
- Morocco is a water-scarce developing country where all the key stylised facts 
incorporated into the applied model are observed, and 
- There exist several datasets on Morocco that are highly relevant to this 
dissertation. In particular, a Moroccan social accounting matrix for the year 
1994 (Löfgren et al. 1997) provides an ideal dataset for this dissertation. 
Some important facts abount Morocco for this study are described below. 
5.2.1 Geography and climate 
Morocco is located in the North Africa bordered by both the Atlantic Ocean and the 
Mediterranean Sea. Moroccan territory is 71 million hectare, including the Western 
Sahara, and characterised by high degree of geographical heterogeneity that is well 
illustrated by the fact that both the broadest plains and the highest mountains in 
North Africa lie in Morocco. 
As a consequence, climatic conditions vary across the country. In general, the plain 
regions along the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts are associated with annual 
precipitation levels of 400 - 750 mm, while the annual precipitation level 
frequently exceeds 750 mm in the high and the middle Atlas regions which form a 
north-east part of the Atlas mountains. By contrast the Saharan regions have often 
under 100 mm precipitation per year. On average, total precipitation for the entire 
Moroccan territory is estimated at 150 billion m3 per year (World Bank 1995), 
which is equivalent to 211 mm per year. Table 1 shows spatial variation of mean 
precipitation in Morocco and Figure 10 shows the country map. 
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Table 1 Spatial variation of annual mean precipitation in Morocco 
[Unit: mm per yearl 
City Region 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 75-99 
Tangier North 839.1 600.9 676.1 624.3 804.0 708.9 
Fes North 572.2 407.3 468.2 391.7 401.8 448.2 
Ifranc North (Middle Atlas) 1034.3 785.9 944.8 774.9 968.2 901.6 
Rabat North (Atlantic coast) 632.2 453.0 494.8 347.7 511.1 487.8 
Casablanca North (Atlantic coast) 431.9 302.1 396.2 316.3 442.0 377.7 
Marrakech Central 223.8 197.7 228.2 198.0 277.5 225.0 
Ouarzazate 
Agadir 
Central east 
South (Atlantic coast) 
92.7 
214.7 
77.1 
260.1 
188.5 
322.8 
116.9 96.4 
156.7 328.9 
115.1 
256.6 
Laayoune South (Western Sahara) 63.0 45.2 78.1 73.4 N. A. 63.5 
Source: Royaume du Maroc (1982 - 1985,1990 - 2003) 
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Figure 10 Country map of Morocco 
During the past two decades drought occurs every two years on average, which is 
significantly higher than its average for the past 100 years (every 10 years). Recent 
drought years are 1992,1993,1995,1999, and 2000. Although it is inconclusive 
whether this higher frequency of droughts is caused by anthropogenic factors such 
as greenhouse gas emissions or not, several climate change researchers predict 
further decrease of precipitation in this region. 
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Hulme et al. (1995) derive future climate change scenarios for Africa using a 
two-stage process. First, an energy-balance model predicts the transient response 
of the global system, but not the regional response. Second, general circulation 
models (GCMs) predict regional responses mostly based on equilibrium 
experiments corresponding to the steady-state with a fixed level of greenhouse 
gases. Simulation results of nine GCMs are combined for the second stage because 
of significant difference between model experiments. Although their scenarios 
show a huge range of possible future rainfall from decrease of tens of percent to 
increase of similar magnitude from the current level, they conclude that "it does 
appear that northern Africa may experience a further reduction in rainfall amounts 
over coming decades" (p. 16). 
Knippertz et at. (2003) statistically investigate the effects of the large-scale 
atmospheric circulation parameters, especially synoptic and baroclinic activities, 
on precipitation in Morocco based on monthly precipitation data of the Global 
Historical Climatology Network (GHCN). They utilise their findings to examine 
the consistency between simulation results of precipitation, which is "not always 
well reproduced in GCMs" (p. 81), and other more reliable variables related to the 
large-scale atmospheric circulation, from a coupled atmosphere-ocean GCM, 
ECHAM4/OPYC3, developed in co-operation between the Max Planck Institute 
and the Deutsches Klimarechenzentrum (DKRZ). Their analysis consistently 
predicts a negative influence of increasing greenhouse gas emissions on 
precipitation in the regions along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean coasts, but it 
cannot provide conclusive prediction of precipitation in the regions south of the 
Atlas Mountains where local and orographic influences are dominating. 
5.2.2 Demography 
The total population of Morocco was estimated at 29.6 million in 2002. Population 
growth rate has gradually dropped from 2.0 % per year during the 1980's to 1.6 % 
per year during the 1990's. This drop of population growth is clearly reflected in 
decreasing youth population share of age under 15 from 39.8 % in the year 1990 to 
32.3 % in the year 2000 (Royaume du Maroc 1982 - 1985,1990 - 2003). Table 2 
summarises the demographic data of Morocco. 
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Table 2 Demographics of Morocco 
Year 1975 1980* 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Total population [million persons] 17.2 20.1 22.1 24.5 26.4 28.7 
Youth share of age under 15 group 46.0% 44.4% 41.6% 39.8% 36.2% 32.3% 
10-year mean annual growth rate 2.6% 2.8% 2.5% 2.0% 1.8% 1 1.6% 
* Interpolation based on 1979 and 1982 data. 
Source: Royaume du Maroc (1982 - 1985,1990 - 2003), and 
World Bank (1998) for pre-1975 data 
Note that Morocco is one of the major labour exporting countries to the European 
Union. The net emigration rate in 2004 is estimated at 0.98 persons per thousand 
people (Central Intelligence Agency 2005). 
5.2.3 Economy 
The Moroccan economy has been transformed from a French colonial economy 
which exported agricultural products and phosphate rocks, into more diversified 
economy in which the service sector plays a key role at least in the urban areas. 
Although Morocco is still a leading producer of phosphate, the role of mining 
industry in exports has drastically reduced from 32 % of total value of exports in 
1981 to 8% in 1991, due to both diversification of economic activity and declining 
world price of phosphates (World Bank 1995). 
Morocco is an upper middle-income country with national gross domestic product 
of 32.9 billion US dollar, or 3,597 US dollar per capita based on purchased power 
parity (PPP) in 2000 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2002). Based on the Human 
Development Index, Morocco was 112th among 162 countries in 1999 and 126th 
out of 175 countries in 2001 (UNDP 2000,2003). 
(1) Agricultural sector 
The role of agriculture has been more and more limited in terms of GDP share, 
18.5 % in 1994, but is still highly significant in labour absorption as it provides 
45 % of total employment in the same year. The rural economy provides nearly 
80 % of total rural employment and produces 60 % of total rural value-added 
(Löfgren et al. 1999). 
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Furthermore, it has been observed that high vulnerability of rainfed agriculture to 
draught has sometimes severely hampered nationwide economic development. 
Figure 11 shows relationship between year-to-year variation of nationwide real 
GDP and rainfed agricultural production in physical term. ' 
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Figure 11 Variation of rainfed agricultural production and real GDP 
Note the magnitude of variation of rainfed agricultural production represented by 
non-industrial crop production in the figure. It is obviously a tough business for the 
farmers to cope with such a huge production fluctuation. Furthermore, several 
climate change researchers predict higher frequency of extreme climatic events 
which may significantly worsen this fluctuation (Hulme et al. 1995, Parish and 
Funnell 1999). 
Against this background the Moroccan government has focused on irrigation 
infrastructure development as a core of rural development strategy. The 
government has allocated more than 60 % of public investment in agriculture to 
irrigation development since 1965 (Kadi 2002). It is estimated that the large-scale 
and medium-scale irrigation areas administered by the government has increased 
from 640 thousand hectares in 1984 to 860 thousand hectares in 1994 (Academie du 
Royaume du Maroc 2000). Although the share of irrigation areas is estimated at 10 
- 15 % of the total cultivated land including small-scale private irrigation areas, 
irrigated agriculture currently contributes around 45 % of the agricultural 
value-added and 75 % of agricultural exports (Kadi 2002). 
1 Rainfed agricultural production is approximated by total non-industrial crop production. 
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(2) Urban unemployment 
One of the major challenges of the Moroccan economy is a chronically high rate of 
urban unemployment, underpinned by significant rural-urban migration. This 
migration-induced urban unemployment mechanism is observed by a contrast of 
unemployment rates between rural and urban areas as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 Urban and rural unemployment rates 
1995 1999 2000 2002 
Urban unemployment rate 22.3 % 21.8 % 21.2 % 18.2 % 
Rural unemployment rate 7.6 % 5.0 % 4.6 % 3.6 % 
Source: Royaume du Maroc (1996,2000 - 2003) 
The main driving force of rural-urban migration is not only lower income or higher 
poverty incidence in the rural areas but also poorer public services in the rural areas 
mainly in terms of safe water, electricity, and education (Löfgren et al. 1999). The 
World Bank (1995) reports that a lack of safe water access remains "the primary 
cause of ill-health in the rural areas" (p. 2). 
(3) Trade and foreign direct investment 
The trade balance of Morocco is chronically negative with the ratio of exports to 
imports around 70 - 80 %. Recently the leading export goods are textiles followed 
by food products, in particular fish products, while the leading import goods are 
machinery and equipment for industrial purposes (Economic Intelligent Unit 2002). 
The government has launched a trade liberalisation programme since the early 
1980's under the Structural Adjustment Programme led by the International 
Monetary Fund. Since then, trade liberalisation has gradually been implemented 
through elimination of quantitative restrictions and reductions of import tariffs 
(Löfgren et al. 1999). There still remains, however, a high degree of trade 
protection for domestic agriculture. 
The government maintains relatively tight foreign exchange rate control scheme as 
a principle policy tool to deal with inflation, despite increasing pressure to devalue 
mainly from exporters. The Moroccan local currency dirham is regarded as 
overvalued which obviously contributes to the chronic trade deficit. The share of 
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the foreign direct investment to the gross fixed capital formation is small. It is 
estimated at 3.2 % in 1980's and 9.7 % in 1990's, and the large part of the latter is 
associated with the privatisation of Maroc Telecom (Bouoiyour 2003). 
5.2.4 Water sector and water policy 
(1) Key institution in the water sector 
The major part of water sector in Morocco is directly controlled by the government. 
Key players are DGH (the Direction Generale de 1'Hydraulique), ONEP (the Office 
National de 1'Eau Potable), and ORMVA (the Office Regional de Mise en Valeur 
Agricole). DGH is responsible for water resource development, including 
mobilising raw water for large-scale irrigation perimeters. ONEP is mainly 
responsible for drinking water supply including planning, constructing and 
managing water treatment and supply facilities except for the large cities where 
autonomous water providers (Regies) supply drinking water. ORMVA is 
responsible for management of the major irrigation perimeters. There exist nine 
ORMVAs; Loukkos, Moulouya, Gharb, Doukkala, Tadla, Haouz, Souss-Massa, 
Ouarzazate, and Tafilalet. Overall management of national water policy is provided 
by the National Water and Climate Council (World Bank 1995). 
(2) Water resource development 
Of 150 billion m3 of average annual nationwide rainfall, about 120 billion m3 is 
evaporated and 30 billion m3 remains as a potential water resource of which 22.5 
billion m3 flows as surface water and 7.5 billion m3 replenishes groundwater. 
The rainy season is between December and February and most surface flow is 
concentrated in this period. Due to this highly seasonal nature of the hydrological 
cycle, surface water resource development in Morocco has heavily relied on dam 
construction. Moroccan water resource development plan anticipates that annual 
mobilisation of surface water will be increased from 8.26 billion m3 in 1990 to 
13.78 billion m3 in 2020 by 5.52 billion m3, of which 2.78 billion m3 is to be 
covered by the Al Wahida dam and the remaining 2.74 billion m3 will be covered by 
the other 51 dams. 
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Of 7.5 billion m3 annual groundwater recharge the total renewable groundwater 
resource available for use is estimated at between 3 and 4.5 billion m3. Due to very 
uneven spatial distribution of the renewable groundwater, i. e. the Middle and the 
High Atlas regions are endowed with 70 % of the renewable groundwater resources, 
mining of non-renewable groundwater is undertaken in some regions. Nationwide 
total extraction is estimated at 2.73 billion m3 which is less than the total renewable 
groundwater resources available for use. Groundwater resource development plan 
anticipates 10 % increase of groundwater harvest to 2.99 billion m3 in 2020. 
Other water resources, such as desalination of seawater or recycling of wastewater, 
are rarely utilised in Morocco. For instance desalinisation and demineralisation 
facilities in the southern regions currently produce 0.015 billion m3 as a whole, 
which is merely 0.01 % of total domestic water supply (World Bank 1995). 
The World Bank (1995) reports that the average total public investments in dams 
and transfers for the period between 1990 and 1994 was 0.7 billion 1993 DH per 
year, and was expected to reach 3 billion 1993 DH per year for the period from 
1995 to 2000. 
(3) Water use 
Nationwide water use is dominated by irrigation whose share was estimated at 85 % 
in 1990 (World Bank 1995) and 88 % in the early 2000's (Kadi 2002). The former 
estimate is based on an assumption that some part of return flow from irrigation, a 
proportion of irrigation water returning to aquifers, could be recycled. Based on 
more conventional estimate of gross consumptive use, the share of irrigation water 
in the same year is estimated at 92 % (World Bank 1995; p. 9). The shares of 
domestic and industrial water uses are estimated at 8% and 4% respectively in the 
early 2000's (Kadi 2002). 
Water consumption in 1990 is estimated at 9,190 million m3 for irrigation use and 
1,210 million m3 for domestic and industrial uses. The government has 
traditionally attached high priority to satisfying domestic and industrial water 
demand. The future projection of water demands is thus based on estimation of the 
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future domestic and industrial water demands, and the difference between projected 
water supply capacity and the forecast domestic and industrial demands is defined 
as the irrigation water supply potential. The future domestic and industrial water 
demands in 2020 are forecast at 2,720 million m3, which is equivalent to 2.7 % 
annual growth, based on the following assumptions. 2 
- Per capita domestic consumption rises gradually from the current estimate of 
100 1cd to 150 1cd in the urban areas and from the current estimate of 7.51cd to 
40 lcd in the rural areas, 
- Industrial demand grows annually at a rate of 4 
- Population grows annually at a rate of 2.5 % in the urban areas and 1.5 % in the 
rural areas, taking into rural-urban migration into account, and 
- Water supply delivery loss drops from the current level of 30 % to 20 %. 
As a result, with an additional assumption that 310 million m3 must be kept in water 
courses to flush solid wastes and other debris to the sea, the potential irrigation 
water supply is forecast at 13,610 million m3, which is equivalent to 1.3 % annual 
growth. This potential irrigation water supply shares 81 % of the forecast water 
supply capacity in 2020 (World Bank 1995). 
(4) Irrigation infrastructure development 
As mentioned before, irrigation infrastructure development has been given high 
priority in rural development strategy. The Moroccan government has prepared the 
irrigation investment plan as the National Irrigation Programme (Plan National 
d'Irrigation) in 1992 of which main goal is to expand irrigation areas to exceed 1 
million hectares by 2000 and thereafter reach 1.2 million hectares by the year 2010. 
The total expenditures under the National Irrigation Programme are estimated at 
over 40 billion 1993 Dirham (DH) including the capital costs of new facilities, the 
rehabilitation costs of existing facilities, operation and maintenance costs, recurrent 
Z This forecast is corresponding to the base case, and the lower and upper bound cases are also 
prepared by changing the assumptions, e. g. lower or higher industrial demand growth, status quo 
delivery loss or further reduction to 10 %, etc. The lower bound forecast is 1,949 million m3 and 
the upper bound is 6,276 million m3 (World Bank 1995; p. 14). 
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costs, and debt service. The required annual public spending is estimated at around 
2 billion 1993 DH over the period 1995 - 2000, which is approximately twice more 
than the investment level over the period 1988 - 1994 of 0.9 billion 1993 DH 
(World Bank 1995). 
Löfgren et al. (1997) provide more detailed information about the National 
Irrigation Programme for the period between 1993 and 2001, as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 National Irrigation Programme 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
Investment 
0.51 0.58 1.30 1.98 2.46 1.32 0.66 0.62 0.45 9.88 
[Billion 1994 DH] 
Area [Thousand ha] - 10.0 ý 16.6 15.4 25.5 1 5.9 20.1 (-i - 93.5 
Water [Million m3] - - 68 73 151 46 148 - 486 
Source: Löfgren et al. (1997) 
According to this table, the forecast irrigation expansion is 0.09 million hectare 
during this period, which is too small to achieve the original goal. This discrepancy 
seems mainly due to the exclusion of low probability future projects of which total 
costs is estimated at 8.0 billion 1994 DH. 
Löfgren et al. (1997) reveal that the National Irrigation Programme envisages 
unchanged per hectare irrigation water use. The forecast irrigation water supply 
potential requires, however, significant reduction of per hectare irrigation water use. 
The World Bank (1995) reports that expected irrigation area expansion to 830,000 
hectares of large-scale and 470,000 hectares of small-medium scale irrigation areas 
will result in reduction of available irrigation water from 14,140 m3 per hectare in 
1990 to 10,000 m3 per hectare in 2020. Such a reduction seems to be "not likely to 
be feasible with current technology and has important consequences for future 
investment and for water management"(p. 15). 
(5) Safe water access 
While most statistics agree with almost 100 % coverage of public water service in 
the Moroccan urban areas, the estimate in the rural areas significantly varies. For 
instance, Löfgren et al. (1999) refer to an estimate that only 4% of rural households 
Chapter 5 Calibration and Validation 148 
have safe water access in 1994, while the World Bank (1995) employs an estimate 
that 14 % of rural households have secured water supplies in 1990,2 % being 
household connection, 6% standpipes and 6% modernised wells. 
The present research employs the estimates reported by WHO/UNICEFF (2001) 
that compiles the results of the Moroccan Demographic and Health Survey 
conducted in 1987,1992 and 1995 as well as those of Global Water Supply and 
Sanitation Assessment 2000 conducted by WHO in 1999. Table 5 summarises the 
estimates in WHO/UNICEFF (2001). 
Table 5 Safe water access and improved sanitation in Morocco 
Year 1987 1992 1995 1999 
Urban Safe water access 87.2 94.1 96.8 100.0 
- Private tap 69.7 76.4 85.6 84.0 
- Standpipe 17.5 17.7 11.2 16.0* 
Improved sanitation 91.0 83.0 90.0 100.0 
Rural Safe water access 25.4 17.5 19.8 38.0 
- Private tap 7.9 9.1 10.6 6.0 
- Standpipe 17.5 8.4 9.2 32.0* 
Improved sanitation 28.0 31.0 39.0 36.0 
* Defined as population with reasonable access to a public water point. 
According to the World Bank (1995), the average total public investments for the 
period between 1990 and 1994 was 0.2 billion 1993 DH per year in domestic water 
distribution and 0.15 billion DH per year in sanitation and sewerage, and is forecast 
to reach I billion 1993 DH per year each in domestic water distribution and in 
sanitation and sewerage for the period from 1995 to 2000. 
(6) Water and irrigation land pricing 
In Morocco, volumetric domestic water charge schemes with multiple price ranges 
(or tiers) have been implemented for cost recovery of the domestic water service 
providers (Regies), and the rates of domestic water charges significantly vary 
among the Regies. These rates have been revised at almost annual basis. Table 6 
shows a time series of real-term domestic water tariffs of the average of 10 cities 
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among 12 cities reported in the national statistical yearbook (Royaume du Maroc 
1982 - 1985,1990 - 2003). 
3 
Table 6 Average of real water tariff of 10 cities in Morocco 
Year 1985 1990 1995 2000 
1st range rate [1994 DH/m3] 
5-year mean annual change [%J 
1.14 
-2.9 
1.18 
0.6 
1.75 
8.3 
1.71 
-0.5 
2nd range rate [1994 DH/m3] 
5-year mean annual change [%] 
2.25 
3.4 
2.41 
1.4 
3.60 
8.3 } 
4.88 
6.3 
3rd range rate [ 1994 DH/m3] 
5-year mean annual change [%] 
3.07 
10.1 
3.33 
1.6 ; 
4.97 
8.4 
7.13 
7.5 
1st range 0-30 m3 0-24 m3 0-8 m3 
2nd range 30-60 m3 24-60 m3 8-20 m3 
3rd range > 60 m3 > 60 m3 20-40 m3 
4th range - - > 40 m3 
Source: Royaumc du Maroc (1982 - 1985,1990 - 2003) 
Although the recent drastic real price escalation of domestic water appears 
surprising, it is consistent with the Moroccan government policy to achieve full cost 
recovery of the urban water distribution systems as well as the operation and 
maintenance costs of the sewerage systems by the year 2000 (World Bank 1995; 
p. 31). 
According to Kadi (2002), irrigation land and water pricing for the large-scale 
irrigation areas is legislated by the Code of Agricultural Investment in 1969 as 
follows: 
- Irrigation land charge (land improvement tax), which can be paid by yearly 
instalments for 17 years with 4% annual interest rate, covers 30 % of capital 
investment costs. First five hectares are exempted for the farmers with less 
than 20 hectares land holdings. 
- Volumetric irrigation water charge covers 10 % of capital investment costs, full 
operation and maintenance costs plus 40 % of replacement costs. 
10 cities arc; Agadir, El Jadida, Essaouira, Fes, Kenitra, Marrakech, Meknes, Safi, Tangier and 
Tetouan. Casablanca and Rabat are excluded due to lack of data since 2000. The rate of the 4`1' 
range is slightly higher than that of the 3rd range, e. g. 7.81 versus 7.76 current DWrn3 in Fes in 
2000. 
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In addition, irrigation farmers are responsible for the energy costs for pumping, if 
necessary. The government is responsible for the remaining capital investment and 
replacement costs. In practice, however, volumetric water charges are set far below 
the legislated level, usually only 25 %- 50 % of the level calculated based on the 
Code. The main reason is the necessity for the government both to encourage 
farmers to irrigate and to equalise rate of volumetric charges across different 
irrigation areas. The cost recovery through irrigation land charges is worse due to 
the fact that 80 % of farmers hold less than 5 hectares of land each. 
Coping with this reality, the revision of pricing scheme for irrigation land and water 
are ongoing (Kadi 2002). Although I have not found reliable nationwide statistics 
for the irrigation land and water charges, there is little doubt that rates are 
drastically rising as in the case of domestic water charges. 
5.3 Data description 
5.3.1 Data sources 
The input datasets for calibration and validation of the applied model are 
constructed based on the following data/information. 
(1) Moroccan social accounting matrix for the year 1994 
Löfgren et al. (1999) construct a disaggregated social accounting matrix (SAM), a 
104 x 104 matrix, for the year 1994.4 Because this SAM is designed to capture both 
the urban-rural and the rainfed-irrigated agriculture dichotomies, it is an ideal and 
indispensable database for my research in which these dichotomies play important 
roles. 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) provides this SAM in Excel format on 
request. 
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Several studies have provided Moroccan SAMs for different years. They include; 
Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) for the year 1980; Mateus (1988), Goldin and 
Roland-Holst (1995), Martens (1995), and Decaluwe et al. (1999) for the year 
1985; and Roland-Holst (1996) for the year 1990 and 1994. They are not used in 
this study because none of them contain the information necessary to divide rainfed 
and irrigation agricultures in a satisfactory manner. 
(2) Moroccan national statistical yearbook 
The following data are collected from a series of Moroccan national statistical 
yearbooks (Annuaire Statistique du Maroc). 5 
- Demography, 
- Climatic conditions, 
- Crop production, 
- Minimum wage rates, 
- Domestic water tariff, and 
- Urban and rural labour force and employment. 
(3) International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
The following data are collected from a series of International Financial Statistics. 
- Nominal effective exchange rate, 
- Total value of export, 
- Total value of import, and 
- GDP deflators for Morocco and USA. 
(4) Others 
The other data sources are as follows. 
- The real interest rate data are collected from a series of World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
In England the collections of the SOAS library and the LSE library cover series of Annuaire 
Statistique du Maroc for several years during 1980's and all years since 1990. 
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- Nationwide total irrigation area data are from Academie du Royaume du 
Maroc (2000). 
- Public capital investment is based on data from the World Bank (1995). 
- Proportion of skilled labour in 1994 is from Löfgren et al. (1999). 
5.3.2 Construction of aggregate social accounting matrix 
The applied model requires a SAM consisting of, 
-5 factors - land, capital, unskilled labour, skilled labour and irrigation water, 
- the government and a homogeneous group of households, 
- the rest of the world and a saving account, 
-3 private production sectors - rainfed agriculture, irrigation agriculture and 
urban modern sector, and 
- accounts representing taxes and subsidies. 
This aggregate SAM is constructed based on the 104 x 104 Moroccan SAM as 
follows. 6 
(1) Reclassification by summation 
Most parts of aggregation can be easily done by summation of the accounts that can 
be regarded as breakdowns of an account. By this method the original SAM is 
reclassified as follows. Note that codes within round brackets are used in GAMS 
coding as well as in the aggregate SAM. 
- Unskilled labour (L): A sum of [1] - [4]. Note that rural skilled labour, which 
represents 8.7 % of labour force, is classified into this category due to the 
assumption in my model that all rural labour is unskilled. 
- Farm land (A): A sum of [6] - [8]. 
- Private capital (K): A sum of [10] - [14]. 
- Household (HH): A sum of [16] - [19]. 
6 In this subsection the kt` account in the original 104 x 104 Moroccan SAM is referred to as [k]. 
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- Rest of the World (ROW): Either [21] or a sum of [22] and [23], because the 
original SAM sometimes breakdown the rest of the world into EU [22] and 
non-EU [23] countries. 
- Irrigation agricultural sector (I): A sum of [25] - [39], [53] - [55], and [59] - 
[61], which represent all the rural production activities except for the rainfed 
agricultural activities, which includes rural manufacturing, rural construction, 
etc. 7 
- Rainfed agricultural sector (R): A sum of [40] - [52]. 
- Urban modern sector (U): A sum of [56] - [58] and [62] - [65]. 
- Direct and indirect taxes (TAX): A sum of [100] and [101]. 
- Tariffs and non-tariff barriers (TNT): Asum of [15], [103], and [104]. 
Skilled labour (S) [5], irrigation water (Q) [9], government (GOV) [20], saving 
account (SAV) [24], and subsidies (SUB) [102] are unchanged. 
(2) Mapping commodity accounts to production activity accounts 
The original 104 x 104 Moroccan SAM employs a commodity-by-industry account 
framework to represent private production activities, which allows better treatment 
of secondary products of production activities (Miller and Blair 1985). In the 
commodity-by-industry framework, consumers purchase commodities supplied by 
various industries (production activities) as well as by imports. Despite its 
advantage of representing the actual economic transactions, this framework is not 
compatible with my model in which each production sector produces only one type 
of commodity. To have compatibility it is necessary to map each of 34 
commodities recorded in the original SAM to one of 3 private production sectors. 
This mapping has been done based on an assumption that a composition of a 
commodity output in terms of each industry's product supply is fixed, which is 
Recall that the purpose of rainfed-irrigation division in my model is to capture vulnerability of 
rainfed agriculture. Hence irrigation agriculture stands for non-rainfed rural activities. 
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often referred to as the industry-based technology assumption (Miller and Blair 
1985; p. 165). 8 
The mapping processes are as follows (cf. Miller and Blair 1985). First, let me 
introduce the following matrix notation. 
- The make matrix (Ti; a3x 34 matrix of which rows are production activities 
and columns are commodities. 
- The use matrix (U); a 34 x3 matrix of which rows are commodities and the 
columns are production activities. 
- The final commodity demand matrix (E); a 34 x5 matrix of which rows are 
commodities and the columns are institutions. Note that subsidy account, 
which pays money to commodity accounts, is treated as an institution in 
addition to household, government, rest of the world and saving account. 
- The vectors of commodity-based trade-and-tax (C; ); row vectors with 34 
elements represent transactions from each commodity account to it' account, 
where i= ROW, TAX, SUB, and TNT. 
All of these matrices and vectors are immediately obtained from the reclassified 
SAM as its parts. 
Let vy denote ih row-Y' ow j`h column of V The vector of total production of commodity 
(Q) is obtained as a row vector with 34 elements which represent total output of 
commodities, i. e. % =Zv,. Similarly, the vector of industry total input (A) is 
i 
obtained as a row vector with three elements representing total input of production 
activities, i. e. xj is a column sum of all elements ofjt' production activity account of 
the reclassified SAM. 
The alternative assumption is that a composition of an industry's product in terms of commodity 
input is fixed, which is referred to as the commodity-based technology assumption. For the 
discussion on choice between these two technology assumptions, see p. 166 of Miller and Blair 
(1985), which is based on Stone (1961). 
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Now we can derive the following two matrices which serve as mapping operators 
between commodities and industries. Note that in this subsection `A' indicates a 
diagonal matrix of a vector. 
B=U X-1: a 34 x3 matrix represents the value of commodity required as 
intermediate input to produce one unit value of output of industry, and 
D=V Q-1: a3x 34 matrix represents a fraction of output value of industry to 
produce one unit value of commodity. 
It can be interpreted that the D matrix is an operator to map commodity demand to 
industry demand and the B matrix is the commodity-by-industry version of 
technological matrix. These operators provide all the necessary information. 
First, A° DB, a3x3 matrix, functions as a conventional technological matrix 
which represents the value of industrial output as intermediate input to produce one 
unit value of industries' output. Similar to conventional input-output table, the 
intermediate goods flow among industries are given as Z=AX (3 x 3). 
The final industry product demand matrix is derived as Y= DE (3 x 5). 
Transactions from each industry account to it' account, where i= ROW, TAX, SUB, 
and TNT, are derived as FT= D C; T in which superscript T denotes transposed 
vectors. The derived F is a 3-element row vector. Note that indirect taxes appear 
both in production activity and commodity accounts in the original SAM and these 
two accounts must be combined after this mapping operation. 
(3) The aggregate version SAM 
The aggregate version SAM is shown in Table 7, in which intra-sectoral 
intermediate goods flows (such as a transaction from R to R) are eliminated. 
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Table 7 Aggregate version of Moroccan SAM for 1994 
[ Unit: Billion 1994 DH] 
L S A Q K HH 00V ROW SAV R I U TAX SUB TNT Total 
L 6.8 17.9 17.4 42.1 
S 74.0 74.0 
A 15.4 2.9 18.3 
Q 2.4 2.4 
Ic 
- 
ý----ý 
- 
ý ý 93.5 
1111 42.1 74.0 18.3 2.4 88.0 1 - 7.7 _ 21.4 8.0 262.1 
GOV 5.4 2.1 1 38.9 11 20.4 66.8 
ROW 
SAV 
0.1 5.6 
45.0 
7.0 
8.0 
25.3 
6.7 
3.2 13.7 69.4 124.1 
59.7 
R 23.4 1.4 7.6 18.4 50.8 
I 47.1 11.1 14.4 7.5 35.9 0.7 116.7 
U 123.7 40.8 58.2 
-t 45.3 8.5 43.9 2.5 322.9 
TAX 15.2 2.8 20.9 
ý - 
38.9 
SUB 3.2 ý 
-- 
j 
---) 
3.2 
TNT 3.2 9.2 I i 15.9 ý 28.4 
Total 42.1 74.0 1 18.3 2.4 93.5 1 262.1 1 66.8 124.1 1 59.7 1 50.8 1 116.7 1 322.9 138.9 13.2 128.4 
Note: Codes are explained in (1) of this subsection. 
5.3.3 Other datasets 
All the other input data for the model calibration are as follows. 
- Total population [person]: 26,590,000 
- Rural labour force [person]: 5,024,400 
- Urban unskilled employment [person]: 2,279,666 
- Urban skilled employment [person]: 1,590,734 
- Urban unemployment rate* [%]: 22.3 
- Public water service coverage in rural areas* [%]: 20 
- Water delivery loss in domestic water supply [%]: 30 
- Real interest rate [% per year]: 9.55 
- Irrigation water charge [1994 DH / m3]: 0.347 
- Irrigation area [ha]: 863,800 
- Total water supply [million m3 / year]: 11,377 
0 Based on the value in 1995. 
All the exogenous input data for the model validation are shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8 Exogenous input data for model validation 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Real exchange rate 9.20 9.00 9.14 10.02 10.03 10.14 10.92 11.55 11.14 
[1994DH/1994 USD] 
Production risk factor 1.60 0.44 1.71 0.85 1.13 0.75 0.38 0.90 
[average of `75^-'02 = 1] 
Urban minimum wage 7,626 7,098 7,634 7,549 7,522 7,481 I 
I 
8,108 7,966 7,919 
[1994 DH/ycarj i 
Domestic water charge 2.50 2.58 2.55 2.50 2.88 2.98 5.20 5.11 5.08 
[1994 DH/m3] 
Irrigation water charge 0.347 0.364 0.383 0.402 0.422 0.443 0.465 0.488 0.513 
[1994 DH/m31 ! , ! _ Irrigation land charge ! 3,373 3,542 3,719 3,905 4,100 4,305 4,520 4,746 4,983 
1994 DWm3 
`-ý r-- Domestic water service 20.0 
I 
24.0 27.7 31.3 34.7 37.9 41.0 
I 
43.9 46.7 
coverage % 
Real exchange rates are obtained based on the nominal exchange rates with 
eliminating inflation of both the local currency (DH) and the international currency 
(USD) using GDP deflators. 
Production risk factors are given as a proportion of each year's non-industrial crop 
production in physical term to its average for the period 1975 - 2002. 
Urban minimum wage rates are based on the actual rates with deflating by GDP 
deflator. Number of working hours per year is assumed to be constant at the value 
estimated by dividing calibrated annual minimum wage (to be explained later) by 
the actual minimum wage rate in 1994. 
Domestic water charge is estimated by assuming per capita domestic water 
consumption of 120 lcd during the 1990's and 100 lcd since 2000 and applying an 
average of 10 city's water tariff in real term. 9 
Irrigation water charge in the base year is based on the estimated total irrigation 
water cost by Löfgren et al. (1997). A5% annual price escalation is then applied. 
9 The value in 1994 is calibrated as explained later. It is assumed that a drastic (more than 70 %) 
price rise in 2000 induces reduction of domestic water consumption. 
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Irrigation land charge in the base year is estimated by dividing irrigation land factor 
payment recorded in SAM by the estimate of total irrigation area of 0.864 million 
hectares. A5% annual price escalation is then applied. 
Domestic water service coverage is estimated using the calibrated production 
function such that the value becomes 20 % in 1994 and 38 % in 1999. 
The observed data for the model validation are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 Observed data for validation 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Real interest rate [% per year] 9.6 - 9.6 -I- 12.5 11.6 10.5 12.5 
Urban unemployment rate [%] - 22.3 17.8 16.7 - 21.8 21.2 
. 18.2 
Total value of export (FOB) 
-ý 
[billion 1994 DH] 51.0 
I 
54.6 55.0 
i 
60.3 61.5 65.6 69.2 69.6 74.1 
+L 
Total value of import (FOB) 70.4 74.3 72.6 76.3 81.4 87.0 99.4 
199.1H03.0 Ii 
[billion 1994 DH 
5.4 Model calibration 
5.4.1 Overall procedure 
The applied model has been calibrated based on the above data for the year 1994, 
the base year of this study. It should be noted that only the first-stage optimisation 
is subject to be calibrated since the government decision does not require any 
calibration. This is another advantage to separate decision-making process of the 
government from that of the private agents. Calibration requires an assumption that 
the observed decisions satisfy optimality conditions, which seems much less strong 
for the private agents' decisions than for those of the government. Calibration 
procedure for this model requires particular attention to the following two issues. 
One is the fact that `one person' in the model represents one labour force age person 
and his/her dependents. This means that the number of households Nis not equal to 
total population in the base year, even though initial household size is normalised at 
unity. Moreover, this is important to set, or to judge relevance of, per capita values, 
particularly per capita consumption. 
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The other issue is the physical unit of commodity or, as its dual concept, the price of 
commodity. One unit of, say, urban modem product in the model is defined as a 
composite of highly heterogeneous commodities such as cars, houses, business 
consulting services, and so on. Obviously there is no information about the price of 
such a composite commodity, but there must be a particular relationship between 
the price and the physical unit of commodity that can be compatible with the model. 
In my model this relationship is represented by the technological parameters in the 
production function. For each commodity, technological parameter is calibrated 
given arbitrarily set commodity price. 
The overall calibration procedure is as follows. Calibration equations are derived 
from either the optimal conditions or the optimal solutions of the first-stage 
optimisation explained in Chapter 4. In the explanation SAM(i, j) denotes the i`h 
row f' column of the aggregate SAM, and super impose `^' indicates either 
observed or calibrated values. 
Step 1: Calibrate the number of households and urban labour allocation: 
rural + (L 
"U 
+L 
S)/(1 
- BU in which Lrura 
l -= LR + LI 8E - N=L - LU +eULs , 
is=N, and l' -ABE. 
Step 2: Calibrate `per user' domestic water consumption qH and average per 
capita water consumption qN : 10 
aQSAM GOV HH qH =(), in which aQ is a fraction of water expenditure to 7 (iu +is) ý1-S) 
total transaction from HH to GOV, and 
qH =4{B+(IU+lS) ll-9)}+ýInoý1 
P-lslll-B)"11 
10 The distinction between `per user' and `per capita' is important throughout calibration and 
validation processes. A part of population is not covered by public water supply service. 
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Step 3: Calibrate parameters (p, and ß, x, : 
SAM I, HH) 
rp; = fori=R, 1, U, where SAM(k, HH)+riQSAM(GOV, HH) 
k=R, I, U 
N 
17 Q=q, and 
qH {8+(1u+ls)(1 9) 
_ 
77Q SAM GOV HH 
(oQ 
SAM (k, HH) + r7 QSAM (GO V, HH) 
k=R, I, U 
SAM(k, i ß, k= fori=R, I, U, inwhichFactors=L, S, K, A, Q. SAM(j, i) 
J=Factors 
Step 4: Calibrate wage rates and rural labour allocation: 
U SAM 
(L, U) S SAM 
(S, U) 
w=P, w= 
LS , and 
1 
E, VU 
IeýQ-PýInolNlýpýNýýlýe-1) 
w where Npop is total population, and 
qo = 3.65 [m3/person/year], which is equivalent to 10 [lcd], and F= 0.2 are 
chosen. 
12 
ll = 
SAM (L' I) 
and jR=I 
rural 
_ 
^I 
. WR = 
Lrural 
_ 
11 
Nil" NN 
Step S: Calibrate rates of import, product and income taxes and export subsidy: 
An underlying assumption is that the fraction aQ of the transaction from household account to the 
government account in the SAM represents domestic water expenditure. aQ will be calibrated in 
Step 8 by trial and error. 
12 Subsistence amount of water q,, = 10 led seems reasonable judging from the fact that the rural 
domestic water demand is estimated at 7.5 led in 1990 (World Bank 1995; p. 55). Note that not 
only a labour force age person but also his/her dependent is counted as `one capita' for the figures 
measured in terms of led. `Penalty parameter' of 0.2 is a rough guess. 
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zt _ 
SAM (TNT, i) 1= SAM 
(TAX, i) 
and iI for i =R I, U, in which Prod =L SAM (ROW, i) SAM(j, i) 
j=Prod 
S, K, A, Q, R, I, U, 
SAM(i, SUB) 
s= fori=1, U, and SAM(i, ROW) 
SAM TAX, HH 
iN = YSAM(i, HH)-SAM(TAX, HH) 
dr 
Step 6: Calibrate trade parameters (see Subsection 5.4.2), 
Step 7: Calibrate technological parameters (see Subsection 5.4.3), and 
Step 8: Calibrate remaining parameters such as p, a, rates of water loss, etc. as 
well as domestic water consumption and so on. (see Subsection 5.4.4). 
Below the last three steps are explained. 
5.4.2 Calibration of trade parameters 
Recall the optimal imports and exports derived in Chapter 4. 
i t^ t Jof 4, !r! =. ýlEY and M! _- l1 ++ i 
(1-flE)Y 
zuSý 1-8M 
First we derive Sl' -ý- 
SANG, ROW 1+ 9' 
Y` SAM (k, -i l+ 
k=Prod 
The parameters of the CES function for import composite goods are then calibrated 
as 
in which 
I/af 
I'1J SAM(ROW, i) ý'ý1 l+sl l+ij SAM(k, i)-SAM(i, ROW) Cl+s) ý k=Prod 
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CES elasticity of substitution aM are determined as oM = 2.0,6M = 3.0, QM = 5.0 
using (a) values reported in literature, and (b) the proportion of import to 
commodity production (7.1 % for rainfed agriculture, 15.1 % for irrigation 
agriculture and 32.5 % for urban modem products) as a proxy of substitutability 
between traded goods and domestically produced goods. 13 
5.4.3 Calibration of technological parameters in production functions 
It is assumed that the world price of each commodity in terms of 1994 USD (p'IV) is 
constant. Since the choice of these commodity prices does not affect the simulation 
results, they are normalised at unity. Note that the unit of these prices are 1994 
USD per physical unit of commodity i, in which i=R, I, U. 
Given the world commodity prices, the rates of import and product taxes and export 
subsidy as well as trade parameters, the technological parameters are calibrated as 
follows. Note that the capital depreciation rate is set at 0.07, which is widely used 
in literature. '4 
First, notice the producer and net producer prices are calibrated as 
SAM(k, i) 
pip - `1 + 
S* P"«re and pý k=FQ"or I ", in which 
Sýý. lýiý 
j=Prod 
Factors = L, S, K, A, Q, and Prod = L, S, K, A, Q, R, I, U, as before. 
Similarly, the consumer prices are calibrated as 
plc = pVie(1+fl )17' inwhich 
13 Löfgren et al. (1999) assign values between 2 and 7 to oM of each disaggregated commodity, with 
higher value for grains. Agenor and Aynaoui (2003) employ QM = 0.8 for agricultural products 
and ow-f = 1.0 for urban products. 
la King and Levine (1994) employ 8= 0.07 to construct cross-country dataset of physical capital 
stock. Agenor and Aynaoui (2003) choose 8= 0.08 for Moroccan private capital. 
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(i+Srl (CMl M (I+S')aM-1 
+(1-ýM)QM (1+rM)1} 
'lM 
i 
IVM IaM 
(1+s ) 
+(1-UM 
)ami (1+rAI)ami 
From these price expressions, the equilibrium real interest rate expression, Eq. 
(4.11), are modified into 
PUL Qvs 
1//luK 
QUK zu IJUL NUS += pUC zuP }VU ws 
This gives the calibration equation of P as 
us 
TU 
PUK Put p 
= 
Uc 
U 
(Y 
lS/ WU 1NS 
P /3UK ftUL ýUS 
Similarly, zl and are calibrated by the following equations derived from the 
equilibrium irrigation sector wage and urban unskilled labour allocation solutions. 
l PA 
Qü pvo (Y + tS) 
Pfx Pri 
px, 
pig 
and 
P Qia /jix Qýt Qrg 
1: SAM (i, R) 
1V(r"+S)puc PRx 
T- l=Factor D=R , 
in which R NpRp SAM (K, R) 
D`R = 
{1-(1-Ö)z}(1-1°-IS)-Rit1SAM(K, U)+SAM(K, I)) 
r ijrxw N 
ARK 
ßILPUc (r+a)Lu 1-Pus 
+ 
QlKw'N TuPu ßw 
Äas Pur 
- 
ý= 
ý 
t-UUL ws 
5.4.4 Calibration of remaining parameters 
The last step in the calibration of the model deals with all the remaining parameters 
(&, p and o) as well as the rates of domestic water charge, water expenditure 
fraction aQ, and water delivery loss in irrigation. They are calibrated such that (a) 
the computed optimal household expenditure and total water supply are close to the 
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observed values, and (b) the computed per user domestic water consumption is 
close to an estimate based on which the rate of domestic water charge is determined. 
The latter may require some explanation. Recall that the domestic water tariffs in 
Morocco employ a tiered-structure in which unit water price differs depending on 
water consumption. Consumption levels of, say, 100 lcd and that of 150 lcd result 
in different rates of domestic water charge, which in turn affect the computed value 
of optimal domestic water consumption. Therefore this last step in the calibration 
has been done by trial and error. Once preference parameters and the rate of water 
charge are calibrated, total water supply is adjusted to coincide with the observed 
value by calibrating water delivery loss in irrigation. 
Regarding the last step of the calibration process, two caveats must be made: One is 
the treatment of household income that is not covered by the model. The SAM 
records transactions from GOV, ROW, and TNT to the household account of which 
share to total household income reaches 14.2 %. It cannot be excluded since it 
definitely affects households' decision of the optimal consumption. This extra 
income is thus treated, both in the calibration and validation, as a part of household 
income subject to the no-perfect foresight household expectations, but it is 
excluded from policy simulations. The other is the fact that the computed optimal 
household expenditure with plausible values of $ and other preference parameters 
has been bound to underestimate the observed value. One possible explanation is 
that the households' expectation of rainfed production would be significantly 
affected by the current production. " Nevertheless, the assumption of risk-averse 
forward-looking farmers, which is represented by w<1, is maintained. The 
degree of underestimation, 6.4 % in the base case, seems acceptable judging from 
the complexity of the model. 
5.4.5 Calibration results 
The results of the calibration process are as follows. 16 
15 Remind that the base year (1994) was one of the best crop years with a =1.6. 
16 The GAMS code for calibration is included in the code for validation shown in Appendix B2. 
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Number of households: N= 9,621,410. 
Pure rate of time preference: p=0.075. 
Depreciation rate: 8= 0.07. 
Elasticity of marginal felicity: or= 10. 
Expected value of production risk factor: w=0.9. 
Commodity weight in satisfaction production: 
(pR=0.119, (p1 =0.240, cpu=0.631 , qJQ=0.010. 
Factor share of production function: ßRK = 0.348, ßRL = 0.383,61K = 0.409, 
, 6jL=. 455,8L4 = 0.074,6, Q=0.061, ßuK=0.438, ßuL=0.107, Bus=0.455. 
Technological parameter in production function: 
TR = 140.5, T, = 63.3, ru = 70.1. 
Input-output coefficient : 
apj = 0.146, aRu = 0.174, aIR = 0.080, aju = 0.453, auR = 0.075, au, = 0.136. 
Consumer commodity price [1994 DH/unit]: 
pR` = 9.849, pl` = 10.617, puc = 10.097. 
Producer commodity price [1994 DHlunit]: 
pRp=9.203, plp=9.469, pUI=8.758. 
Initial levels of private capital stock [unit]: mo = 5,445.3, KRO = 385.7. 
Rates of income tax: zH = 0.062. 
Rates of product tax: z=0,11= 0.031, = 0.096. 
Rates of import tax: rm = 1.024, zM = 0.675, z, f=0.229. 
Rates of export subsidy: sR = 0, sl = 0.061, su= 0.043. 
CES elasticity of substitution: a-M = 2.0, am, = 3.0, am = 5.0, 
CES import preference parameter: 5=0.354,8M = 0.470, SM = 0.496. 
Fraction of water expenditure to SAM(GOI, HH): ci' = 0.86 
Domestic water charge rate [1994 DIV m3]: p=2.497 
Irrigation water charge rate [1994 DH/ m3]: p' = 0.347 
Irrigation land charge rate [1994 DHV ha]: p'4 = 3,373 
Per user domestic water consumption [lcd]: q ff 120 
Water delivery loss in domestic water supply [%]: 30 
Water delivery loss in irrigation [%]: 32.6 
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5.5 Validation 
5.5.1 Base case 
The model calibration described in the previous section was based on 
data/information in single year. The statically calibrated model is then dynamically 
validated with time-series data of the following variables as exogenous input. '7 
- Production risk factor 
- Real exchange rate 
- Urban minimum wage 
- Rates of public charges (domestic and irrigation water, irrigation land) 
- Public water service coverage in the rural areas 
The following four variables are selected as validation criteria and their observed 
values and the simulated values will be compared. 
- Real interest rate 
- Urban unemployment rate 
- Total value of exports 
- Total value of imports 
Trade data reported in IFS are significantly smaller than those recorded in the SAM 
(export: 28 %, import: 18 %). These data are proportionally scaled-up such that the 
absolute level of trade data in 1994 coincides. Taxes, subsidies and import taxes are 
fixed at the 1994 level. 
As the base case, a5% annual price escalation of irrigation water and land charges 
in real term is introduced. Judging from recent revision of domestic water tariff 
table and the government policy towards full-cost recovery in irrigation agriculture, 
this assumption is not unrealistic. The base case results are shown in Figure 12. 
" Berentsen et al. (1996) distinguish three types of model validation process; technical validation 
which covers logical consistency, data selection, and methodological issues; operational 
validation which concerns reproducibility of reality; and dynamic validation which concerns 
durability of the model through its life cycle. This section explains operational validation of the 
applied model. 
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Figure 12 Validation results - base case 
Except for the failure to capture fluctuation of real interest rates, the simulated 
values quite well reproduce the observed trends. Considering the rather wide scope 
and consequent complexity of the model, the validation seems quite successful. 
5.5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
The robustness against parameter values is tested by sensitivity analysis in which 
each parameter value is changed upward and downward by 50 %. One of the most 
important endogenous variables, the optimal consumption of satisfaction that 
determines the social welfare, is added into the sensitivity analysis. 
Before discussing the results, it might be worth mentioning that each sensitivity run 
affects the simulated trajectories in a way that the trajectories pivot around the 
initial point. 18 Figure 13 illustrates this fact. 
18 Only the exception is c. Changing ö or Qcauses a parallel shift, while changing other parameters 
results in pivot around, or converging to, the terminal point. 
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Figure 13 Illustration of effects of changing parameter values 
The results of sensitivity analysis are summarised in Table 10. 
Table 10 Results of sensitivity analysis 
[Percentage change of mean value from the base case 
Parameter Scenario c r BU E 
Escalation rate of 50% Low 0.4 % 1.0 % -7.3 % 0.4 % 
1A, Pw 50% High -0.4% -0.9% 7.1 % -0.4% 
50%Low -1.8% -2.9% -4.2% 1.8% 
50% High 1.8% 3.2% 4.3% -1.8% 
50% Low -1.3 % -1.9% -2.8% 1.2% 
50% High 0.5 % 0.7 % 1.0 % -0.4 % 
50% Low -3.6% -5.4% -7.9% 3.3% P 50% High 2.8 % 5.3 % 7.2 % -3.0 % 
50%Low 5.6% 0.1% 1.2% -0.5% 
50% High -3.6% -0.4% -1.1 % 0.4 % 
Legend: c: consumption of satisfaction, r. real interest rate, ©°: urban unemployment rate, E: 
total value export, and M: total value import. 
E and M are both proportional to total product and respond exactly the same way. 
These results show the robustness of the model against the variation of parameter 
values. The most parameter-sensitive variable seems urban unemployment rate, in 
particular against p and price escalation rate of irrigation water and land charges. 
As a whole the pure rate of time preference p is the most influential parameter. The 
importance of p in dynamic optimisation is understandable. The welfare 
improvement effect of higher p, which means more myopic preference, is simply 
due to the short period of validation, only 8 years. It is expected that for the longer 
period higher p will result in lower welfare as shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14 Welfare impacts of changing values of p and 8 
The observed relatively significant impact of changing depreciation rate on welfare 
illuminates the importance of private capital stock. This shift is expected to hold 
for the entire planning horizon. 
5.6 Construction of sustainable production functions 
5.6.1 Concept of sustainable production function 
As explained in Chapter 3, the public sector production functions represent the 
relationship between public capital stock and production capacity on condition that 
production and consumption of publicly supplied goods do not endanger 
sustainability. What I demonstrate here is admittedly rudimentary application of 
this concept, but the potential of this approach should not be underestimated. 
Construction of sustainable production functions in reliable and operational manner 
requires knowledge of impacts of production activity on ecosystem resilience, 
consensus on safe minimum standards to maintain the resilience, and technological 
and engineering knowledge to achieve it. This challenge provides an excellent 
opportunity to implement truly interdisciplinary study in which each discipline 
plays a distinct and indispensable role. 
In this thesis sustainable production functions are constructed by multiplying the 
required level of capital stock based on the present engineering practice by a factor 
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(termed as `sustainability coefficient'). Even such a simplified method could 
provide, I hope, some useful insight about sustainable development policy. 
5.6.2 Sustainable raw water production function 
The World Bank (1995) reports the expected public expenditure in water sector and 
the detailed information of dams in Morocco (p. 56-58). Based on this information 
a time series of both raw water supply capacity and public capital stock in raw water 
production is constructed as shown in Table 11. 
Table 11 Raw water production development 
Year 
Supply 
capacity 
[Million 
m'] 
Increment 
[Million 
m3] 
Capital 
stock 
[Billion 
1993DH] 
Investment 
[Billion 
1993DH] Year 
Supply 
capacity 
[Million 
m3] 
Increment 
[Million 
m3J 
Capital 
stock 
[Billion 
1993DH] 
Investment 
[Billion 
1993DH] 
1990 11,072 71.5 6.00 0.7 2005 14,740 8.0 25.61 3.0 
1991 11,272 200.9 6.28 0.7 2006 14,841 100.6 26.82 5.0 
1992 11,279 6.4 6.54 0.7 2007 14,968 127.4 29.94 5.0 
1993 11,291 12.1 6.78 0.7 2008 15,107 138.5 32.84 5.0 
1994 11,464 173.3 7.01 0.7 2009 15,313 206.5 35.54 5.0 
1995 11,764 300.0 7.22 3.0 2010 15,370 57.0 38.06 5.0 
1996 11,816 52.0 9.71 3.0 2011 15,573 203.0 I 40.39 5.0 
1997 13,565 1,749.1 12.03 3.0 2012 15,593 20.0 42.56 5.0 
1998 13,573 8.2 14.19 3.0 2013 _ 15,730 137.0 44.58 5.0 
1999 13,954 380.7 16.20 3.0 2014 15,730 j 46.46 5.0 
2000 14,043 88.9 18.06 3.0 2015 16,069 339.0 48.21 5.0 
2001 14,182 139.0 19.80 3.0 2016 16,069 49.84 5.0 
2002 14,267 85.0 21.41 3.0 2017 16,102 32.5 51.35 5.0 
2003 14,440 172.5 22.91 3.0 2018 16,102 1 52.75 5.0 
2004 14,732 292.5 24.31 3.0 2019 16,244 142.0 1 54.06 5.0 
Source: Adopted from World Bank (1995) 
The annual depreciation rate is assumed to be 7 %, the same as for the private 
capital stock, and the value of initial capital stock is assumed to be 6 billion 1993 
DH such that public capital stock does not decrease between 1990 and 1995. 
Annual public investments in raw water production are based on the World Bank 
(1995) up to the year 2000, and those after the year 2000 are assumed to be 3 billion 
1993 DH until 2005 and 5 billion 1993 DH from 2006. 
Based on this table, public capital stock is converted into physical terms based on 
the calibrated consumer price of capital good, and a sustainability coefficient of 1.3 
is applied based on a crude assumption that raw water supply development without 
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loosing ecosystem resilience requires 30 % more capital stock input than the 
present engineering practice. 19 This assumption makes, for example, the 
sustainable production capacity in 1994 be 90 % of the observed production 
capacity with the present engineering practice. The sustainable production function 
is calibrated as shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15 Sustainable raw water production function 
The calibrated production function consists of following equations. 
Rr = 11,829.2 x 
(1- 
45.53e_00015 
) 
for GR < 1,250, 
Rt = 13,591.0 x 
(1- 
2,876.45e-0,00' 
l 
for 1,250: 5 GR < 1,827, 
Rr = 14,342.2 x 
(1- 
5.16e"0.0025 
) 
for 1,827< GR < 2,757, 
R1= 15,135.3 x 
(1- 
3.59e-0'00'5 C; R 
) 
for 2,757: 5 GR < 3,855, 
Rt = 17,020.9 x 
Cl 
- 0.38e-o. ooos0I) for 3,855: 5 GR < 6,417, and 
R1 = 9,911.2 x 
(GR )o'' 
- 7,746.36 for GR >_ 6,417, and 
in which R1 : sustainable raw water production [million m3 /year], and 
GR : public capital stock in raw water production [million unit]. 
19 The model sensitivity to sustainability coefficients is tested in Chapter 6. 
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5.6.3 Sustainable treated water production function 
Based on treated water production data in the ASM with treated water supply public 
expenditure reported in the World Bank (1995), a time series of treated water 
supply capacity and public capital stock in treated water production is constructed 
as shown in Table 12, with assumptions that the annual depreciation rate is 7 %, that 
the value of initial capital stock is 1 billion 1993 DH, and that delivery loss is 30 % 
in 1990 with decreasing 0.5 % per year when the annual investment is 0.2 billion 
1993 DH and 1.35 % per year after 1995. 
Table 12 Treated water production development 
Year 
Water production [mil. m3J 
ONEP Regies 
Delivery 
Loss 
Total sup? ly 
[mil. m] 
Capital stock investment 
[Billion 1993DH] [Billion 1993DH] 
1985 387.0 107.0 32.5% 333.5 1.00 0.2 
1986 393.0 109.0 32.0% 341.4 1.13 0.2 
1987 423.0 116.0 31.5% 369.2 1.25 0.2 
1988 461.0 117.0 31.0% 398.8 1.36 0.2 
1989 478.0 122.0 30.5% 417.0 1.47 0.2 
1990 525.0 128.0 30.0% 457.1 1.57 0.2 
1991 562.0 127.0 29.5% 485.7 1.66 0.2 
1992 587.0 140.0 29.0% 516.2 1.74 0.2 
1993 560.0 126.0 28.5% 490.5 1.82 0.2 
1994 593.0 119.0 28.0% 512.6 1.89 0.2 
1995 583.0 96.0 26.7% 497.9 1.96 1.0 
1996 611.0 91.0 25.3% 524.2 2.82 1.0 
1997 615.0 114.0 24.0% 554.0 3.62 1.0 
1998 630.0 111.0 22.7% 573.0 4.37 1.0 
1999 649.0 105.0 21.3% 593.1 5.06 1.0 
2000 650.0 120.0 20.0% 616.0 5.71 1.0 
2001 658.0 127.0 18.7% 638.5 6.31 1.0 
Source: Royaume du Maroc (1985,1990 -2003), World Bank (1995) 
Based on this table, public capital stock is converted into physical terms based on 
the calibrated consumer price of capital good, and a sustainability coefficient of 1.8 
is applied based on a crude assumption that sustainable supply of treated water 
including high level of wastewater treatment requires 80 % more capital stock input 
than the present engineering practice. 20 This assumption makes, for example, the 
20 Remind that the Moroccan government plans to invest one billion 1993 DH annually for the 
sewerage facilities in addition to one billion 1993 DH investment for the drinking water supply 
system between 1994 and 2000 (World Bank 1995), and that the current sewerage service is far 
from satisfactory. 
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sustainable production capacity in 1994 be 69 % of the observed production 
capacity with the present engineering practice. The calibrated sustainable 
production function is shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16 Sustainable treated water production function 
The calibrated production function consists of following equations. 
Qt= 528.1x1-3.13e"0.0120, ) for G,: <503, 
Qt = 622.9 x 
(1- 0.72e-0.00301) for 503 <_ Gt: < 903, and 
Q, = 82.9(G) 0.3 - 45.29 for GI: ? 903, 
in which Qt : sustainable treated water production [million m3 /year], and 
G1: public capital stock in treated water production [million unit]. 
In addition, it is assumed that both the public water supply service coverage in the 
rural areas and the delivery loss of treated water are determined by the following 
function of public capital stock G: 
Br = 1- 0.93e"0.000ac, , and 
Loss Hr = 0.08 + 0.25 e-° °°'3ct 
in which 6,: rural water service coverage [dimensionless], and 
Loss H1: Domestic water delivery loss. 
These functions are calibrated such that delivery loss rates of 30 % and 20 % 
correspond to the capital stock in 1990 and 2000 respectively, and such that rural 
water service coverage of 20 % and 38 % corresponds to the capital stock in 1994 
and 1999. 
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5.6.4 Sustainable irrigation land production function 
Based on irrigation land data (Academie du Royaume du Maroc 2000) with the 
National Irrigation Development Programme (Löfgren et al. 1997) for the irrigation 
area expansion after the year 1996 and public expenditure data in irrigation 
infrastructure (World Bank 1995), a time series of irrigation area and public capital 
stock in irrigation infrastructure is constructed as shown in Table 13 with 
assumptions that the annual depreciation rate is 7% and that the value of initial 
capital stock is 3.5 billion 1993 DH. 
Table 13 Irrigation land development 
Year 
Irrigation 
area 
[1000 ha 
Capital 
stock 
[Billion Dli 
Investment 
[Billion DH Year 
Irrigation 
area 
[1000 hal 
Capital 
stock 
[Billion DH 
Investment 
[Billion DH 
1980 578 3.5 0.5 1990 763 6.2 0.9 
1981 596 3.8 0.5 1991 802 6.6 0.9 
1982 612 4.0 0.5 1992 835 7.1 0.9 
1983 620 4.2 0.5 1993 856 7.5 0.9 
1984 644 4.4 0.5 1994 864 7.8 0.9 
1985 653 4.6 0.5 1995 875 8.2 2.0 
1986 670 4.8 0.5 1996 891 9.6 2.0 
1987 693 5.0 0.5 1997 916 10.9 2.0 
1988 709 5.1 0.9 1998 922 12.2 2.0 
1989 734 5.6 0.9 1999 942 13.3 I 2.0 
Source: Academic du Royaume du Maroc (2000), 
Löfgrcn et al. (1997), and World Bank (1995) 
Based on this table, public capital stock is converted into physical terms based on 
the calibrated consumer price of capital good, and a sustainability coefficient of 1.5 
is applied based on a crude assumption that sustainable supply of irrigation land 
requires 50 % more capital stock input than the present engineering practice. This 
assumption makes, for example, the sustainable production capacity in 1994 be 
around 78 % of the observed production capacity with the present engineering 
practice. The calibrated sustainable production function is shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17 Sustainable irrigation land production function 
The calibrated production function consists of following equations. 
Al = 770.1 x 
(1-1.19e-0003c; ) 
for Gt :< 685, 
At = 790.9 x 
(i 
- 21.09e-0*007ct 
) 
for 685 < G1 :< 914, and 
A, = 894.1 x 
(1- 87.95e-0.0070I) for 914: 5 G' :<1,429, and 
At= 751.5(G1 Y'' - 663.4 for Gt : >_ 1,429, 
in which A,: sustainable irrigation land provision [1000 ha /year], and 
Gr : public capital stock in irrigation land production [million unit]. 
In addition, the following relationship between public capital stock GI and delivery 
loss of irrigation water is assumed. 
Loss IRe = 0.15 + 0.3043 e-0-0"'I , 
in which Loss-IR,: irrigation water conveyance 
loss. 
5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter provides the necessary information to conduct policy simulations. The 
case study country, Morocco, is introduced with taking care to explain the 
specification and key assumptions of the applied model. 
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The employed data and model calibration procedure is explained in depth in order 
to ensure reproducibility of this research. Although a calibration procedure itself 
has highly study specific nature, a detailed explanation of this process, which is 
rarely found in literature, may be useful for other researchers. 
The result of model validation seems successful. Sensitivity analysis reveals 
parameter-robustness of the applied model. The effects of changes in parameter 
values are consistent with economic theory as well as our intuition. 
Finally sustainable production functions that play a key role in policy simulations 
are constructed based on a time-series of public capital accumulation and supply 
capacity development that represents the relationship between supply capacity and 
public capital stock with present engineering practice that is not necessarily 
sustainable. Therefore sustainability coefficients, which are rather arbitrarily 
chosen for illustrative purpose and are subject to sensitivity analysis, are multiplied 
to the required level of public capital stock. 
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Chapter 6 
Policy Simulation 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports methodology and results of the policy simulations. The 
objectives of policy simulations of this thesis are; 
- to establish a policy analysis procedure under uncertainty, 
- to investigate performance of sustainable development policy alternatives in 
each policy environment which is determined by exogenous drivers, 
- to see policy implications of different level of sustainability coefficients in 
sustainable production functions, which represent safe minimum standards of a 
society, and 
- to see policy implications of international aid flows that represent a sustainable 
development policy of the global community. 
Concerning the first objective, this study proposes a policy analysis procedure with 
a clear distinction between the planning and the implementation of policies. 
Policies are planned based on expectations of uncertain exogenous variables but 
they must be implemented with realised values of those variables that do not, in 
general, satisfy the expectations. The policy-making process must accommodate 
uncertainty not only in optimisation process but also in simulating the 
implementation process when the expectations are not satisfied. This thesis 
explicitly incorporates uncertainty into both parts of the policy-making process, 
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using Monte-Carlo simulation technique. This approach allows policy simulations 
to deal with uncertainty in a more flexible and practical way than the stochastic 
dynamic optimisation approach. The remaining objectives are achieved by 
simulating policy scenarios in which each policy alternative consisting of 
endogenous policy variables is located in alternative environments determined by 
exogenous drivers. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Before conducting policy simulations, 
properties of the first-stage solution without supply side constraints are investigated 
in Section 6.2. This section illuminates both similarity and difference between the 
analytic and the applied models. It also provides a control against which 
implications of supply side constraints in the applied model are clarified. Section 
6.3 establishes the simulation procedure with a detailed explanation of the policy 
implementation process under uncertainty. Section 6.4 formulates policy scenarios. 
Each policy scenario represents a particular combination of endogenous policy 
variables with a particular environment. The main objectives of policy simulations 
are (i) to demonstrate potential of the proposed methodology, and (ii) to provide 
rough idea of policy implications, rather than to provide practical policy advice. In 
this sense my model is not a fully applied model, but a platform to construct such a 
model. Section 6.5 reports the simulation results, and discussion on the results is 
provided in Section 6.6. 
6.2 Numerical simulation without supply side constraints 
6.2.1 Simulation setting 
The numerical simulations in this section correspond to Simulation 1 in Chapter 3 
that tests the validity of Proposition 3.3. As in Simulation 1, the simulation model 
consists of only the first stage optimisation with constant rates of public charges. 
The model is almost identical to that for validation, except for the exogenous input 
data. The following exogenous inputs are given. 
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- Public charges are fixed at the levels in 1994 and rural water service coverage 
is set at 100 %. 
- Urban minimum wage is fixed at the levels in 1994. 
- Production risk factors and foreign exchange rates are randomly disturbed 
around their expected values with standard deviations of 0.366 for the 
production risk factor and 0.09 for the real exchange rate. ' 
-3 different levels of initial private capital stock are given by multiplying the 
calibrated private capital stocks in 1994 by 1,0.5, and 2, respectively. 
In order to investigate convergence property of the trajectories, the planning period 
is set at 100 years. Taking random factors into account, Monte Carlo simulations 
with 5 trials are employed and the mean values are evaluated. 
6.2.2 Results 
Figure 18 shows the simulated trajectories of consumption and capital stock levels. 
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1 These values are exactly the same in policy simulations. See Subsection 6.3.2 of this chapter. 
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These trajectories clearly exhibit a convergence tendency, as observed in the 
analytic model. This convergence property, which precludes the existence of 
threshold values of initial capital stock below which the economy is driven into a 
poverty trap, is the most important similarity between the analytic and the applied 
models. By analogy it is expected that introduction of supply side constraints does 
not change this convergence tendency. 
A distinct difference between the analytic and the applied models is lack of 
steady-states in the applied model, which reflects the fact that the nationwide 
productivity of rainfed agriculture in the applied model is fixed and its per capita 
value decreases with population growth. It is an introduction of trade that enables 
the applied model to have positive growth in the per capita consumption of 
satisfaction in spite of the decrease of per capita rainfed agricultural productivity. 
It appears prima facie surprising that consumption level of public supplied water, of 
which price is constant at unity, is disturbed by random shocks more severely than 
the level of satisfaction consumption. This is so because it is the relative price, not 
the nominal price, of commodities that directly affects the optimal consumption 
levels. In terms of relative price the price of publicly supplied water fluctuates the 
most because other three commodity prices follow the same fluctuation of real 
exchange rates. 
From the viewpoint of social welfare, positive growth of per capita consumption 
level shown in Figure 18 contributes to welfare improvement. ' To complete the 
picture, however, information on both the safe water access rate, which is fixed by 
assumption in this experiment, and the unemployment rate is also important. 
Figure 19 shows the optimal trajectories of urban unemployment rate and irrigation 
labour wage rate, which further endorse the convergence property of the optimal 
trajectories of the applied model. 
2 Despite the perfect safe water access, the mean level of satisfaction consumption in the first year 
is nearly 20 % less than the calibrated consumption level in 1994. This is mainly due to 
elimination of extra income such as transactions from GOV, ROW, and TNT to households (see 
Subsection 5.4.4 in Chapter 5). 
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government commits to implement and how the government absorbs the 
expectation errors. 
Among many alternatives, I assume the following implementation rule. The 
government commits to implement the planned pricing schedules of public charges 
and to invest (accumulate) the planned amount of public capital in physical terms. 
This assumption aims at capturing inflexible aspects of public pricing and 
infrastructure investment policies in practice. 
The gap between the plan and the reality is absorbed by introducing safety margins 
of both the supply capacity and the financial position. In the policy planning 
process the sustainability constraints and the equations of motion of public capital 
are modified into, for instance, 
Qi 9iýNýl+vý`{Br+(1u`+18X1-6t)}=ZscFR(GR), and 
GR1 
_GR _ ZGBBRMR/poc _öGR, in which 
cE (0,1) and xýB E (0,1) are safety 
factors regarding to the sustainability constraints and the government budget, 
respectively. 3 
The lower values of safety factors are associated with the larger safety margins. 
There is a trade-off between satisfying the sustainability constraints or keeping 
positive budget balance and the attainable social welfare. The larger safety margins 
are associated with the lower probability of violating sustainability constraints or 
running budget deficit and at the same time with the lower social welfare. My 
model could capture this trade-off by introducing the Monte Carlo method for the 
policy implementation simulations. 4 
3 Needless to say, in the simulation of policy implementation the original equations of motion 
without safety factors are used. 
4 Monte Carlo simulation of this study is a common application of this technique. For wider 
application of Monte Carlo simulation, see Rubinstein (1981). 
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6.3.2 Simulation procedure 
The established simulation procedure is as follows. 
(i) Set the exogenous policy variables, e. g. investment allocation, tax rates, etc. 
(ii) Based on the expectation of production risk factors and foreign exchange rates, 
endogenously determine the optimal rates of public charges pt, pry' and pA, as 
well as consequent levels of public investment It G, I1GR, and ItG1. 
(iii) Introduce random disturbances around the expected value of the production 
risk factor and foreign exchange rates, which are given as normally distributed 
random numbers generated by GAMS. Standard deviations are set at 0.366 for 
the production risk factor based on a coefficient of variation of non-industrial 
crop production between 1975 and 2002, and 0.09 for the real exchange rate 
based on a coefficient of variation of real exchange rates for the decade after 
1993 when the structural adjustment program finished. 
(iv) Conduct Monte Carlo simulations of policy implementation process given 
randomly disturbed production risk factors and foreign exchange rates. In 
addition to all the exogenous policy variables, the optimal pricing and 
investment schedules determined in (ii) are given exogenously. 
In order to absorb imbalance between the revenue and the expenditure of the 
government, it is assumed that the government has a saving account in which 
surplus budget is saved and deficit is covered by, if possible, dissaving. Only the 
year in which the government saving account runs a deficit is regarded as the 
budget deficit year. Based on preliminary Monte Carlo simulations with this 
assumption, safety factors are set at X '3c = 0.85 and , acs = 0.98 such that the 
probabilities to violate sustainability constraints and to run a government budget 
deficit become around 10 to 15 % for the former and around 5% for the latter under 
the current environment. 
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In addition, it is assumed that 20 % of import tax revenues is earmarked to water 
sector public investment. 5 This specification aims at capturing the relatively high 
dependence of the revenue of the Moroccan government on trade taxes (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2002). Without taking into account negative effects of trade 
liberalisation in terms of reduction of disposable budget, any trade liberalisation 
proposals are hardly convincing for the policy-makers. 6 
A number of trials of Monte Carlo simulations is set at 100. For demonstrative 
purpose it seems large enough. The planning period is set at 15 years. 
6.3.3 Evaluation criteria 
Separation of the planning and the implementation processes with introducing 
Monte Carlo simulation for the latter allows the policy makers to evaluate policy 
scenarios from wider perspectives. It is expected that some policy could attain 
better mean values but more risky in terms of larger dispersion and some performs 
other way around, as the most clearly demonstrated by the choice of safety margins. 
There is no unique optimal policy but a range of alternative satisficing policies, and 
a choice of `the best' policy necessarily depends on tastes, for instance the degree of 
risk averseness, of the policy makers and the stakeholders in the policy-making 
process. ' For such a policy making procedure the following evaluation indicators 
are employed. 
a. Social welfare 
b. Probability to satisfy the sustainability constraints 
c. Probability to satisfy the government budget constraint 
1994 SAM records 28.4 billion 1994 DH of import tax revenue. Judging from the fact that the 
total public expenditure for the water sector during the period 1995-2000 is approximately 7 
billion DH according to World Bank (1995), this assumption seems reasonable. 
6 For example, Goldin and Roland-Holst (1995) conduct policy simulations of trade liberalisation 
without incorporating the effects of revenue reduction for the whole economy. They celebrate the 
positive effects of combination of trade liberalisation and irrigation water price doubling policy, 
and simply add that "[t]he government budget still declines appreciably with tariff revenues, but 
this might be offset by alternative, nondistortionary sources of revenue" (p. 190). 
This policy making process matches an aphorism of Simon (1982): "Optimizing in a simplified 
world is an important means for satisficing in the real world" (p. xx). 
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d. Minimum consumption levels 
e. Terminal stock level of total private capital 
f. Terminal stock level of total public capital 
g. Nationwide unemployment rates 
h. Nationwide safe water access rates 
The indicators (a) - (c) measure the performance of policy from the viewpoint of the 
original government optimisation problem, and the indicator (d) measures the 
severity of the least favourable event. In addition to the original utility metric social 
welfare, money-metric social welfare is derived in order to grasp the magnitude of 
welfare difference between policy scenarios. Money-metric social welfare is 
measured by equivalent variations (EV) defined as the amount of income which 
must be given up to make felicity levels under the base case and under the 
alternative policy scenarios indifferent. More precisely, the EV in the year t is such 
a `constant income stream' for the entire time horizon starting from the year t, and it 
is obtained as 
{(1- 
T. )rr` - yßci - cb`se) Pr Pi Et= 
l+(1-rH)rt* 
'la 'Q 
i=R. I. U 
Oi 
l+(1-r11)rr*-(l+v 
l+p 
in which c `tee is the realised consumption of satisfaction under the base case 
scenario, and all the other variables are corresponding to each alternative policy 
scenario. 
The indicators (e) - (f) represent the terminal conditions of state variables that form 
a part of the original problem, although they have not explicitly been accounted. 
The indicators (g) and (h) are included as proxies of poverty alleviation in terms of 
reduction of socially disadvantaged population. 
These indicators are obtained for each trial of Monte Carlo simulation, and then the 
mean and the standard deviation across trials are computed. 8 
8 The GAMS code for policy simulation is attached as Appendix B3. 
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6.4 Policy scenarios 
6.4.1 Policy alternatives 
The applied model contains two types of endogenous policy variables: (i) rates of 
public charges, and (ii) public investment allocation among three types of public 
capital. The policy alternatives are constructed as their combinations. 
(1) Pricing schedule of public charges 
There are several CGE studies dealing with water pricing policy in Morocco. 
Goldin and Roland-Holst (1995) investigate the effects of doubling the price of 
irrigation water. As de Melo comments in the discussion section, the model set-up 
such as perfectly elastic water supply at a fixed cost cannot capture implications of 
water shortage and does not provide useful insight. 
Löfgren et al. (1997) conduct policy simulation in which irrigation water pricing 
policy is located within rural development policy. They prepare two alternatives of 
irrigation water tariff; one covers the operation and maintenance cost and the other 
covers full costs of irrigation water supply. This study also does not take into 
account the effects of water scarcity on water supply or water price. 
The most interesting study in this regard is Decaluwe et al. (1999). They explicitly 
incorporate the effects of water scarcity into two types of water production function, 
of which the first type represents the water produced by the existing dams and the 
second type does the combination of retrieving both surface water and groundwater. 
The high degree of spatial heterogeneity of water availability in Morocco is 
captured by differentiating water production technology between the northern and 
the southern regions with different segmentation of water markets. Then they 
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conduct policy simulations with Boiteux-Ramsey pricing and marginal cost pricing 
along with tax reform policies. 9 
Although the Boiteux-Ramsey pricing is not applicable to my model due to lack of 
proper cost function, it is possible to derive a marginal cost as a cost of hypothetical 
additional unit of investment entailed by an infinitesimal additional demand. 10 
Considering the importance of marginal cost pricing in the literature, marginal cost 
pricing was envisaged as an alternative of pricing policy. A test trial of simulation 
immediately revealed, however, that the marginal costs in my model fluctuate 
drastically and the magnitude of prices could reach several hundreds times higher 
than the calibrated rates of charges. As a result, only one pricing policy, the optimal 
pricing policy such that the sustainable supplies and the optimal demands coincide, 
is employed. 
(2) Public investment allocation 
According to the World Bank (1995) the current public expenditure of the 
Moroccan government is summarised in Table 14. 
Table 14 Current annual public expenditure in water sector 
1990-1994 1995-2000 
Share million 1993 DH Share million 1993 DH 
Water resource development 
Drinking water and sewerage 
Irrigation development 
36.0% 
18.0% 
46.0% 
700 
350 
900 
43.0% 
28.5% 
28.5% 
3,000 
2,000 
2,000 
Total 100.0% 1,950 100.0% 7,000 
Sourcc: World Bank (1995) 
9 Boiteux-Ramsey pricing rule is obtained as an interior solution of a consumer surplus 
maximisation problem under certain budgetary constraint (Boiteux 1956; p. 35). Although this 
rule is designed to achieve the second-best optimality, realisation of the second-best optimality 
along Boiteux-Ramsey pricing requires several restrictive assumptions regarding to elasticity of 
supply at marginal cost, convexity of demand in regard to the budgetary requirements, and so on 
(Dicrkcr 1991). 
10 This is corresponding to the long-run marginal cost. In my model the short-run marginal cost is 
zero because of no variable costs. 
Chapter 6 Policy Simulation 188 
The base case of infrastructure investment policy is set at the investment allocation 
pattern during the period 1995 - 2000. The alternatives of investment policy are 
prepared as follows. 
Base (status-quo): (OR, BG, BI )= (0.43,0.285,0.285) 
Alt. 1 (domestic water priority): (BR, 9G BI )= (0.285,0.43,0.285) 
Alt. 2 (irrigation priority): (9R, 0G BI )= (0.285,0.285,0.43) 
Alt. 3 (raw and domestic water priority): (BR, 0G BI )= (0.43,0.43,0.14) 
Alt. 4 (domestic water and irrigation priority): (BR, BG BI )= (0.14,0.43,0.43) 
Alt. 5 (raw water and irrigation priority): (9R, 8G ) 
0' )= (0.43,0.14,0.43) 
6.4.2 Policy environments 
In addition to the abovementioned two types of policy variables, the applied model 
contains several variables which could be treated as policy variables. For instance 
the applied model has potential to investigate impacts of revising import tariffs, 
which are key trade policy variables in the real world. Nevertheless, this thesis 
regards these variables as exogenous drivers that determine policy environments. 
This treatment is consistent with the original model design while it is still possible 
to see the influence of these variables on sustainable development policies. Import 
tax rates and minimum wage of urban unskilled labour are selected as such 
exogenous drivers to be investigated, due to their importance in the real policy and 
relevance to sustainable development. 
Further, climate change is also selected as another exogenous driver considering its 
importance in sustainable development studies. 
Each exogenous driver provides alternative environments as follows. 
(1) Climate change 
The most part of Africa including Morocco has experienced secular climate change 
in terms of annual rainfall reduction and temperature rise, and several studies warn 
that climate change in Africa could accelerate in the future (Hulme et al. 1995, 
Parish and Funnell 1999, Knippertz 2003). 
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Assessment of climate change impacts entails so high degree of uncertainty that we 
could not conclude whether annual rainfall will increase or decrease (Hulme et at. 
1995, Knippertz 2003). Nevertheless, there seems a consensus that climate change 
would be manifested as more frequent extreme events such as droughts and floods 
(Hulme et al. 1995). It is expected that a larger coefficient of variation of rainfed 
productivity could represent such a climate change scenario. l l The status quo value 
of coefficient of variation (0.366) is selected as the base case (CCbase), and 50 % 
higher value (0.55) is chosen as an alternative environment (CC1). 
(2) Trade regime 
Since the introduction of the structural adjustment programme in early 1980's the 
trade liberalisation has been one of key political issues in Morocco. While 
Morocco is undertaking gradual trade liberalisation under WTO rules and the 
Association Agreement with the European Union and most non tariff barriers have 
been eliminated as a result, there remain considerably high import tariffs which aim 
at protecting domestic production sectors, in particular agricultural sectors, as well 
as keeping this important revenue source for the government (Löfgren et al. 1999, 
Economists Intelligence Unit 2002). This reluctance of the government to 
voluntarily implement further trade liberalisation supports the idea of the trade 
regime as an exogenous driver. 
The status quo trade regime in 1994 is selected as the base case (TRbase). As an 
alternative trade regime (TR1), 20 % reduction of import tax rate resulting in no 
earmarked tax revenue to water sector is chosen consulting with Löfgren et al. 
(1999), as they provide the most detailed account of Moroccan trade liberalisation 
policy among Moroccan CGE studies introduced so far. Their simulations cover 
four policy alternatives combining tariff unification at two different levels (29 % 
and 10 %) and non-tariff barriers elimination. In their model the government 
saving level is kept constant by adjusting the rate of value added tax. This 
specification enables the model to capture the welfare effects of revenue reduction 
" Possibility that climate change would affect water production process is, however, not 
incorporated. 
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due to trade liberalisation. Studies without taking into account these negative 
effects of trade liberalisation cannot provide practically meaningful insights. 
(3) Urban minimum wage 
A wage gap between urban and rural areas is the principal determinants of urban 
unemployment rate in Harris-Todaro type migration equilibrium model, which is 
employed in the applied model. Considering the importance of urban 
unemployment problem from the social welfare viewpoint, it is interesting to see 
how wage reduction of urban unskilled labour affects sustainable development 
policy via reduction of urban unemployment. A motivation to regard the urban 
minimum wage as an exogenous driver is the fact that it is often determined by 
lobbying competitions between business organisations and labour unions. 
The status quo minimum wage for urban unskilled labour in 1994 is selected as the 
base case (MWbase), and 10 % reduction of the minimum wage is chosen as an 
alternative case (MW1) consulting with Agenor and Aynaoui (2003) who analyse 
economic impacts of Moroccan labour market policy using a CGE model. They 
explicitly introduce not only urban-rural differentiation but also formal-informal 
dichotomy of urban production sector in order to capture potential impacts of 
labour market reforms in realistic manner. Their policy experiments consist of 5% 
minimum wage reduction, which affects only unskilled workers in the urban 
informal sector, and 5% payroll tax rate reduction, which affects urban formal 
employers of unskilled workers. The main message of their study is that 
labour-market reform such as minimum wage cut or payroll tax cut alone cannot 
have long lasting positive effects on the labour market but have to be located in 
wider economic policy such as public investment policy aiming at economic 
growth. This is exactly what my model can do, although the specifications related 
to the labour market policy in my model are much cruder than those in their model. 
6.4.3 Sustainability coefficients 
Sustainability coefficients employed in construction of sustainable production 
functions are chosen in ad-hoc manner and it is necessary to conduct sensitivity 
analysis of the applied model to them. Moreover, it is possible to interpret this 
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sensitivity analysis as a policy experiment of society's safe minimum standards that 
are necessarily embodied in sustainability coefficients. In reality, any sustainable 
production function cannot eliminate risks of violating sustainability constraints or, 
in other word, losing ecosystem resilience due to high degree of uncertainty. 
Although it is not always possible to assign probability of losing ecosystem 
resilience to particular values of sustainability coefficients, there generally exists a 
tradeoff between reducing risks of violating sustainability constraints and reducing 
costs in choosing sustainability coefficients. Policy simulations with different 
values of sustainability coefficients provide information for such a decision and/or 
policy implications of different degrees of risk averseness of a society. 
The base case scenario (SCbase) employs sustainability coefficients of 1.3 for raw 
water, 1.8 for treated water, and 1.5 for irrigation land, as explained in Chapter 5. 
These values are increased by 20 % for the alternative scenario (SCI), i. e., 1.56 for 
raw water, 2.16 for treated water, and 1.8 for irrigation land. 
6.4.4 International aid flows 
In developing countries insufficient public capital stock is one of the most 
challenging problems which often triggers a vicious circle in which insufficient 
public capital stock results in low service quality which hinders sufficient 
investment in public capital due to inadequate level of cost recovery. Apart from 
low service quality, it is often observed that full cost recovery pricing, which is 
beneficial in the long run, is not feasible due to negative welfare effects in the short 
run. For these cases international aid flows, either as grants or as loans, can play a 
vital role in pursuing sustainable development. The last policy scenarios 
investigate the policy implications of international aid flows. 
The volume of international aid flows is mostly determined by donor countries, and 
it is natural to regard it as one of exogenous drivers. The reason why I separately 
investigate the international aid flows lies in my belief that international aid flows 
are key instruments of sustainable development policies of the global community. 
It is interesting to see how the international aid flows affect an individual nation's 
sustainable development policies, in particular how they facilitate the policy 
implementation. 
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The base case scenario (IAbase) assumes no international aid flow, and the 
alternative scenario (IA1) assumes availability of external loans such that initial 
public capital stocks increase 20%. Repayment conditions for loans are set as 
follows. 
Interest rate: 7% per annum including grace period 
Grace period: 5 years with interest payment 
Maturity period: 15 years including grace period 
6.5 Simulation results 
6.5.1 Sustainable development policies in various policy environments 
(1) Optimal pricing schedules 
Given the investment allocation policy as a policy alternative, sustainable 
development policies in this thesis are presented as the optimal pricing schedules of 
three public charges. 
Figure 20 shows the optimal pricing schedules of domestic water charges. 
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Figure 20 Optimal pricing schedules of dome stic water charges 
Note that there is no difference between policies in the base and CC1 environments 
because the difference in the coefficient of variation of production risk between two 
environments plays a role only in the policy implementation process, not in the 
planning process. In addition, note that Alt. 1, Alt. 3 and Alt. 4 have almost identical 
optimal domestic water pricing schedules, as well as Base and Alt. 2. 
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Figure 20 shows that the policy alternatives associated with the same investment 
allocation tP have almost identical optimal domestic water pricing schedules. This 
fact suggests that there is little difference between policy alternatives in total public 
capital accumulation in spite of heterogeneous composition of GR, G, and C1, 
otherwise the accumulated G significantly varies in spite of the same investment 
allocation LP. 
Figures 21 and 22 show the optimal pricing schedules of irrigation water charges 
and irrigation land charges, respectively. 
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Figure 21 Optimal pricing schedules of irrigation water charges 
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Figure 22 Optimal pricing schedules of irrigation land charges 
These two figures show more complicated pricing schedules than those of domestic 
water charges. It is observed that minimum wage reduction (MWI environment) 
has very little effects on optimal pricing schedules while that tariff reduction (TR1 
environment) significantly affects them. 
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(2) Social welfare 
Figures 23 and 24 show the simulated trajectories of mean per capita consumption 
of satisfaction and mean per user consumption of publicly supplied water. 12 
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Figure 23 Mean satisfaction consumption 
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Figure 24 Mean publicly supplied water consumption 
12 For the per capita water consumption calculation not only a labour force age person but also 
his/her dependent is counted as `one capita', otherwise the term `per capita' always means per 
one labour force age person. See Footnote 12 in Chapter 5. 
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It is observed that the publicly supplied water consumption is severely suppressed 
in the first year, less than 40 % of the level with status quo public charges (90 lcd). 
This suppression is considerably mitigated in the next year and further diminished 
throughout the planning period, but the status quo level of 90 lcd is not achieved 
even in the terminal year. This severe suppression of water consumption has only 
marginal impacts on the level of satisfaction consumption of which reduction from 
the level with status quo public charges (600 unit/capita/year) is less than 1.6 % in 
the first year, and in most cases the levels of satisfaction consumption exceed this 
status quo level in the second year. 
The simulated money-metric social welfare in terms of the net present values of 
equivalent variations (EV) under various environments is shown in Table 15. 
Table 15 Net present value of equivalent variations (EV) 
Policy environment Policy 
Base CC1 TR1 MW1 
Base (l , CF, ff) = Mean [DH/capita] - -21.9 
192.1 1,961.4 
(0.43,0.285,0.285) c. v [%] - (2,414.0) (10.7) (2.1) 
Alt.! (cP, Ö', (f) = Mean [DH/capita] 486.8 464.8 781.1 2,449.4 
(0.285,0.43,0.285) c. v [%] (2.9) (114.0) (2.7) (2.2) 
Alt. 2 (C', ! f', 0I) = Mean [DH/capita] 130.9 109.0 330.0 2,091.9 
(0.285,0.285,0.43) c. v. [%] (3.9) (486.9) (6.2) (2.1) 
Alt. 3 ((t, if, LI) = Mean [DH/capita] 127.8 105.9 404.5 2,092.2 
(0.43,0.43,0.14) C. V. [%] (6.0) (497.7) (4.7) (2.2) 
Alt. 4 (d, if, ! I) = Mean [DH/capita] 490.7 468.7 740.4 2,452.7 
(0.14,0.43,0.43) c. v [%] (2.8) (113.2) (2.8) (2.2) 
Alt. S (0P, iF, 0') = Mean [DH/capita] -988.5 -1,010.3 -662.0 975.8 
(0.43,0.14,0.43) c. v [%] (3.1) (52.2) (6.5) (2.0) 
Note: Bold italic indicates the best policy alternative in each environment. 
The abbreviation "c. v" stands for coefficients of variation. 
Policy environments "base" stands for (CCbase-TRbase-MWbase-SCbase-IAbase), 
"CCL" stands for (CCl-TRbasc-MWbase-SCbasc-IAbasc), and so on. 
Good performance of Alt. 1 and Alt. 4 and poor performance of Alt. 5 collectively 
imply the importance of investment in treated water production sector, while 
relatively poor performance of Alt. 3 indicates that excessively low irrigation 
investment could hamper welfare improvement effects of treated water production 
investment. 
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Another interesting finding is the effects of policy environments (exogenous 
drivers) on sustainable development policies. Alt. 4 achieves the highest social 
welfare in the base, CC1, and MW1 environments, while Alt. l does in TR1 
environment. 
Welfare implications of each policy alternative are more clearly illustrated by the 
trajectories of mean annual EV shown in Figure 25. 
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A common pattern for all environments is that Alt. 4 achieves the highest EV at the 
beginning but after several years Alt. 1 overtakes it. Whether Alt. 4 overtakes Alt. 1 
once again or not depends on the policy environment. It can be inferred that higher 
social welfare could be achieved by altering policy between Alt. 1 and Alt. 4 
appropriately. Figure 25 provides useful information for designing the optimal 
policy. 
Figure 25 also shows that the trajectories in the base, CC1 and MWl environments 
have essentially a similar shape, while those in TRl environment have a different 
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shape. In particular trajectories under the base and CC1 environments have an 
almost identical shape. These findings well correspond to the shape of optimal 
pricing schedules. 
The main implication of future climate change represented by CC1 environment is 
not revealed in mean values but in drastically increased coefficients of variation 
shown in Table 15. This implication is graphically illustrated in Figure 26, which 
depicts trajectories of annual EV of every fifth trials (5th, 10th, 15th, """) among 100 
trials associated with Alt. 4 under the base and CC1 environments. 
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Figure 26 Effects of climate change on annual EV paths 
Figure 26 shows that drastically amplified uncertainty makes comparison between 
policy alternatives almost impossible under CC1 environment. This amplified 
uncertainty is also reflected in the minimum trajectories of satisfaction 
consumption among 100 trials shown in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27 Effects of climate change on minimum consumption 
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Figure 27 shows that the amplified uncertainty significantly pulls down the 
minimum values of satisfaction consumption among 100 trials but that it does not 
change the relativity among policy alternatives. 
(3) Constraints observance 
Table 16 shows how likely policy alternatives violate sustainability constraints. 
Table 16 Probability to violate sustainability constraints 
li Policy environment Po cy Base CC1 TR1 MWi 
Base Mean 
[%] 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 
C. V. % (67.5) (65.2) (67.1) (67.5) 
Alt I Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 . c. v % (66.9) (65.3) (67.1) (67.5) 
Alt 2 
Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 
. C. V. (66.9) (65.2) (67.1) (67.5) 
Alt 3 Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 . C. V. [%] 67.5 (65.2) (67.1) (67.5) 
Alt 4 Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 . c. v %]i (66.9) 65.3 (67.1) (67.5) 
Alt 5 Mean [%] 13.3 13.5 13.5 13.5 . C. V. % (67.5) (67.5) (66.6) (66.0 
The results show no significant difference between policy alternatives. It is 
interesting that high uncertainty under CC1 environment has no effect on 
observance of sustainability constraints. 
Table 17 shows that policy alternatives have almost no effect on another constraint 
of the original optimisation problem, the government budget constraint, although 
policy environments have some effects. 
Table 17 Probability of budget deficit 
P li Policy environment o cy Base CC1 TR1 MWl 
Base Mean [%] 4.4 7.7 8.7 4.4 
C. V. [%]_ (210.2) (222.2) (149.1) (210.2) 
Alt. 1 Mean [%] 4.4 7.7 8.6 4.4 
C. V. % (210.2) (222.2) (148.8) (210.2) 
Alt 2 Mean [%] 4.4 7.7 8.7 4.4 . c. v % 210.2 222.2: (148.6) 210.2 
Alt. 3 Mean [%] 4.4 7.7 8.7 4.4 
C. V. ff o]_ (222.2) 149.1 (210.2) 
4 Alt 
Mean [%] 4.4 7.7 8.6 4.4 
. c. v %1 1_ (210.2) (222.2) (148.8) (210.2) 
Alt. 5 Mean [%] 4.4 7.7 8.9 4.5 
C. V. [%] 1 (210.2) (222.2) (152.7) 207.9 
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Tables 16 and 17 show that both probabilities are associated with large coefficients 
of variation. If these constraints are strict, it is necessary to apply lower safety 
factors, which also pulls down the attainable levels of social welfare. 
(4) Terminal capital stock levels 
The terminal values of both public and private capital stocks have important 
implications for social welfare after the planning period. 
Tables 18 and 19 show terminal values of per capita private capital stock consisting 
of household assets (m) and rainfed capital (KR) and terminal values of total public 
capital stock, respectively. 
Table 18 Terminal values of per capita private capital stock 
Policy environment Policy 
Base CCI TR1 MW1 
Base Mean [unit/capita] 6,799.8 6,799.8 6,810.7 
6,828.6 
C. V. % (3.0) (4.4) (3.0) (3.0) 
I Alt Mean [unit/capita] 6,805.5 6,805.5 6,818.9 
6,834.3 
. e. v % (3.0) (4.4) (3.0) (2.9) 
2 A1t Mean [unit/capita] 6,802.0 
6,802.0 6,813.1 6,830.8 
. c. v % (3.0) (4.4) (3.0) (3.0) 
Alt 3 Mean [unit/capita] 6,799.3 6,799.3 
6,812.5 6,828.2 
. c. v % (3.0) (4.4) (3.0) (3.0) 
ARA Mean [unit/capita] 6,805.6 6,805.6 6,817.9 6,834.4 
ex. % (3.0) (4.4) (3.0) (2.9) 
S Alt Mean [unit/capita] 
6,786.2 6,786.2 6,798.5 6,815.3 
. c. v [%] (3.0) (4.4) (3.0) (3.0) 
Note: Bold italic indicates the best policy alternative in each environment. 
Table 19 Terminal values of total public capital stock 
[million unit] 
P li 
Policy environmen t 
o cy Base and CC1 TR1 MW1 
Base 12,697.4 7,142.6 12,611.9 
Alt. 1 12,803.3 7,293.6 12,718.5 
Alt. 2 12,752.8 7,191.9 12,667.2 
Alt. 3 12,651.0 7,170.7 12,567.0 
Alt. 4 12 807.5 7,268.6 12,722.5 
Alt. 5 12,394.3 6,896.9 12,310.4 
Note: Bold italic indicates the best nolicv alternative in each environme nt. 
The difference of capital accumulation between policy alternatives is much less 
than 1% of the stock for private capital and less than 2% for public capital, if we 
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Tables 16 and 17 show that both probabilities are associated with large coefficients 
of variation. If these constraints are strict, it is necessary to apply lower safety 
factors, which also pulls down the attainable levels of social welfare. 
(4) Terminal capital stock levels 
The terminal values of both public and private capital stocks have important 
implications for social welfare after the planning period. 
Tables 18 and 19 show terminal values of per capita private capital stock consisting 
of household assets (m) and rainfed capital (KR) and terminal values of total public 
capital stock, respectively. 
Table 18 Terminal values of per capita private capital stock 
Policy environment Policy 
Base CC1 TR1 MW1 
Base Mean [unit/capita] 6,799.8 6,799.8 6,810.7 
6,828.6 
c. v %] (3.0) (4.4) 3.0) (3.0) 
Alt 1 Mean [unit/capita] 6,805.5 6,805.5 6,818.9 
6,834.3 
. ex % (3.0) 4.4 3.0 -J2.9Z 
Alt 2 Mean [unit/capita] 
6,802.0 6,802.0 6,813.1 6,830.8 
. ex % (3.0) (4.4) (3.0) (3.0) 
Alt 3 Mean [unit/capita] 6,799.3 6,799.3 
6,812.5 6,828.2 
. C. V. % (3.0) (4.4) (3.0) (3.0) 
Alt 4 Mean [unit/capita] 6,805.6 6,805.6 
6,817.9 6,834.4 
. (3.0) 4.4 (3.0) (2.9) 
Alt 5 Mean [unit/capita] 6,786.2 6,786.2 6,798.5 
6,815.3 
. c. v [%] (3.0) (4.4) (3.0) (3.0 
Note: Bold italic indicates the best policy alternative in each environment. 
Table 19 Terminal values of total public capital stock 
[million unit] 
Polic environmen t Policy 
Base and CC1 TRl MW1 
Base 12,697.4 7,142.6 12,611.9 
Alt. l 12,803.3 7,298.6 12,718.5 
Alt. 2 12,752.8 7,191.9 12,667.2 
Alt. 3 12,651.0 7,170.7 12,567.0 
Alt. 4 12 807.5 7,268.6 12,722.5 
Alt. 5 12,394.3 6,896.9 12,310.4 
Note: Bold italic indicates the best nolicv alternative in each environmc nt. 
The difference of capital accumulation between policy alternatives is much less 
than I% of the stock for private capital and less than 2% for public capital, if we 
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exclude Alt. 5. This observation is consistent with what domestic water optimal 
pricing schedules imply. 
A policy alternative associated with the largest terminal values in each environment 
coincides with the best policy alternative in terms of net present value of EV. This 
fact precludes trade-offs between social welfare during planning period and that 
after planning period and makes it easy to identify the best policy alternative in 
each environment. 
Note that the coincidence of order between net present value of EV and terminal 
values of capital stock is not entirely general although 1st, 2nd and 6th policy 
alternatives always coincide. For example, under the base environment Alt. 3 ranks 
4th in the net present value of EV but it ranks 5th in the terminal values of either 
private or public capital stock. 
(5) Unemployment and safe water access 
As explained in Chapter 1, meeting basic human needs is at the heart of sustainable 
development. In this thesis basic human needs are represented by safe water access 
and employment. Figure 28 shows the mean values of nationwide safe water 
access rates. 
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Figure 28 Mean values of nationwide safe water access rates 
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Similar to the optimal pricing schedules of domestic water charges, the policy 
alternatives associated with the same investment allocation BG (e. g. Base and Alt. 2) 
have almost identical paths of the nationwide safe water access rates. The 
achievement of sustainable development policies, especially policy alternatives 
with domestic water priority, is remarkable in safe water access provision. 
Figure 29 shows the mean values of nationwide unemployment rates. 
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13 15 
In contrast to the safe water access provision, performance of sustainable 
development policies in unemployment reduction is disappointing. Nationwide 
unemployment rates rapidly decrease for first several years, but then they start 
rising again. This poor performance is mainly due to population concentration into 
urban areas with positive population growth, because the probability for the urban 
unskilled labourers to get jobs in urban modern sector (9) generally increases 
throughout the planning period, as shown in Figure 30. 
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Recall Lemma 4.1 in p. 105. The fact that the shape of trajectories in Figure 30 is 
similar to that of safe water access rate indicates that rise of urban job getting 
probability is mainly due to improvement of rural safe water access. This is further 
endorsed by the fact that no policy alternative is enough effective for raising 
irrigation labour wage in the long run as shown in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31 Mean values of irrigation labour wage rates 
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For further achievement in unemployment reduction, some additional policy may 
be necessary. Relatively high irrigation labour wages associated with Alt. 5 may 
suggest the possibility to raise irrigation labour wage by investing more in both the 
raw water and the irrigation land production. 
6.5.2 Policy implication of sustainability coefficients 
This subsection reports the simulation results under policy scenarios associated 
with SCI environment in which sustainability coefficients are raised by 20 %. With 
modified sustainability coefficients each sustainable production function is 
recalibrated as follows. 
[Raw water production] 
R1= 11,821.9 x 
(1-167.75e'0 0085cR) for GR < 1,500, 
Rt = 13,580.4 x 
(1- 
21,143.18e'o. oosc') for 1,500: 5 GR < 2,193, 
Rl = 14,312.4 x 
ll I. -O. 002cl, I for 2,193 < GR < 3,309, 
R, = 15,080.9 x 
(i_ 
7.72e_0 001508) for 3,309 < GR < 4,626, 
Rt = 16,795.9 x 1- 0.44e'0.00°3cR for 4,626: 5 GR < 7,700, and 
R, = 7,884.7x(GRýýý-3,225.51 for GR >-7,700. 
[Treated water production] 
Qt = 525.9 x 
(1- 4.77e_0.012°: ) for G1: < 604, 
Qt = 614.6 x 
(1- 0.90e-0.0030, ) for 604: 5 G1: < 1,084, and 
Qt = 79.9(Gt)°'3 - 56.92 for G1: >: 1,084. 
[Irrigation land provision] 
Ar = 728.9 x 
(1-1.35e-0003Gr) 
for Gi :< 853, 
At = 787.6 x 
(1- 
66.96e-o. oo7c; 
) 
for 853 <_ Gl :<1,097, and 
At = 892.2 x 
(1- 
312.80e_0007c; 
/ 1 
for 1,097: 5 Gr :<1,715, and 
At = 738.0(G)°' - 663.58 for 
IG1 
: >_ 1,715. 
As a result, the proportions of the current sustainable production capacities to the 
current capacity with the present engineering practice become 55.7% for raw water 
production, 50.9% for treated water production, and 72.3% for irrigation land 
provision. It is the raw water production that is most severely affected by the 
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increase of sustainability coefficients. Judging from this fact, it is anticipated that 
more public investment in raw water production may have favourable effects on 
social welfare. 
(1) Optimal pricing schedules 
Figures 32 to 34 show the optimal pricing schedules. 
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Figure 32 Optimal pricing schedules of domestic water charges in SC1 
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Figure 33 Optimal pricing schedules of irrigation water charges in SCI 
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As observed in Figure 20, the policy alternatives associated with the same BC' have 
almost identical domestic water pricing schedules. The increased sustainability 
coefficients significantly affect the shapes of optimal pricing schedules. In all 
policy scenarios, the optimal prices are significantly higher in the first year but tend 
Dm*s§c water charge (SC1"TRt) 
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to converge on the counterpart pricing schedules under SCbase environment. It 
seems that a 20 % increase of sustainability coefficients does not induce qualitative 
change in sustainable development policies. 
(2) Social welfare 
Figures 35 and 36 show the paths of mean per capita satisfaction consumption and 
mean per user publicly supplied water consumption in SCI environment. 
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Figure 35 Mean satisfaction consumption in SCI 
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Although the suppression of domestic water consumption in the first year is much 
severer in SCI environment than in SCbase environment, the effects on satisfaction 
consumption is small, and there is almost no difference of the terminal values of 
satisfaction consumption after 15 years between SCbase and SC1 environments. 
This result corroborates our expectation of convergence property of optimal 
trajectories observed in the experiments without supply side constraints. 
The simulated money-metric social welfare in terms of the net present values of EV 
under increased sustainability coefficients is shown in Table 20. 
Table 20 Net present value of EV in SC1 environment 
li Policy environment Po cy SCI SCI-CC! SC1-TR1 SCI-MWI 
Base (C , 
d', Ö) = Mean [DH/capita] -498.2 -520.1 -385.3 1,463.9 
(0.43,0.285,0.285) C. V. [%] (4.5) (101.7) (5.9) (2.1) 
Alt. l (dt, 6(7, a) = Mean [DH/capita] -23.0 -44.9 138.1 1,941.8 
(0.285,0.43,0.285) c. v [%] (88.7) (1,178.4) (10.4) (2.3) 
Alt. 2 (0, ! f', li) = Mean [DH/capita] -356.4 -378.3 -259.6 1,606.7 
(0.285,0.285,0.43) c. v [%] (5.8) (140.1) (7.8) (2.2) 
Alt. 3 (0, £F, d) = Mean [DH/capita] -433.7 -455.6 -400.6 1,531.3 
(0.43,0.43,0.14) c. v [%] (5.0) (115.5) (5.6) (2.2) 
Alt. 4 (O', Ö', Or) = Mean [DH/capita] -82.9 -104.8 -24.7 1,881.0 
(0.14,0.43,0.43) c. v [%] (24.7) (504.6) (64.8) (2.3) 
Alt. S (e, if, d) = Mean [DH/capita] -1,453.4 -1,475.1 -1,160.1 511.8 
(0.43,0.14,0.43) c. v [%] (3.0) (35.8) (4.0) (1.9) 
Note: Bold italic indicates the best policy alternative in each environment. 
Policy environments "SC! " stands for (SCI-IAbase-CCbase-TRbase-MWbase), etc. 
Comparison between SCbase results (Table 15) and SC1 results (Table 20) shows 
that in terms of net present value of EV the most severely affected policy 
alternatives by increase of sustainability coefficients are always Alt. 3 and Alt. 4, in 
which Alt. 4 is the most affected one under TRbase environment while Alt. 3 is 
under TR1 environment. It means not only policy alternatives with low investment 
allocation to raw water sector as expected but also those with low investment 
allocation to irrigation land are mostly damaged by SC1 environment, in terms of 
social welfare. 
More conspicuous difference between SCbase and SCI environments is drastic 
increase of coefficients of variation associated with All and Alt. 4 in SC1 
Chapter 6 Policy Simulation 207 
environment. This does not mean, however, dispersion of entire trajectories as 
caused by CCl environment. Instead, it is caused by dispersion of annual EV only 
in the first year as shown in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37 Effects of larger sustainability coefficients on annual EV paths 
This observation is confirmed by the fact that elimination of the first year values 
from the calculation of net present value of EV reduces the coefficients of variation 
from 88.7% to 4.9% for Alt. 1 and from 24.7% to 7.2% for Alt. 4 in 
SC 1-IAbase-CCbase-TRbase-MWbase environment. 
Figure 38 shows the trajectories of mean annual EV in SC1 environment. 
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Figure 38 Mean annual EV in SC1 environment 
EV (SCI-AIt4) 
Chapter 6 Policy Simulation 208 
Except for the very low values recorded in the first year, the shape of trajectories 
associated with each policy alternative is very similar to SCbase counterparts. It 
suggests that a 20% rise of sustainability coefficients does not structurally change 
the welfare effects of sustainable development policies. This observation is further 
endorsed by Figure 39 showing that the increase of sustainability coefficients only 
marginally affects minimum values of satisfaction consumption among 100 trials, 
except for the first year. 
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Figure 39 Effects of larger sustainability coefficients on 
minimum consumption 
(3) Constraints observance 
Tables 21 and 22 show the probabilities to violate sustainability constraints and to 
run deficit of the government saving accounts in SC1 environment. 
Table 21 Probability to violate sustainability constraints in SC1 
Policy environment Policy 
Base CCI TR1 MW1 
Base Mean [%] 13.3 13.4 13.7 13.4 
c. v % (67.5) (65.1) (66.3) (66.6) 
Alt. I Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.3 
c. v. - % (67.5) (65.2) (66.6) (67.5) 
Alt 
.2 
Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.5 13.3 
C. V. % (67.5) (65.2) (65.9) (67.5) 
Alt. 3 Mean [%] 13.3 13.4 13.8 13.4 
c. v °/a (67.5) (65.1) (66.0) (67.7) 
A1t. 4 Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.5 13.3 
c. v % (67.5) 65.2 (66.6) (67.5) 
Alt. 5 Mean [%] 13.3 13.5 13.6 13.6 
c. v % (67.5) (65.7) (66.1) 66.1 
Minimum satisfaction consumption (Base ) Minimum satisfaction consumption (SC1) 
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Table 22 Probability of budget deficit in SCI 
i Policy environment Pol cy Base CC1 TR1 MW1 
Base Mean [%] 4.5 7.6 8.9 4.5 
C. Y. %_ (204.7) (223.6) (148.1) (204.7) 
Alt I Mean [%] 4.5 7.6 8.7 4.5 . C. V. % (206.9) (223.6) (147.9) (204.7) 
Alt .2 
Mean [%] 4.5 7.6 8.8 4.5 
c. v % (204.7) (223.6) (147.6) (204.7) 
Alt. 3 Mean [%] 4.5 7.6 8.9 4.5 
C. V. % (204.7) (223.6) (151.6) (204.7) 
Alt. 4 Mean [%] 4.5 7.6 8.9 4.5 
C. V. [%] 206.9 (223.6) 148.1 (204.7) 
Alt. 5 Mean [%] 4.5 7.6 8.9 4.5 
C. V. [%] (204.7) (223.6) (151.6) 204.7 
Increase of sustainability coefficients barely affects these probabilities. It implies 
that these probabilities are mostly determined by safety factors, not by 
sustainability coefficients. 
(4) Terminal capital stock levels 
Tables 23 and 24 show terminal values of per capita private capital stock consisting 
of household assets (m) and rainfed capital (K') and terminal values of total public 
capital stock, in SC1 environment. 
Table 23 Terminal values of per capita private capital stock in SCI 
Polic environment Policy 
Base CC1 TR1 MW1 
Base Mean [unit/capita] 6,794.0 6,794.0 6,803.8 6,822.9 
c. v % 2.9 4.4 3.0 2.9 
Alt 1 Mean [unit/capita] 6,799.7 6,799.7 6,811.1 6,828.6 . c. v % 2.9 4.4 3.0 2.9 
Alt 2 Mean [unit/capita) 6,796.4 
6,796.4 6,805.9 6,825.3 
c. v [%] 2.9 
- 
4.4 3.0 2.9 
Alt 3 Mean [unit/capita] 6,792.9 6,792.9 6,801.8 
6,821.9 
. c. v % 2.9 4.4 3.0 2.9 
A1t 4 Mean [unit/capita] 6,798.8 6,798.9 6,808.7 6,827.7 . c. v % 2.9 4.4 3.0 2.9 
5 A1t Mean [unit/capita] 6,780.8 6,780.8 6,792.5 
6,809.9 
. c. v % 2.9 4.4 3.0) 2.9 
Note: Bold italic indicates the best policy alternative in each environment. 
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Table 24 Terminal values of total public capital stock in SC1 
(million units 
P li Polic environment o cy Base and CCI TR1 MW1 
Base 12,579.7 7,032.8 12,494.7 
Alt. 1 12,685.9 7,168.9 12,601.7 
Alt. 2 12,637.1 7,073.9 12,552.2 
Alt. 3 12,523.6 6,985.0 12,440.1 
Alt. 4 12,668.2 7,126.4 12,583.7 
Alt. 5 12,280.6 6,798.2 12,197.2 
Note: Bold italic indicates the best nolicv alternative in each environme lt. 
There is no significant difference between SCbase and SC1 environments in terms 
of terminal capital stock. The previous observation that a policy alternative 
associated with the largest terminal values in each environment achieves the highest 
net present value of EV is still valid. 
(5) Unemployment and safe water access 
Figures 40 and 41 show the mean values of nationwide safe water access rates and 
nationwide unemployment rates in SC1 environment. 13 
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Figure 40 Mean values of nationwide safe water access rates in SCI 
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Figure 41 Mean values of nationwide unemployment rates in SCI 
13 The trajectories in CCl environment are omitted because they are almost identical with those in 
CCbase environment. As observed in Figure 28, the policy alternatives associated with the same 
B° have almost identical paths of safe water access rates. 
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The influence of higher sustainability coefficients is not negligible in nationwide 
unemployment rates. In the first year the nationwide unemployment rates 
associated with each policy environment in SC1 environment are 1.4 % higher than 
their counterparts in SCbase environment. Except for the first year, the differences 
in unemployment rates between SCbase and SCI environments for each policy 
alternative in average for the planning period are 0.2 % to 0.3 % in TRbase 
environment, and this difference for Alt. 3 in TR1 environment reaches 0.54 %. Not 
only the reduction of EV but also this considerable increase of unemployment rates 
must be counted as social costs of higher sustainability coefficients. 
The noticeable rise of unemployment rates coupled with almost unchanged safe 
water access rates in SCI environment indicates downward effects of increased 
sustainability coefficients on irrigation labour wages. This irrigation labour wage 
reduction in SC1 environment is demonstrated by Figure 42. 
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Figure 42 Mean values of irrigation labour wage in SCI 
It is clearly observed that the wage rate trajectory of Alt. 3 in TR1 environment goes 
down most conspicuously. 
6.5.3 Policy implications of international aid flows 
The last set of policy simulations investigates policy implications of international 
aid flows. 
(1) Optimal pricing schedules 
Figures 43 to 45 show the optimal pricing schedules under increased initial public 
capital stock by 20 % provided by international aid flows in terms of external loans. 
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Figure 43 Optimal pricing schedules of domestic water charges in IA1 
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Figure 44 Optimal pricing schedules of irrigation water charges in IA1 
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Figure 45 Optimal pricing schedules of irrigation land charges in IA1 
Note that the convergence of the optimal domestic water pricing schedules of the 
policy alternatives with the same 90 is observed as in Figures 20 and 32. The 
increased initial public capital stock significantly changes the shapes of optimal 
pricing schedules, but after several years the optimal prices tend to converge on the 
counterpart pricing schedules under IAbase environment. It seems that 20 % 
increase of initial public capital stock financed by external loans does not induce 
qualitative change of sustainable development policies. 
(2) Social welfare 
Figures 46 and 47 show the paths of mean per capita consumption of satisfaction 
and mean per user consumption of publicly supplied water in IA1 environment. 
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Figure 46 Mean satisfaction consumption in IAI 
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Figure 47 Mean publicly supplied water consumption in IAI 
The suppression of publicly supplied water consumption in the first year is 
mitigated by the increased initial public capital stock. Although the first year 
consumption of 42 lcd is still less than a half of the status quo level, this mitigation 
of water consumption suppression improves feasibility of sustainable development 
policy. The convergence property of optimal trajectories is observed again and 
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there is almost no difference of the terminal values of satisfaction consumption 
after 15 years between IAbase and IA1 environments. 
The simulated net present values of equivalent variations (EV) under increased 
initial public capital stock due to international aid flows are shown in Table 25. 
Table 25 Net present value of EV in IA1 environment 
li P Policy environment o cy IA1 IA1-CCI IA1-TRI IA1-MW1 
Base (d, lf', d) = Mean [DH/capita] 134.8 112.9 363.4 2,094.8 
(0.43,0.285,0.285) c. v [%] (8.1) (469.1) (8.5) (2.2) 
Alt. I (LP, 6', LI) = Mean [DH/capita] 644.9 622.9 963.7 2,605.6 
0.285,0.43,0.285) C. V. [%] (3.1) (85.1) (3.3) (2.3) 
Alt. 2 (0, (P, LI) = Mean [DH/capita] 272.3 250.3 479.1 2,231.5 
(0.285,0.285,0.43) c. v. [%] (4.3) (211.9) (6.3) (2.3) 
Alt. 3 (0, Ö', (I) = Mean [DH/capita] 321.8 299.9 686.4 2,285.2 
(0.43,0.43,0.14) C. V. [%] (5.2) (175.9) (4.3) (2.3) 
Alt. 4 (! /, LP, ! f) = Mean [DlFcapita] 643.7 621.7 903.3 2,604.6 
(0.14,0.43,0.43 C. V. [%] (3.0) (85.3) (3.5) (2.3) 
Alt. S (d R, (P, 0') = Mean [DWcapita] -858.4 -880.2 -499.5 1,104.7 
(0.43,0.14,0.43) C. V. [%] (3.7) (59.9) (9.8) (2.6) 
Now Ibld italic indicates the best policy alternative in each environment. 
Comparison between IAbase results (Table 15) and IA1 results (Table 25) shows 
that Alt. 3 enjoys the largest benefits in terms of the higher net present values of EV 
from the increased initial public capital stock, and Alt. I and Alt. 4 follow it, all of 
which share 9G = 0.43. This observation indicates the effectiveness of public 
investment in treated water sector for improving social welfare. To confirm this, an 
additional alternative environment (IA2) is prepared, in which the same amount of 
external loans as IA1 environment is exclusively invested in G. Figure 48 shows 
the comparison of mean annual values of EV between IA1 and 1A2 environments. 
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The figure illustrates unambiguous advantages of concentrating external loans on 
the investment into treated water production capital G. In fact, the net present 
values of EV increase more than 20 % and reach 794.8 DH per capita with Alt. I and 
797.8 DH per capita with Alt. 4 under IA2 environment. 
The effects of IAl environment are more clearly observed in Figure 49. 
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Figure 49 Mean annual EV in Al environment 
It is observed that trajectories of mean annual EV generally shift upward in IAI 
environment but tend to converge on those in IAbase environment towards the end 
of planning period. Furthermore, the relation between different policy alternatives, 
such as overtaking point between Alt. 1 and Alt. 4, is not affected by the initial 
public capital increase. It suggests that a 20% increase in initial public capital stock 
does not structurally change the welfare effects of sustainable development 
policies. 
(3) Constraints observance 
Tables 26 and 27 show the probabilities to violate sustainability constraints and to 
run deficit of the government saving accounts in IA1 environment. 
Mean EV (IA1) 
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Table 26 Probability to violate sustainability constraints in IAI 
P lic Policy environment o y Base CC1 TR1 MW1 
Base Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.3 
c. v [% ] (67.5) (65.2) (66.6) (67.5) 
Alt. l Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 
e. v % (66.9) (65.3) (67.5) (67.5) 
Alt .2 
Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.3 
C. V. %_ (66.9) 
` 
65.2 (66.6) (67.5) 
Alt. 3 Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.3 
C. V. % (67.5) (65.2) (66.6) (67.5) 
Alt. 4 Mean [%] 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 
c. v % (66.9) (65.3) (67.5) (67.5) 
Alt. 5 Mean [%] 13.3 13.5 13.5 13.5 
C. V. % (67.5) (65.7) (66.3) (66.0 
Table 27 Probability of budget deficit in IAI 
li P Policy environment o cy Base CCl TRl MWl 
Base Mean [%] 4.5 7.7 9.2 4.5 
C. V. ff o]_ (204.7) (221.7) (151.6) (204.7) 
Ali. l Mean [%] 4.5 7.7 9.2 4.5 
C. V. (204.7) (222.2) (151.6) (204.7) 
Alt .2 
Mean [%] 4.5 7.7 9.2 4.5 
C. V. (204.7) (221.7) 151. (204.7) 
Alt 3 Mean [%] 4.5 7.7 9.2 4.5 . C. V. [% (204.7) (222.2) (151.6) (204.7) 
ARA Mean [%] 4.5 7.7 9.2 4.5 
c. v. [%]_ (204.7) (222.2) (151.6) (204.7) 
Alt. 5 Mean [%] 4.6 7.8 9.4 4.6 
C. V. % (202.6) (221.6) (150.5) 202.6 
Increase of initial public capital stock barely affects these probabilities. It further 
suggests that safety factors are almost sole determinants of these probabilities. 
(4) Terminal capital stock levels 
Tables 28 and 29 show terminal values of per capita private capital stock consisting 
of household assets (m) and rainfed capital (KR) and terminal values of total public 
capital stock, in IAl environment. 
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Table 28 Terminal values of per capita private capital stock in IA1 
li P 
Policy environment 
' cy o Base CC1 TRl MW1 
Base Mean [unit/capita] 6,801.2 6,801.2 6,812.5 6,830.0 
ex % 
___ __(2.9) 
(4.4) (3.0) 2.9 
Alt 1 Mean [unit/capita] 6,807.2 6,807.3 6,820.9 6,836.0 . C. V. % 2.9 (4.4) (3.0ý J 2) 
. 
Alt 2 Mean [unit/capita] 6,803.5 6,803.5 6,814.7 6,832.3 . ex % (2.9) (4.4) (3.0) 2.9 
Alt. 3 Mean [unit/capita] 6,801.6 6,801.6 6,816.1 6,830.5 
C. V. % (2.9) 4.4 3.0 (2.9) 
Alt. 4 Mean [unit/capita] 6,807.4 6,807.4 6,819.6 6,836.1 2.9) (4.4) (3.0) 
__ 
(2.9) 
5 Alt Mean [unit/capita] 6,787.6 6,787.6 6,800.2 6,816.6 . c. v % (2.9) (4.4) (3.0) (2.9) 
Note: Bold italic indicates the best policy alternative in each environment. 
Table 29 Terminal values of total public capital stock in IAI 
[million unit] 
li 
Polte environment 
_ Po cy Base and CC1 TRl MW1 
Base 12,494.7 6,937.2 12,408.8 
Alt. 1 12,607.9 7,093.1 12,522.6 
Alt. 2 12,550.9 6,982.4 12,464.8 
Alt. 3 12,466.7 6,997.5 12,382.3 
Alt. 4 12,613.6 7,062.8 12,528.2 
Alt. 5 12,189.1 6,690.5 12,104.7 
Note: Bold italic indicates the best policy alternative in each environment. 
These results are of high interest from two aspects. First, reduction of terminal 
public capital stock due to loan repayment is small at around 1.5 to 3.0 %, in spite of 
relatively tough repayment conditions in terms of a short maturity period and an 
interest payment obligation during the grace period. If a portion of international aid 
flows can be given as grants, it is fully possible that international aid flows even 
mainly consisting of external loans could increase terminal capital stock. 
Second, coincidence between the best policy alternative in terms of social welfare 
and that in terms of terminal capital stock in each environment is no more valid, 
except for TRI environment. This case poses a tough decision to policy-makers 
between social welfare during the planning period and the source of future social 
welfare after the planning period. 
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(5) Unemployment and safe water access 
Figures 50 and 51 show the mean values of nationwide safe water access rates and 
nationwide unemployment rates in IA1 environment. '4 
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Figure 50 Mean values of nationwide safe water access rates in IAI 
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Figure 51 Mean values of nationwide unemployment rates in IA1 
Although the benefits of increased initial public capital stock in meeting basic 
human needs are marginal, they are at least positive as a mean of planning period. 
This fact guarantees the positive effects of international aid flows. 
Lastly, Figure 52 illustrates the effects of exclusively investing external loans into 
treated water production capital G in meeting basic human needs. 
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Figure 52 Effects of exclusively investing external loans into treated water 
production capital in basic human needs satisfaction 
14 Again, the trajectories in CCl are omitted because of their similarity with those in CCbase. The 
policy alternatives with the same ©0 have almost identical paths of safe water access rates. 
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Note that the paths of nationside safe water access rates of Alt. 1 and Alt. 4 are 
almost identical in each environment. Only disadvantage of exclusively investing 
external loans into treated water production capital seems 0.5 % higher nationwide 
unemployment rate in the first year, while there is almost no difference of period 
average nationwide unemployment rates in IA1 and IA2 environments. In safe 
water access provision there is clear advantage of concentrating external loans on 
the investment into G. 
6.6 Discussion 
Before discussing the simulation results it might be appropriate to reconfirm what 
this thesis tries to demonstrate through policy simulations and what it does not. 
This thesis tries to demonstrate the potential of the proposed methodology with 
providing concrete images of policy analysis based on that methodology. In 
addition, it aims to provide rough ideas of policy implications of sustainable 
development policies. 
This thesis does not, however, try to provide any materials directly applicable to the 
real policy-making. Neither does it aim to seek the best sustainable development 
policies. For such purposes much more accurate sustainable production functions, 
at least, must be prepared based on highly interdisciplinary research efforts. The 
following discussions must read with this caveat. 
6.6.1 Advantages of proposed methodology 
Policy simulations of this thesis provide information across multiple aspects of 
sustainable development policies including (i) social welfare during the planning 
period, (ii) future ability to generate social welfare after the planning period, (iii) 
observance of sustainability constraints, and (iv) basic human needs satisfaction. 
This rich information, which is rarely found in the existing literature, not only 
facilitates policy-makers to make decisions but also improves accountability of 
sustainable development policies. The simulation results contain interesting cases 
(IA1, IA1-CCI, and IA1-MWI) in which the best policy alternatives from the 
aspect of the present social welfare and of the future ability to generate social 
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welfare are different. Based on my methodology it is not necessary to integrate 
these incommensurable results in some unique indicator, but to imagine as if the 
policies were implemented and to choose more `preferable' ones. 
The advantages to separate the planning and the implementation processes are also 
well demonstrated by policy simulation results. It enables policy makers to see the 
implications of policies not only in terms of the expected values but also the 
minimum values or degree of dispersion of the simulated trajectories. The 
comparison between CCbase and CCI environments most clearly demonstrates its 
merits, in which the effects of increased variability of production risk factor 
presumably caused by climate change are manifested as both drastically dispersed 
annual EV trajectories and considerable reductions of minimum consumption 
values across 100 trials. These policy implications cannot be obtained without 
separating policy planning simulation based on expectations from Monte Carlo 
simulations of policy implementation process. 
6.6.2 General implications of sustainable development policies 
The general implications of simulated outcomes of sustainable development 
policies can be described as follows. 
a. A slight suppression of satisfaction consumption in the first year followed by a 
steady growth at around 0.5 % annually throughout the planning period. 
b. A severe suppression of publicly supplied water consumption in the first year, 
which is more than 60 % reduction from the simulated consumption level with 
status quo public charges. The consumption level considerably rises in the 
second year and continues to grow, but it remains around 95% of the status quo 
level in the terminal year even in the most preferable cases. 
c. Total private capital stock gradually grows at around 1%a year, while total 
public capital stock explosively grows at around 15 %a year on average. 
d. Safe water access is quickly and drastically improved. In the terminal year 
nationwide safe water access rates often approach to 100 %. 
e. Nationwide unemployment rates drop quickly in the first 5 to 8 years by 2 to 
3% in the best case, but gradually increase afterward. 
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Overall impression of sustainable development policies is successful considering 
the fact that these outcomes are achieved under very severe sustainability 
constraints. On the other hand, a severe suppression of water consumption and a 
mediocre performance in fighting against unemployment suggest that some 
additional policies might be necessary to realise sustainable development. 
Throughout the policy simulations the sustainable development trajectories show a 
tendency to converge towards the end of planning period, and this tendency is 
shared by both the analytic and the applied models. It precludes the possibility for 
these models to generate poverty traps, which are of high empirical interests. There 
are several potential sources of this convergence property. 
The most plausible one is a particular specification of expectation formation 
process of households assumed in this thesis. Because households always assume 
zero growth rates of exogenous prices (constant prices) regardless of their actual 
growth rates in every moment, it functions to absorb the fluctuations of exogenous 
variables. 
Another strong candidate is the lack of human capital accumulation mechanisms, 
which are often regarded as a generator of poverty traps. 15 For example, it might 
be plausible that there exists some threshold value of a society's wealth above 
which a better access to education increases a proportion of skilled workers to 
unskilled workers of which consequence is higher productivity, while below which 
such an education access cannot be realised and productivity drops as a result of 
less skilled workers. This kind of mechanism is not incorporated in the applied 
model. 
6.6.3 Implications of policy alternatives 
Comparison among six policy alternatives reveals that either Alt. 1 or Alt. 4 always 
achieves the best outcomes in many aspects, and Alt. 5 is always the worst. The 
main implication is the importance of improving safe water access for sustainable 
13 See Kremer and Chen (2002) or De la Croix and Doepke (2003) for this issue. 
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development. Although it is undeniably a product of the employed model 
specifications, I believe its relevance to the real problems. 
Relatively poor performance of Alt. 3, particularly in terms of nationwide 
unemployment rates, implies the necessity of maintaining appropriate level of 
irrigation investment. Irrigation is often regarded as one of main environmental 
threats, but it is also widely recognised that irrigation is indispensable not only to 
feed global population but also establish sound rural economy in many developing 
countries. The simulation results support the latter view. 
Another interesting finding is that the best policy alternatives switch depending 
upon policy environment. Its policy implication is that the government has to 
forecast policy environment in order to determine the strategy. In addition, it is 
observed that the policy alternatives associated with the highest mean annual EV 
alternate between Alt. 1 and Alt. 4 as time goes by. It provides useful information 
how to find better policy alternatives in which investment allocation is allowed to 
be time variant. 
6.6.4 Implications of policy environments 
The simulation results also provide us several policy implications of each policy 
environment. The major implications are as follows. 
- Severer climate change (CC1 environment) drastically disperse consumption 
trajectories of which mean values are hardly affected. It makes the worst 
events more devastating and decision-making more difficult. 
- Trade liberalisation in terms of 20 % tariff reduction (TR1 environment) has 
positive effects on social welfare in terms EV due to lowering consumer prices. 
On the other hand, it results in much lower public capital accumulation, by 
more than 40 %, than in TRbase environment. These negative effects result in 
poorer basic needs satisfaction performance in terms of both the nationwide 
safe water access and unemployment rates. 
- 10 % reduction of urban unskilled labour wage (MW1 environment) improves 
the performance of sustainable development policy in every aspect. 
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- Adoption of safer sustainability coefficients (SC1 environment) has significant 
negative welfare impacts only in the first year. These negative impacts remain 
throughout the planning period but their magnitude is small. 
- 20 % increase of initial public capital stock financed by external loans (IA1 
environment) greatly mitigates negative welfare impacts of sustainable 
development policies. The negative effects of loan repayment on public capital 
stock are small. It is observed that reductions in terminal total public capital 
stock from lAbase environment are no more than 1.7 %. 
It should be noted that lack of distributional aspects in the model results in the 
all-round triumph of minimum wage reduction (MW1) despite the fact that urban 
unskilled labourers are highly likely to be losers. Introducing distributional issue 
into sustainable development policy analysis must be realised in future to have 
directly relevant implications to the real policy. 
6.6.5 Feasibility of sustainable development policies 
The biggest threat for the feasibility of sustainable development policies is 
identified as severely suppressed water consumption, particularly in the first year. 
This drawback of the sustainable development policies can be mitigated by 
increasing initial public capital stock to a certain degree, as demonstrated in IAI 
environment. In fact, if the government exclusively invests the same amount of 
external loans as in IA1 environment into treated water production capital G (IA2 
environment), per user consumption of publicly supplied water in the first year 
becomes 52 lcd, which is nearly 50 % more than the value in IAbase environment. 
Nevertheless, it seems not enough to secure feasibility of sustainable development 
policies. 
In order to improve the feasibility of sustainable development policies, it might be 
necessary not only to increase international aid flows but also to set transitional 
periods to apply sustainable production functions. For instance, it might be 
practical to gradually increase the values of sustainability coefficients from unity to 
the target levels for, say, 5 years. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
7.1 General conclusion 
This thesis presents a coherent body of research work encompassing conceptual 
clarification, theoretical analysis and empirical analysis with a case study, for 
which motivation is to make a contribution to operationalising the concept of 
sustainable development and to providing necessary information to implement it. 
To make this challenge somehow tractable, the study scope is confined in water 
crisis in water- stressed developing countries from a wide range of issues relevant 
to sustainable development. 
In this thesis the concept of sustainable development is articulated with paying 
special attention to its principal objective and the meaning of sustainability. The 
primary objective is specified as meeting the basic human needs all over the world, 
and the meaning of sustainability is defined as not undermining the resilience of 
ecosystems functioning as life-support systems. 
The proposed methodology is built on the foundation of microeconomic theory, in 
particular Rams ey-Cas s-Koopmans (RCK) type neoclassical growth theory, but its 
practical applicability and relevance to the articulated concept of sustainable 
development are at the same time pursued. This is why I dare to replace several 
basic constituents of the neoclassical growth theory with innovative ideas in spite of 
Chapter 7 Conclusions 225 
high risks associated with deviating from a well-established framework. The 
important innovative ideas include: 
- To separate optimisation processes of the private and the public sectors, instead 
of a prevailing benevolent social planner setting. 
- To replace the perfect foresight assumption with the no-perfect foresight 
assumption in which households expect that the future trajectories of 
exogenous variables are constant at the current values but every moment they 
update this expectation based on the realised values at that moment. 
- To separate policy simulations of the policy planning phase from those of the 
policy implementation phase in order to deal with exogenous variables 
associated with uncertainty. 
The advantages of the proposed methodology are not a few. Firstly, it paves a way 
to develop dynamic optimisation CGE models free from the perfect foresight 
assumption. Secondly, it enables policy analysis to reflect the second-best nature, 
or controllability, of public policy. A little thought tells us that the first-best 
outcomes obtained by the conventional approach with social benevolent planner 
setting and perfect foresight assumption are of little relevance to empirical policy 
analysis. Thirdly, it can provide rich information useful for both policy-making and 
justification purposes. In addition, it can accommodate various uncertainties in a 
straightforward manner, in which the uncertainties without probability distribution 
can also be dealt with. These advantages are demonstrated by a case study of 
Morocco. 
The model construction strategy of this thesis is to start from a simple analytic 
model and then to develop an applied numerical model. The former model, the 
analytic model, is thus assigned to intermediate roles, but its contribution to overall 
achievements of this thesis should not be underestimated. The analytic model itself 
is a pioneering water-extended RCK growth model free from both benevolent 
social planner setting and perfect foresight assumption. The main contributions of 
the analytic model are (i) to serve as an indispensable model platform of the applied 
model, and (ii) to provide key implications only based on which the applied model 
can be solved numerically. Furthermore, comparison between predictions of local 
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stability analysis with linearisation method and the results of numerical simulations 
reveals the severely limited applicability of the linearised local stability analysis to 
highly non-linear systems. 
The applied model employed in the case study is a highly aggregate dynamic 
optimisation CGE model, which is developed based on the analytic model with 
incorporating four key stylised facts of water-stressed developing economies; (i) 
dominant water use share of irrigated agriculture, (ii) high production risks of 
rainfed agriculture, (iii) high urban unemployment rates, and (iv) poor safe water 
access in the rural areas. The latter two stylised facts are modelled as a generalised 
version of Harris-Todaro rural-urban migration equilibrium in which indirect 
utilities derived from the expected income in the rural and the urban areas are 
equalised. The applied model is successfully calibrated and validated based on 
empirical data of Morocco between 1994 and 2002. 
The policy simulations generate highly interesting results. The major findings 
include: 
a. The importance of public investment in safe water access provision and 
irrigation sector is unambiguously demonstrated; 
b. The best policy alternatives switch in different policy environments; 
c. Severe consumption suppression of publicly supplied water is identified as a 
major threat to feasibility of sustainable development policy; and 
d. Contribution of international aid flow (even without grant element) to 
implement sustainable development is demonstrated. 
Although it does not aim at providing any materials directly applicable to the real 
world, this thesis is expected both to fill the existing information gap in 
operationalising sustainable development to a certain extent and to stimulate 
research efforts sharing the same motivation, which will hopefully facilitate 
implementation of sustainable development in the real world. 
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7.2 Fulfilment of research objectives 
This thesis has two equally important research objectives; one is to establish a 
policy analysis framework relevant to sustainable development, and the other is to 
clarify policy implications of sustainable development policies. 
For the former objective, the following advantages of the proposed framework 
prove its relevance to the articulated concept of sustainable development. 
- Sustainable development policies can be evaluated in various aspects 
encompassing social welfare during the planning period, terminal capital stock 
as a basis of future social welfare after the planning period, observance of 
sustainability constraints, safe water access rates and unemployment rates as 
measures of basic human needs satisfaction. 
- Sustainability constraints are translated into sustainable production functions 
that are defined as the relationship between public capital stock and production 
capacity on condition that production and consumption of publicly supplied 
goods do not endanger resilience of ecosystems functioning as life-supporting 
systems. Although the employed sustainable production functions are 
hypothetical, sustainable constraints are conceptually anchored in ecosystem 
resilience. 
- The model addresses negative welfare impacts of lack of safe water access, 
competition between domestic water use and irrigation water use, and effects 
of public investment in safe water access provision and irrigation on urban 
unemployment. These issues represent various pathways through which water 
affects basic human needs. 
For the latter objective, the policy simulations provide rich information to see 
outcomes of sustainable development policies in various policy environments. It is 
observed that the best policy alternatives switch according to policy environments. 
Further, the policy simulations identify severe consumption suppression of publicly 
supplied water as a potential threat to feasibility of sustainable development, and 
also demonstrate the positive impacts of international aid flows on this feasibility. 
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Although there are several important issues left over by this thesis as mentioned in 
the next section, it can be concluded that this thesis has successfully fulfilled the 
research objectives. 
7.3 Future work 
7.3.1 Distributional issue 
Distributional issue is at the heart of sustainable development mainly in two aspects. 
One is its implication for poverty, and the other is its importance for feasibility of 
policy. 
For the former, Drenowski (1977) discusses the concept of relative poverty based 
on which the poor are those who gain when income becomes more evenly 
distributed and the non-poor are those who lose. Furthermore, Lintott (1998) 
asserts that "once basic material needs are satisfied, it is an individual's relative, not 
absolute, consumption that counts for his or her welfare" (p. 242). It implies that 
intra-generational equity matters in sustainable development of which principal 
objectives include poverty alleviation. 
For the latter, it is well recognised that Pareto optimality criterion is hardly 
applicable to the real policy because policies always generate winners and losers. A 
little thought tells us that feasibility of policies crucially depends on the proportion 
of losers and the magnitude of their loss. Evaluation of feasibility based on the 
average of a society is thus neither reliable nor convincing. 
The main reason why I gave up to incorporate such an important issue into the 
applied model is the fact that departure from a crucial assumption of the 
representative household would result in an undesirable model specification in 
which indexing individuals or households based on their migration and asset 
accumulation history is required. Incorporating distributional issue will drastically 
increase model complexity and make it difficult to keep analytical tractability. 
Nevertheless, this is daunting but attractive challenge and the payoff for success 
must be immense. 
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7.3.2 Sustainable production functions 
Construction of sustainable production functions in a reliable and operational 
manner may require truly interdisciplinary research projects in which ecologists 
contribute to understand impacts of production activity on ecosystem resilience, 
economists and sociologists play a crucial role in forming consensus on certain safe 
minimum standards to maintain this resilience, and scientists and engineers provide 
technological knowledge to achieve it. It is not necessarily a barrier to implement 
sustainable development but can be regarded as an excellent opportunity to conduct 
such an interdisciplinary project. 
Successful construction of sustainable production functions not only improves the 
direct applicability of the proposed methodology to real policy analysis but also 
promotes genuinely interdisciplinary activities of which synergy effects could be 
substantial. 
7.3.3 Integrated treatment of water and energy 
Water and energy are acknowledged as the most important issues for sustainable 
development. Furthermore, there are various direct and indirect linkages between 
water and energy, as described in Chapter 1. An example of linkages is energy 
input in water production. Suppose that desalination of seawater is indispensable to 
increase water production capacity, and necessary energy input exceeds sustainable 
energy consumption level. Lacking energy from the analysis may provide us 
fallacious prescriptions for sustainable development in such a case. It is thus highly 
desirable to address water and energy issues in an integrated manner. 
An integrated treatment of water and energy issues is, however, expected to be 
costly in terms of analytical tractability. This is mainly why I set aside this 
integration issue. Nevertheless, this integration of water and energy issues is 
another rewarding challenge to go one step forward to realise sustainable 
development. 
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Appendix Al Proof of Proposition 3.1 
Recall the "clairvoyant" consumption function at period t. 
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c(t)=17(t)[m(t)+ ft W(s)e-1r 
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If we substitute true trajectories of exogenous variables w, r, and p with the 
households' expectations about them, which we assume constant at the current 
values at period t, we obtain 
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By putting (A1.2) and (A1.3) into (A1.1), the consumption function becomes 
c(t)- 
b5 r(1)-b4 
{a, r(t)-a, }s 
m(t)+ 
w(t) {1-lim 
e-{r(t)-v}sl 
bl{p(t)}ý-ý[1-lime 1 r(t)-v sJ 
(A 1.4) 
In order to converge two limits towards zero in (A1.4) we need the following two 
conditions. 
r(t)-v> 0= r(t)>v, and (A1.5) 
bsr(t)-b4 >0 r(t)> 
b4 
= 
yQ- p. (A1.6) 
b5 o'-1 
First we check the relativity between two critical values as follows. 
va-p_v(Q-1)-(vQ-p)_p-v>0. (A1.7) 
o-1 a'-1 o-1 
Here recall that we previously assume that both the numerator and the denominator 
of the far right hand side are positive. Now we can examine the following 3 cases. 
(1) Case 1: r>v 
Since (A1.5) and (A 1.6) are satisfied, the above two limits converge to zero, and we 
obtain 
c(t)_ 1? 1(1)+ 
w(t) (A1.8) 
(2) Case 2: b4/b5 <r<v 
If r(t) = v, c(t) becomes positive infinity from (A1.1). Otherwise the limit 
corresponding to (A1.5) diverges to positive infinity and that of (A1.6) converges to 
zero. As a result, c(t) becomes negative infinity. 
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(3) Case 3: r: 5 b4/b5 
If r(t) = b4/b5, c(t) becomes positive infinity from (A1.1). Otherwise, we need to 
modify (A 1.4) into the following form to examine this case. 
e 
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Further, the far right limiting term is modified as 
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Since r< vwe have the inequality p -r >p-v> 0. 
Hence the far right hand side of (Al . 10) diverges to positive infinity. Since the first 
term of (A1.9) converges to zero and the second term diverges to positive infinity, 
c(t) diverges to positive infinity. 
In sum, we need the condition r>v to have sensible consumption decision. When 
this condition is satisfied, the optimal consumption level is determined by (A1.8). 
Q. E. D. 
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Note that the denominator of the right hand side of (A2.1) is always positive for the 
given domain, Since the numerator is a quadratic function of J with positive 
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intercept and the denominator converge to positive infinitesimal, we have 
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Since the corresponding denominator is positive infinitesimal, we have proven 
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Q. E. D. 
Two optimality conditions (3.15a) and (3.15b) are transformed into the following 
two equations with p(t) = p(0)e(a-`'+p)' and 0= 0. 
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From these two equations we can derive the following optimality condition, 
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This implicit function determines water price p(t), given k(t). Once p(t) is 
determined, the level of k at the next moment is determined by the equation of 
motion, and it determines water price at that moment, and so on, while the time path 
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of G is determined by that of p. Hence T (p; k) =0 and the equations of motion of 
k and G determine a set of trajectories. 
Now let us derive the rate of change of water price along this set of trajectories. By 
taking time derivative of the equations (A3. la) and (A3. lb) with logarithmic 
transformation, we derive 
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It is clear that the necessary and sufficient condition to have a unique trajectory of 
water price is 6-D=O, and this satisfies r(p; k) = 0. 
As a result, the system determining the trajectories becomes 
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In addition, the differential equation of water price becomes 
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Appendix A4 Proof of Proposition 3.8 
When 0>0 the relationship 0= pu holds, since the shadow price of relaxing 
water balance consumption means the social benefit of providing additional water 
of which relative price to the capital good isp. 
With 0= Pu , sustainability condition 
(3.15d), and (3.15c), the optimality 
conditions (3.15a) and (3.15b) are transformed into 
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From these two optimality conditions, we derive the following equation. 
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By taking time derivative of the both hand sides of Eq. (A4. la) with logarithmic 
transformation, the following differential equation is derived. 
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Due to the fact that the interior solution is a special case of market clear solutions, 
the rate of change of the water price has to follow that of the market-clear optimal 
trajectories. Recall the market-clear optimal counterpart is 
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It is obvious that one of necessary conditions to have Os =OmPc is that the term 
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If the latter is the case, Os must always be zero and this requires ý, ýc =ýk =0 as 
well, which means a steady-state, due to the fact that Os=O! c. At the steady-state 
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which cannot be neither positive nor negative infinite since zero water price does 
not make sense which requires infinite water supply capacity. As a result, when 
0>0 there is no interior solution satisfying necessary conditions (3.15a) - (3.15d). 
Q. E. D. 
Appendix A5 Derivation of A matrix 
Each element of the matrix A is derived as follows. Note that the derivation often 
utilises the fact that a= ýmPc _k=0, in which the overline denotes the value 
evaluated at the steady-state. 
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ak 
(xe b8 
kd 
Ixe b8 
:. A23 = -b sb i6 
Dz 
D, 
k 
(7) A31 1 xe =o. 
kk 
(8) A32 = `ý 
I 
xe =ka 
(Xe 
.= -b6b16 
p 
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(9) Asa= ak ka e+4 ik=-b8b16. ak 
kIx 
akk 
lx 
Q. E. D. 
Appendix A6 Proof of Proposition 3.11 
First of all, the local stability condition is valid only for the neighbourhood of the 
steady-state. Hence the economy must be enough close to the optimal steady-state 
to apply this proposition. 
Let g(r) denote the characteristic polynomial of A. We have 
g(r)=_-r3 + trace Ax r2 +cP(A)xr+detA, where 
trace A= Ali + A22 + A33 , 
0(A) = A12A21-All (A22 +Ass), and detA=All (A22A33 -A23A32) -AJ2AuAss 
The coefficients of g(r) are evaluated as 
traceA=5JEa(G)-1l -C°`Glýrý`G) 
2b____ 
-bb16, lJ NodD1 PDi 
P(A)={e0 (G)-1} b6b16 
kD72 
+b8blb 1 and 
detA = 0. 
As det A= 0 the characteristic equation g(r) =0 has one zero real eigenvalue which 
is unstable. The remaining two eigenvalues are expressed as 
r= 
trace Af (trace A)2+40(A) 
2 
Their signs are determined as follows. 
Case 1: ea (G) <1 
Because both of traceA and «(A) are strictly negative, two eigenvalues are either 
two negative real numbers or two conjugate complex numbers with negative real 
part. In both cases they are stable eigenvalues. 
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Case 2: Ea (5) >1 
The sign of «(A) is strictly positive and (trace A)2 + 40 (A) > (trace A)2 holds 
regardless of the sign of trace A. Thus one of the remaining two eigenvalues is 
positive real number and the other is negative real number, which means the 
former is an unstable and the latter is a stable eigenvelue. 
Case 3: e0 (G) =1 
O(A) = zero is associated with one zero real eigenvalue and the other one is r= 
trace A which is negative with e (G) =1. Hence this case is associated with one 
stable and two unstable eigenvalues. 
Recall that the linearised system around the optimal steady-state is unstable unless 
as many initial conditions as the number of unstable eigenvalues are freely chosen 
(Gandolfo 1997; Theorem 18.3). Along the market-clear trajectories the initial 
water price is completely determined by the condition r (p; Go, k o) = 0. 
Therefore the initial values of the same number of state variables as that of unstable 
eigenvalues must be freely chosen to achieve the optimal steady-state along the 
optimal trajectories. 
Q. E. D. 
Appendix A7 Proof of Proposition 3.12 
The current value Hamiltonian of the household problem in discrete time is 
1-a 
Hý=c +1A, s+l{(r, -v) m, +w, -cM-psgf}" 1-0' 1+p 
The necessary conditions to have an interior solution are 
aH 10 Ac 
1-Q 
ac`, ý f=1+ ý+i = 9ý 
(A7.1 a) 
P 
ýq 
'=01pp =(I - qý) 
cq1 (A7. l b) 
ss 
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(1+v DH, 
2J+1=1+p2 
s 
(A7.1 c) I+p ani, l+rs 
(a-t) 
lim 1+v 2, m, =0. (A7.1d) 
8-->- l+P 
The following optimal conditions are exactly the same as in continuous-time. 
qx and cM .1 
9ý 
1-w 
psl-ics . (A7.2) -, P) 
By putting (A7.2) into (A7.1a) we have "ý9+1ý(1+p)=1/ýblpsl-ýcsý) , and 
ý, ý(1+ p) since the same relation must hold in period s-1 as 
well. From these relations with Eq. (A7.1c), we derive 
1_ýO 1 
J-1 
c, +l = cr 
Pr 1+ r+' a, and with no-perfect foresight assumption 
Pr+j 
UP 
J 
l+r, a 
1+p cr+1 = 
Cl (A7.3) 
Recall the equation of motion of the household assets with incorporating relations 
(A7.2) is expressed as m,, 1=L+-r, m, + -'(iv, -bl psl-9'c3) . From this with l+v l+v 
no-perfect foresight assumption, the inter-temporal budget constraint from period t 
to Tis derived as follows. 
l+y T_ wt 1+y 
i 
_b, 
prl-ncr l+rr 1IU l+y 
J 
mr+r 1+rr -mr+1+rr 
_o 
l+r 1 +rr 
l_o 
l+p l+rr 
Recall that the transversality condition with Eq. (A7.1c) becomes 
(s-r) (L, 
+r, 
) (J-t) (s-t) 
lim v 'z ms =) l im m 
l+y 
=0 
s-ý°° 1+/0 J l+rt 
T 
It means that when T goes to infinity, mt+T 
+v becomes zero. Now we can 
(I+ 
r, 
derive the discrete-time consumption function as 
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cr = 77 , mz + 
Wt 1+y in which 
l+r, 
i_o 
l+rr 
j -1 
f11+it "a 1+y Rt 1+r 
j_o 
l+p l+ 
In order to have sensible optimal consumption, it is required to have convergence 
i/Q 
for each summation, and it is so when 
l+y 
and 
l+rr I+y 
are strictly I+r 
(I+ 
p 
(I+r, ) 
less than unity. It is easily found that its necessary and sufficient condition is rt >v 
due to the fact that v- 
1+, TO_I -1 =(l+v 
1-( 
1+ >0, and the ( p) P) 
corresponding optimal consumption becomes as Proposition 3.12 states. When r, 
does not satisfy this condition, ct cannot be a positive finite value. 
Q. E. D. 
Appendix A8 Proof of Proposition 3.13 
The equation of motion of private capital in discrete-time is expressed as 
k, 
+l -k, ={(r; -v)ks +w; -b, p3' 
°cs}/(l+v)_i O. Except for this slight 
modification, the discrete-time version of the system determining market-clear 
trajectories is exactly the same as the continuous-time version. 
Now let us consider the excess-supply trajectories. The Lagrangian of the 
government problem in discrete time is 
1-a 
Lý- cý + 
l+y 
, +lkok + 
l+y I, 
+ 
f 
p3 (RH + cY" ýNo (1+výs -8G, 1-a' l+p 1+p 
+D, jF'v (G, ) -(4H +4") No (1+v)'} . 
When the sustainable water supply capacity exceeds the optimal water demand, OS 
= 0. In addition, the following relationship among the other two Lagrange 
multipliers holds. 
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l+v dal _ pG _1 pf 
I l+y A+1 in which liG is the l+p No (l+v) No (1+v)s 1+p 
shadow price of additional unit of investment in public capital, and us is the 
shadow price of additional unit of investment in private capital. 
The first equality holds because the shadow price of additional unit of investment in 
public capital and the shadow price of allowing additional unit of public capital in 
the next year must be the same along the optimal trajectories. Note that Af+1 
represents the value of additional unit of public capital in year s+1 from the 
perspective of year s+1. The same value from the perspective of year s is 
1+v 
2Z' . 
The same logic leads to , u; =1+v 
+1, and the second equality 
'Ua =1Ju, 
holds because the same capital good is invested in public 
No (1+v) 
capital and private capital and consequently the ratio of their shadow price along 
the optimal trajectories must be unity, as explained for the continuous-time case. 
Let define u, =, ua =1s us. The necessary conditions to have an interior 
No (1+v) 
solution under Os =0 are 
6s-Qaa, _-No (l+v)ýsaPs 
Iksýs +Ps(4H+V)J' (A8.1a) 
P, 
. -a 
D6, 
=-No(I+v)'up 
a {ksos +Ps('+)} 
ak, ak, 
-No (1+v)3, u., +1+P No (1+v)s-l, us_,, and (A8. lb) 
1+p () P '-l+výý-1-P'ý 
A8. lc 
Equations (A8. lb) and (A8. lc) are combined into 
eJ-or 
a' 
_-No (1+v)', u, 
8+y+ a {kso. 4 +p (qH+RM)} " 
(A8.2) 
ak, l+v aka 
From Equations (A8. la) and (A8.2), the discrete-time version of T becomes 
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kH 
ac, lap, a/aPs k,, + Ps 
(qs + 4m )) 
or equivalently acf/ak, [(o+v)/(l+v)+a/a3{1ý: +Ps (RH +qM)}] 
J/1J I'Jlk 
k 
ac aJ r? J(t3+V+ l+y 
oo 
J sl sJ1 
J 
ac, lakJ 
Dk 
{k (I+v 
+0s 
)PJW 
+R'"ýý} 
J 
Hence the discrete-time version offs is expressed as 
fES=C _k 
(5+V+Ok 
-p qH+4M =0. ss 1+V s s(s s) 
By substituting 1 JO with 
{(r; 
-v)k, +w -bl p, '-Pc, 
}/(1+v), we have 
1-9 (r` +8)k, +1v1 
fES(Pr; kt)= 1+P"(1-ýp)t-9(1+v) -pr(gH+qM)- l+v 
The remaining equations of motion are self-evident. 
Q. E. D. 
Appendix A9 Proof of Lemma 4.1 
Let Mu denote the expected wage income derived from allocating one unskilled 
labourer to urban areas, and M, that to the irrigation agriculture sector, 
respectively. Let 0E denote the probability for the unskilled member migrating to 
urban area to be employed in the urban modern sector. We have M° = 0, i-vu and 
Ml =wtI{1-(1-9t)z}. 
Due to the poor access to safe water in rural areas, the expected water consumption 
is expressed as cIH° = qi' for the urban residents and qt" = 9tgH + (1-O) q for the 
irrigation labourers. 
Let V° denote indirect felicity derived from expected income wage when one 
unskilled labourer is allocated to urban areas and VI denote that to the irrigation 
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agriculture sector. The indirect felicity is derived by solving the following felicity 
maximisation problem. 
_( R 
©R( fei( U 9tl H WQ 
{cRMaxqHju(c1), 
ý1-lc1) lie) crý 
I, gt) 7 
subject to budget constraint pRcR + pt c! +p Ct + ptq" <M', , 
for i=U, I. 
Assuming an interior solution, we derive the Marshallian demands and 
consequently the following indirect felicity for each case. ' 
91 
VUOETIU 1 , and 
i=R, I, U, Q 
Pi 
V' =(OX9 Zvi o, )}+Pr9., o 
1H 
Bi 
i_R, I, U. Q 
(Tt 
The following equilibrium probability 9E` is easily obtained by solving V° = V,, 
-(e)"2 
1 BE` =w 
[w: 
{1-(1-}+10--1J]. 
ur 
In addition, there is a restriction that 0< 9E <_ 1, which imposes a condition 
zwi (o t)2 + 
{(l 
- z)wI - pt 9no t -1v 
U (o, )1-Iv¢ _}.. pt? 0S0 
Q. E. D. 
Appendix Al 0 Proof of Proposition 4.1 
Recall that the equation of motion of household assets in terms of equity share is 
t t+l 
t 
mt+ý -1 
+r 
nit - B, ct + BZ + B3 -1}uR c 
iR 
1+v l+v IM pt zR Kt 
I YRL 
l+t 
IfR YRq 
-( 
11 '7R ! '/) 
w` 
-(1-8)KR and (A10.1) l1 +V J ZR tßpr('; +8)I 
For the purpose of this analysis we can apply any positive monotonic transformation to the 
felicity function. Thus we use the simplest case, u (c)= c. 
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m, +1=1 mf-Blcf+B2+(1+v)s(B3-B4), 
fors 
- t+1, (A10.2) 
V¢ 
is 
where B, =I vc 
A fJ('-ir 
, B2 =1 vc 
[wveE*1 U* 
(1+V)Pr rPQ , _R. r. v 
rP; ý1+výPr 
+wi 1 S+iv, (1-1°-1 S){1-(i -Bo)z}+p 0(1-i'-1 
S)(1-9t)], 
_ 
QR YRL 
ulý 
( 
mit YR and B 
FR 
Rxw; 
RR QRLrt +1R t5) B= (1+V) p, 4 1+V iR lßPr(+8) NRK 
The optimal consumption at the year t+T with the constant price expectation is 
obtained from Eq. (4.7) as follows. 
1 
ct+T = c*1+pJ 
T/a 
- 
(A10.3) 
From Eq. (A10.2) and Eq. (A10.3), we obtain the intertemporal budget constraint 
between the years 1+1 and 1+1+ T as follows. 
T 
ryl 
r1 
+ý- 
T 
)r 
Ill BCýf'1+82ý/ý2+( (B3-B4) ß, (A10.4) 
r+ý+T l l+ i'r) r+1 'tr I+ v 
r=1 J=1 i=i 
where - 
l+y l+r Ila 
_ 
l+y 
and ß' 
l+rt l+p 
A 
l+rt' 
ý3 
l+rt 
When T approaches to infinity, the left hand side becomes zero from the 
transversality condition and A,. +1rl 
('+ l 
obtained from the optimal conditions 
(4.5d) and (4.5e). 
I+v 
+PýT 
4+T'nlr+T llril 
(11+1 
lm 
(1-F 
ýJ 
lT 
m( 
1i 
lT 
mr+T 
=. i<"' "M nrt+T 
rl+ylT 
T-rý ll+1; 
) ]=°" 
At the same time the boundedness of the right hand side requires that all the 
common ratios 63's must be less than unity, which is guaranteed if rt >v due to the 
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fact that v>1+p 
becomes 
-1. When this condition is satisfied Eq. (A10.4) 
mr+i-Blc 1ß -B21 
Q 
-11+v/t(B3-B4)1 #8ß3 . 
(A10.5) 
Eq. (A 10.5) is incorporated into Eq. (A10.1) and finally the optimal consumption at 
time t is obtained as 
mQ 
at Q "i 
4i l+r 1/cT 1 Ju Ew u" 
lw` B` 1` 
}[pucm 
`+ 
ratt. ru + P r-y r 
+wll S+tivt (l-' `-l8 )(i-(1-o1)z)+P: q0(1-li "'-1 s)(1-9t)} 
1rap IR 
- 1 
1 pFL 
w r/R FR TA 
'RK 
puo (rt + 8) aR 
+(l+v) -rt - 
(l+v) 
rt(I+rt) zR 
(PRL) 
,ß 
r1 
ti v! t 
C ) YR 
YRK 
Qý 1 PAL (1- 8) puKR t 
( 
l+r l+v zß 
TR 
t 
Q. E. D. 
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Appendix B GAMS Code 
Appendix 131 GAMS code for simulations of the analytic model 
$Ontext 
Numerical simulations of analytic model 
Comparison between MC and ES trajectories 
Satoshi Kojima, University of York, 
$Offtext 
""-"Calibration of MC steady-state ""*"" 
Sets 
t time period /1 "200 / 
i/1"3/ 
first(t) starting year; 
first(t) = YES$(ORD(t) EQ 1); 
Scalars 
policy_k multiplicative factor to initial private capital stock /1/ 
policy_G multiplicative factor to initial public capital stock /1/ 
factor scaling-up factor /5/ 
tau technological parameter [dmnl] 
wbar steady-sate wage [unit per labourer per time period] 
qHbar steady-state domestic water consumption [water unit per HH per time period] 
qMbar steady-state industrial water consumption [water unit per labourer per time period] 
Qbar steady-state aggregate water demand [water unit per time period] 
rbar steady-state interest rate [per year] /. 1/ 
pbar steady-state water price [unit per water unit] /I/ 
kbar steady-state per capita private capital stock (unit per household] 
nyu population growth rate [per time period] /. 02 / 
delta depreciation rate /. 05 / 
rho time preference /. 075/ 
phi weight of market goods in household production /0.98/ 
sigma elasticity of marginal felicity /3/ 
beta K factor share of private capital / .5/ 
beta_Q factor share of industrial water /. 2 / 
beta_L factor share of labour / .3/ 
b1, b6, b7, b8, b9, b10, b11, b12, b13, b14, dl, d2, d3, xbar2; 
* Calibration of technological parameter 
tau = (rbar+delta)/(rho+delta); 
Parameters 
Nbar(i) steady state population [ person] / 1=1000,2=2000,3=3000/ 
Gbar(i) steady-state public capital stock [ unit] 
FWbar(i) steady-state water production [ water unit ]; 
bi =1 /(1-phi)"(1-phi)/phi"phl; 
b6 = beta Q/ (1-beta Q); 
b7 = betaK / (1-beta_Q); 
b8 = beta-_L/ (1-beta Q); 
b9 = delta+nyu - (delta + rho)/sigma; 
b10 = (sigma-1)"beta K*beta_Q"b6/sigma; 
b11 = (delta+nyu)/beta Q"b6; 
b12 = (delta+nyu)*(delta + rho)/beta Q"b6; 
b13 = (delta+nyu)'beta_K+(delta + rho)'(1-beta_Q); 
b14 =beta K"(1-beta_Q)*beta_Q"*b6; 
dl=beta K_*beta_Q"b6; 
d2=(1-beta Q)*beta_Q**b6; 
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d3 = 1/(1-beta_Q); 
xbar2=tau*beta_K*beta_Q**b6/(delta+rho); 
kbar = xbar2**(1/b8)*(1/pbar)**(b6/b8); 
wbar=tau*beta_L*kbar**b7*(beta Q/pbar)"b6; 
qHbar = (1-phi)/pbar"(1+rbar-(1+nyu)*((1+rbar)/(1+rho))**(1/sigma))* 
(kbar+wbar/(rbar-nyu)); 
gMbar=tau'kbar"'b7'(beta_Q/pbar)"(1/(1-beta Q)); 
F\Nbar(i)=(gHbar+gMbar)*Nbar(i); 
Gbar(i)=pbar"FWbar(i)/delta; 
-"Talibration of water production parameters 
Scalars 
FW1 
G1 1st threshold of G/ 28000 / 
FW2 
G2 2nd threshold of G/ 44000 / 
a 1, a 2, a 3, b 1, b 3, c 2 
b_2 / 0.1 /; 
FW1=factor"1000; 
Parameters 
e G(i) water production elasticity at steady state [dmnl] ; 
"modell 
a_1=(factor*FV1bar(" 1 ")-FW1)A og(Gbar(" 1 ")/G1); 
b_1=p_1 *Iog(Gl)-FW1; 
e G("1") = 1/(Iog(Gbar("1"))-b 1/a_1); 
"modelt 
a 2=(factor*FVJbar("2")-FW1)I(Gbar("2")"b 2-G1"b_2); 
c 2=a 2'G1"'b 2-FW1; 
e_G("2") =b 2/(1-c 2/(a_2*GbarC'2")**b 2)); 
FV12=a_2'G2"b 2-c_2; 
*model3 
a 3=(factor'FVVbar("3")-FV12)llog(Gbar("3")/G2); 
b 3=a 3'log(G2)-FW2; 
e_G("3") = 1/(Iog(Gbar("3"))-b 3/a 3); 
"""" Calibration end """"" 
Scalars 
N initial population 
epsi small number /0.0001/ 
HHsize household size in equation 
kz k(t) in equation [unit per person ] 
Gz G(t) in equation [unit ] 
Qz water production [water unit per time period] 
GO Initial public capital stock [ unit ] 
kO Initial per capita private capital stock [ unit per person 
"choose steady-state among i=1,2,3 
N=Nbar("1"); 
GO = Gbar("1")'policy_G; 
kO = kbar'policy_l5 
Parameters 
k(t) optimal private capital stock at time t [unit per capita] 
G(t) public capital stock at time t [unit ] 
c(t) per capita optimal consumption [ unit per capita per time period ] 
w(t) wage [ unit per labourer per time period] 
r(t) interest rate [ per time period] 
x(t) latent variable 
IG(t) public investment [ unit per time period] 
IP(t) per capita private investment [ unit per capita per time period] 
p(t) water price at time t [unit per water unit] 
qH(t) optimal domestic water consumption [water unit per capita per time period] 
qM(t) optimal industrial water consumption [water unit per labourer per time period] 
Q(t) water production [water unit per time period] 
S(t) water balance [water unit per time period] 
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u_MC(t) felicity at time t for MC 
u_ES(t) felicity at time t for ES ; 
Positive variables 
wz wage 
rz interest rate 
pz water price 
qHz domestic water consumption 
qMz industrical water consumption ; 
Equations 
Interest'calc rz' 
Wage 'calc wz' 
Dom wat'calc qHz' 
Ind wat'calc qMz' 
MC'market-clear solution' 
ES 'excess-supply solution' ; 
Interest.. rz =e= tau*beta K*(beta_Q/pz)**b6*(1/kz)**bB-delta; 
Wage.. wz =e= tau*beta_L*(beta_Q/pz)**b6*kz**b7; 
Dom wat.. qHz =e= 
(1-phi)/pz*(1+rz-(1+nyu)"((1+rz)/(1+rho))**(1/sigma))"(kz+wz/(rz-nyu)); 
Ind wat.. qMz =e= tau*kz**b7"(beta Q/pz)**(1/(1-beta Q)); 
MC.. Qz-(qHz+qMz)*N"HHsize =e= 0; 
ES.. 1/b1 /pz""(1-phi)"(1+rz-(1+nyu)"((1+rz)/(1+rho))"*(1 /sigma))*(kz+wz/(rz-nyu)} 
kz*( (rz-nyu)"kz+wz-(l +rz-(1+nyu)*((1+rz)/(1+rho))**(1/sigma))*(kz+wz/(rz-nyu)) )- 
pz*(qHz+qMz)-(delta+nyu)*kz =e= 0; 
Model MCpath /Interestrz, Wage. wz, Dom_wat. qHz, Ind wat. gMz, MC. pz /; 
Model ESpath /lnterest. rz, Wage. wz, Dom wat. gHz, Ind_watqMz, ES. pz 1; 
*""""" Start of Excess-supply solution """""" 
Loop(t, 
"""" Initial guess and range 
G(first)=GO; 
k(first)=k0; 
gHz. I=gHbar, 
gMz. I=qMbar; 
pz. l=pbar, 
rz. l = rbar, 
wz. I = wbar, 
pz. lo = epsi; 
rz. lo = nyu+epsi; 
f MfRMRRMffMM MMffffiffffMf 
HHsize=(1+nyu)**(ord(t)-1); 
Gz=G(t); 
kz=k(t); 
Q(t)=(Gz It G1)*(a_1*log(Gz}b_1)+(Gz ge G1)*(Gz le G2)*(a 2*Gz**b_2-c 2)+ 
(Gz gt G2)*(a 3*Iog(Gz)-b 3); 
Solve ESpath using MCP; 
I P(t)=rz. I*kz+wz. l-pz. U(1-phi)*gHz. I; 
k(t+1)=(IP(t)+k(t))/(1+nyu); 
IG(t)=pz. l*(qHz. l+qMz. l)*N*HHsize; 
G(t+1)=1 G(t)+(1-delta)*G(t); 
S(t)= Q(t) - (gHz. I+gMz. l)*N*(1+nyu)**(ord(t)-1); 
P(t)=Pz. l; 
qH(t)=gHz. l; 
qM(t)=gMz. l; 
***End Loop "" 
c(t) = qH(t)*(p(t)"phi/(1-phi))"phi; 
u_ES(t) =1/(sigma-1)/c(t)"(sigma-1); 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP p ESpath. xls p 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP Q ESpath. xls Q 
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$Iibinclude XLDUMP c ESpath. xls c 
$libinclude XLDUMP S ESpath. xls S 
$libinclude XLDUMP G ESpath. xls G 
$libinclude XLDUMP k ESpath. xls k 
End of Excess-supply optimal solution 
Start of Market-clear optimal solution " """ 
gHz. l=gHbar, 
pz. l=pbar; 
G(first)=GO; 
k(first)=k0; 
***Loop start 
Loop(t, 
HHsize=(1 +nyu)"(ord(t)-1); 
Gz=G(t); 
kz=k(t); 
Qz=(Gz It G1)'(a 1'Iog(Gz)-b 1)+(Gz ge G1)*(Gz le G2)*(a 2*Gz"b 2-c 2)+ 
(Gz gt G2)*(a 3*Iog(Gz)-b_3); 
Solve MCpath using MCP; 
I P(t)=rz. l'kz+wz. I-pz. l/(1-phi)'gHz. I; 
k(t+1)=(IP(t)+k(t))/(1+nyu); 
IG(t)=pz. l*(qHz. l+qMz. l)*N*HHsize; 
G(t+1)=IG(t)+(1-delta)*G(t); 
Q(t)=Qz; 
p(t)=pz. I; 
qH(t)=gHz. l; 
qM(t)=gMz. l; 
r(t)=rz. I; 
w(t)=wz. I; 
***End Loop """ 
c(t) = gH(t)"(p(t)"phi/(1-phi))""phi; 
S(t)= Q(t}(qH(t)+gM(t))*N"(1+nyu)"*(ord(t)-1); 
u_MC(t) =1/(sigma-1)/c(t)"(sigma-1); 
$libinclude XLDUMP p MCpath. xls p 
$libinclude XLDUMP c MCpath. xls c 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP Q MCpath. xis Q 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP G MCpath. xls G 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP k MCpath. xls k 
Appendix B2 GAMS code for validation of the applied model 
$Ontext 
Validation of the aplied model. 
Satoshi Kojima, University of York, 5 Janurary 2005 
$Offtext 
""~"" Static calibration start """""""" 
"Calibrating parameters 
Scalars 
omega bar expectation of production risk factor [dmnl] / 0.9 / 
sigma coefficient of relative risk aversion [dmnl] /10 / 
delta depreciation rate [per year] /. 105 / 
rho time preference [per year] /. 075/ 
nyu population growth rate [per year] 1.02/ 
pr esc price escalation for irrigation water and land charge [per year] /. 05 /; 
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Set 
i acount/A, K, L, S, Q, HH, ROW, GOV, SAVR, I, U, TAX, SUB, TNT/; 
alias(i, j); 
Set 
jOT(j) subset for OT / Q. GOV, ROW, TNT / 
jDG(j) subset for DG / HH, GOV, SAV, R, I, U/ 
iprod(i) subset for total revenue /A, K, L, S. Q, R, I, U/ 
fac(i) subset for total factor payment / A, K, L, S, Q/ 
sec(i) production sectors / R. I, U /; 
Table rawsam(i, j) raw data of Social Accounting Matrix [billion DH] 
* SAM is omitted due to limited space 
Parameters 
SAM(i, j) social accounting matrix [DHJ; 
SAM(i j) =1000000000'rawsam(i, j); 
Scalars 
HHsize Household size in loop statement 
pop1994 total population in 1994 / 26590000 / 
HHsize_c Household size in 1994 
omega c production risk factor in 1994 / 1.601 / 
ex_wat share of water expenditure among payment to the government [dmnl] /. 86 / 
theta_U urban unemployment rate /. 223 / 
qno subsistence amount of water [m3 per "labour person unit" per year] 
gno_Icd qno in Icd term (Icd] / 10 / 
wcov_c public water supply coverage in rural area [dmnl] / 0.2/ 
zbar loss of labour service due to lack of safe water [dmnl] / .2/ 
rr c real interest rate [1 per year ]/0.095 / 
"Employment data (Lofgren et al. 1999) 
L rur rural employment [labourer-year] / 4640200/ 
LS tc urban skilled employment [labourer-year] / 1590734 / 
LU tc urban unskilled employment [labourer-year] 12279666 / 
"Price data (ASM and Lofgren et al. 1997) 
" p_c is calcurated from mean range tariff with assuming that gH_Icd = 120. 
p _p 
domestic water charge In 1994 [ DH per m3 ]/2.4965 / 
* pw_c is corresponding to Irrigation water total cost in Lofgren (1997; p. A-11) 
pw c irrigation water charge in 1994 [ DH per m3] / . 347 / "pA_c is calibrated such that Al = 863831 ha in 1994 
pA c irrigation land charge in 1994 [ DH per ha] / 3372.84 / 
*exchange rate from WDI 
re_c official exchange rate in 1994 [ DH per USD] / 9.2027 / 
oth_inc per capita income excluded from the model assumption [ DH per capita ] 
epsi small number / 0.0001/ 
N household number [household] 
Ybar average value product of rainfed sector [ DH per HH per year] 
YRbar average productivity of rainfed sector [ unit per HH per year] 
qH c per capita publicly supplied water consumption in 1994 [m3 per capita per year] 
gH_Icd per user publicly supplied water consumption [Icd] 
qHbar_c per capita average water consumption in 1994 [m3 per capita per year] 
qHbar_lcd per capita average water consumption [Icd] 
Q 
_j 
total water supply [million m3 per year] 
wU minimum wage in urban sector [DH per labour per year] 
wS_c wage for skilled labourer in 1994 [DH per labour per year] 
wl c wage for irrigation labourer in 1994 [DH per labour per year] 
th Ec urban job success rate in 1994 [ dmnl] 
LR_tc rainfed employment in 1994 [labourer per year] 
Ll_tc irrigation employment in 1994 [labourer per year] 
Ql_tc aggregate irrigation water Input in 1994 [million m3 per year ] 
Al_tc irrigation land input in 1994 [ha] 
IR 
_c 
labour allocation to RF sector in 1994 [dmnl] 
II 
-c 
labour allocation to IR sector in 1994 [dmnl] 
IL Lc unskilled labour allocation to urban sector in 1994 [dmnl] 
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IS skilled labour allocation to urban sector [dmnl] 
*water loss rate (calibrated such that total water supply =11,377 million m3) 
loss_Hc water loss of domestic water supply in 1994 [dmnl] /0.3/ 
loss 
_IRc 
water loss of Irrigation water supply in 1994 [dmnl] /0.326/ 
*Initial values 
m0 per capita initial private capital stock [ unit per capita ] 
KRO per household initial rainfed capital stock [ unit per HH ] 
x, y, bR, cu; 
N=L rur+( LS tc +LU tc )/(l -theta - 
U); 
qno = qno (cd*pop1994/N"365/1000; 
Ybar = sum(iprod, SAM(iprod, "R"))/N/omega c; 
qH_c = ex wat*SAM("GOV', HH")/p c/(wcov_c*L rur+(LS tc +LU tc)/(1-theta U)); 
gH_Icd = gH_c/365'1000"N/pop1994; 
th E_c = (1-theta U)*LU tc/(LU tc+theta_U"LS tc); 
IS = LS_tc/N; 
IU 
_c = 
LU tc/N/th_E_c; 
AI tc = SAM("A"; 'I")/pA_c; 
Ql_tc = SAM("Q"; 'I")/pw c/1000000; 
gHbar c= qH c*(wcov_c+(IU c+IS)*(1 wcov_c))+qno"(1-IU c-IS)"(1 wcov_c); 
gHbar Icd =gHbar c/365'1000'N/pop1994; 
oth_inc= sumUOT, SAM("HH", jOT))/N; 
HHsize_c = popl994/N; 
Parameters 
phi(sec) weight In satisfaction production [dmnl] 
phi -Q 
weight of water consumption in satisfaction production [dmnl] 
DH_sec HH expenditure except for water [DH] 
beta(sec, fac) factor share [dmnl] 
fact(sec) total factor payment [DH] 
rev-t(sec) total revenue [DH] 
tar c(sec) Import tariff [dmnl] 
taxte c(sec) product tax [dmnl] 
tax hc income tax [dmnl] 
subs_c(sec) export subsity [dmnl] 
tau(sec) technological parameter [dmnl] 
p bar(sec) world product price [ USD per unit] / R=1,1=1, U=1 / 
p_d(sec) world product price in local currency [ DH per unit] ; 
p_d(sec) = re c"p bar(sec) ; 
DH_sec = sum(sec, SAM(sec; 'HH")); 
phi(sec) = SAM(sec, HH")/(DH sec+ex wat*SAM("GOV', HH")*gHbar c/qH_c/(wcov_c+ 
(IU c+IS)*(1-wcov_c))); 
phi_Q = (ex_wat'SAM("GOV'; 'HH")*gHbar c/qH c/(wcov_c+(IU_c+IS)*(1-wcov_c)))/ 
(DH sec+ex_wat'SAM("GOV', HH")*gHbar c/qH c/(wcov_c+(IU_c+IS)*(1-wcov_c))); 
rev_t(sec) = sum(iprod, SAM(iprod, sec)); 
fait(sec) = sum(fac, SAM(fac, sec)); 
beta(sec, fac) = SAM(fac, sec)Ifac t(sec); 
beta("R", fac) = SAM(fac, "R")/fact("R")'omega c; 
beta("R", 'A") = 1-beta("R", "K")-beta("R", "L"); 
tar c(sec) = SAM('TNT", sec)/ SAM("ROW', sec); 
taxte c(sec)= SAM('TAX", sec)/ rev_t(sec); 
tax_h_c = SAM('TAX"; 'HH")/(sum(i, SAM(i, "HH"))-SAM("TAX', °HH")); 
subs c(sec) = SAM(sec, "SUB")/SAM(sec, ' ROW') ; 
*Wage calculation 
wU = SAM("L' ,' U")/LU tc; 
wS_c = SAM("S", 'U")ILS tc; 
wl c=(th_E c*wU/wcov c**phi Q-p c*qno*(lwcov_c-1))/(1-(1-wcov_c)*zbar); 
Li to= SAMC'U', "I")/wl c; 
LR tc =L rur-LI tc; 
II c= LI tc/N; 
IR c= LR_tc/N; 
b_R = beta("R"S'IC')+beta("R", , L"); 
* Derive tau("UR") as a function of p d("UR") 
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tau("U") = (1+tax_p c("U"))*rev_t("U')/(1+subs c("U"))/fac t("U")* 
( (rr c+delta)'(1+subs_c("U"))'sum(DG SAM("U", jDG))Ibeta("U", "IC')/ 
(sumUDG, SAM("U", jDG)}(tar c("U"}-subs c("U"))'SAM("ROW'; 'U")) )** 
beta("U'; "K")*(wU/beta("U"; 'L"))''beta("U", "U')*(wS c/beta("U", "S"))** 
beta("U", 'S")/p d(°U")**(1-beta("U", "K°)); 
* Derive y= tau("IR")*pp("IR") as a function of p_d("UR") 
y=p d("U")**beta("I"; 'K")*(1+tax_p cCT'))*rev_t('T')/(1+subs c("I"))/ 
fac t("I")*( (1 +subs c("U"))*sum(jDG, SAM("U", jDG))/(sum(jDG SAM("U", jDG))- 
(tar c("U")-subs c("U"))'SAM("ROW'; 'U")) )*"beta("I", "K")*(pA_d 
beta("I", "A")).. beta("I", 'A')"(pw c/beta("P',, Q")).. beta("P', "Q")* 
(WI c/beta("I"; 'L"))*'beta("I"; 'L")*((rr c+delta)/beta("I", "K"))** 
beta("I"; 'K"); 
*tau("IR") 
tau('I") = y/p d(I"); 
`x = p_d("RF')*tau("RF") 
x=p d("U")*"beta("R"; 'K")*Ybar*( N*(rr c+delta)*(1+subs c("U"))* 
sum(jDG, SAM("U', jDG))/(sum(jDCý SAM("U", jDG))-(tar c("U"}subs c("U"))* 
SAM("ROW', "U"))/SAM("K", ' R") )"beta("R"; 'K")/( (1-(1-wcov_c)*zbar)* 
(1 -IS-IU_c)+betac"I", L")IbetaC'I", "K')/wI c*(beta("U"; 'K")/ 
beta("U", "L")'wU"th E c"IU_c-(SAM(' K', ' I")+SAM("K', "U"))/N) )**beta("R"; 'L"); 
tau("R") = x/p d(°R"); 
"' Calibration of trade parameters and technological coefficient aij's *"* 
Parameters 
s_M(sec) Armington import elasticity / R=2,1=3, U=5 / 
d_M(sec) Armington share parameter ; 
d_M(sec) =( (1+tar c(sec))/(1+subs c(sec))'(SAM("ROW', sec)/( (1+taxp_c(sec))/ 
(1+subs_c(sec))'rev_t(sec)-SAM(sec, ROW') ))"(1/s M(sec)) )/ 
( 1+ ((1+tar c(sec))/(1+subs_c(sec))'(SAM("ROW', sec)/( (1+tax_p_c(sec))/ 
(1+subs c(sec))'rev_t(sec)-SAM(sec, "ROW') ))"(1/s M(sec))) ); 
alias(sec, secl); 
*secl is the receiving sector 
Parameters 
px c(sec) consumer price [DH per unit) 
pp-p(sec) producer price [DH per unit] 
pnet c(sec) producer price net intermediate [DH per unit] 
aij(secl, sec) technology coefficient 
sij(secl, sec) intermediate input [physical unit] ; 
pc c(sec) = p_d(sec)'(1+tar c(sec))'(1+subs c(sec))*( d M(sec)**s M(sec)* 
(1+subs c(sec))"(s M(sec)-1)+(1-d M(sec))'*s M(sec)*(1+tar c(sec))** 
(x M(secj-1))/( d M(sec)"x M(sec)'(1+subs_c(sec))'*s M(sec)+(1_d_M(sec))** 
x M(sec)*(1+tar c(sec))'*s M(sec) ); 
pp c(sec) = p_d(sec)'(l+subs c(sec))/(1+tax_p c(sec)); 
pnet c(sec)=pp_c(sec)'fac t(sec)lrev_t(sec); 
sij(secl, sec) = SAM(sec, secl)/pc c(sec); 
aij(secl, sec) = siJ(secl, sec)/(rev_t(secl)/pp c(secl)); 
YRbar = Ybar/pp_c("R"); 
mO = (SAM ("K''l')+SAM("K', "U"))/N/(n_c+delta)/pc c("U"); 
KRO = SAM("K , "R")/N/(rr c+delta)/pc c("U"); 
cu= phi("U")/pc c("U")'( 1+(1-tax h c)*nr_c-(l +nyu)'((1+(1-tax_h_c)*rr c)/(1+rho))** 
(1/sigma) )'( px c("U")'m0+(1-ta)h_c)/((1-tax_h_c)'rr c-nyu)*(wU*th_E_c*IU_c+ 
wS c'IS+wI c*(1-IU c-IS)'(1-(1-wcov_c)*zbar)+othinc+p c*qno*(1-IU_c-IS)* 
(1-wcov_c)/(1-tax h c))+omega bar*YRbar/rr c*pnet c('R")-b_R/ 
((1-tax h c)'rr c*(1+(1-tax h c)*rr c))*(YRbar/tau('R"))**(1/b_R)*((1-tax h_c)* 
wl ctbeta("R"; 'L'))*'(beta("R"; 'L'Yb_R)'(px c("U")*((1-tax h c)*rr c+ 
delta)/beta("R", K"))*'(betaC'R", K')Ib_R)-1/(1+(1-tax h_c)*nEc)*((1-tax h c)* 
wl c*(YRbar/tau("R"))*'(1/beta("R"; 'L'))*(1/KRO)*'(beta('R"; 'IC')/ 
beta("R"; 'L"))-(1-delta)'px c("U")*KRO) ); 
Q t=(qH c*N*(wcov_c+(IU c+IS)*(1-wcov_c))/(1-loss Hc)+beta("I"; 'Q")*wl_c*LI tc/ 
beta("l', "L')/pw c/(1-loss_IRc))/l000000; 
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""""" Static calibration end """"""" 
"ººººº Validation startºººººtiºº" 
Set 
t total time period / 1994*2002 / 
first(t) starting year ; 
first(t) = YES$(ORD(t) EQ 1); 
Scalars 
pz domestic water price [DH per m3] 
pwz irrigation water price [DH per m3] 
pAz irrigation land price [DH per ha] 
wUz wUmin(t) in equation [DH per labourer per year] 
wcovz wcov(t) in equation [dmnlj 
mz m(t) in equation [ unit per capita ] 
KRz KR(t) In equation [ unit per household ]; 
*Exogenous variables 
Parameter 
omega(t) producition risk [dmnl) 
/ 1994=1.601,1995=0.444,1996=1.708,1997=0.847, 
1998=1.129,1999=0.750,2000=0.384,2001=0.905,2002=1.079 / 
re(t) real exchange rate (1994 constant DH per 1994 constant USD] / 1994=9.2030, 
1995=9.0009,1996=9.1397,1997=10.0208,1998=10.0268,1999=10.1446,2000=10.9245, 
2001=11.5496,2002=11.1444 / 
p(t) domestic water price [DH per m3]/ 1994=2.4965,1995= 2.585,1996= 2.549, 
1997=2.500,1998=2.876,1999=2.975,2000=5.202,2001=5.111,2002=5.081 / 
pw(t) irrigation water price [DH per m3] 
pA(t) Irrigation land price [DH per ha] 
wcov(t) public water supply coverage in rural area [dmnl] 
/1994=0.2000,1995=0.2396, 
1996=0.2773,1997=0.3131,1998= 0.3471,1999=0.3795,2000= 0.4102,2001=0.4394,2002=0.4672 / 
wUmin(t) urban minimum wage [DH per labourer per year] /1994=7625.7250,1995=7097.6804, 
1996=7633.5034,1997=7548.9215,1998=7521.8749,1999=7481.0968,2000=8107.6975, 
2001=7966.3741,2002=7919.1427 / 
tar(sec) import tariff [dmnl] 
tax_p(sec) product tax [dmnl] 
tax h income tax (dmnl] 
subs(sec) export subsity [dmnl] 
eta_M(sec) consumer price coefficient [dmnl] 
pp(sec, t) producer price of product [ DH per unit) 
pc(sec, t) consumer price of product [ DH per unit] 
ppz(sec) pp(sec t) in equation 
pcz(sec) pc(sec t) in equation 
qHbar(t) per capita average water consumption [m3 per capita per year] 
qH(t) per capita piped water consumption [m3 per user per year] 
rr(t) interst rate (per year] 
IU(t) labour allocation to urban sector 
wl(t) irrigation sector wage [DH per labourer per year] 
th_E(t) probability to get urban job 
wS(t) skilled labour wage [DH per labourer per year] 
LI t(t) aggregate irrigation labourer [ person per year] 
m(t) optimal private capital stock in year t[ unit per capita ] 
KR(t) rainfed capital stock per household [ unit per household ] 
IP(t) per capita private capital stock investment [ unit per capita ] 
cu hat(t) optimal consumption of urban product [ unit per year ] 
c hat(t) optimal consumption of satisfaction [ unit per year] 
Al t(t) aggregate Irrigation land input [ 1000 ha ] 
QI t(t) aggregate irrigation water input [ million m3 per year ] 
IR_ratio(t) share of irrigation usage [dmnl] 
qHlcd(t) per capita domestic water consumption [ Icd ] 
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*validation report variables 
unemploy(t) unemployment rate [per cent] 
E tot(t) total exports [ million 1994 DH ] 
M tot(t) total imports [ million 1994 DH ] 
real int(t) real interest rate [per cent] ; 
*Status quo tax and subsidies 
tar(sec)=tar c(sec); 
tax_p(sec)=tax_p c(sec); 
tax_h=tax h c; 
subs(sec)=subs c(sec); 
eta_M(sec) _ (1+subs(sec))*( d_M(sec)'*s M(sec)*(1+subs(sec))**(s M(sec)-1)+ 
(1-d_M(sec))**s_M(sec)*(1+tar(sec))**(s M(sec)-1) )/ 
(d M(sec)"*s M(sec)*(1+subs(sec))**s M(sec)+(1-d M(sec))**s M(sec)* 
(1+tar(sec))**s M(sec) ); 
pp(sec, t) = (1+subs(sec))/(1+tax_p(sec))*p bar(sec)*re(t); 
pc(sec, t) = (1+tar(sec))*eta_M(sec)*p bar(sec)*re(t); 
*5% price escalation schedule 
pw(t)=(1+pr esc)'"(ord(t)-1)*pw c; 
pA(t)=(1+pr esc)"(ord(t)-1)'pA c; 
Positive variables 
th_Ez probability to get urban job [dmnl] 
rrz real interest rate [ per year ] 
wlz irrigation sector wage rate [ DH per year] 
wSz skilled labour wage rate [ DH per year] 
IUz labour allocation to urban sector [dmnl] 
qHbarz per capita average water consumption [m3 per capita per year] 
qHz per capita piped water consumption [m3 per user per year] 
LI tz aggregate irrigation labourer [ person per year] ; 
Equations 
interest evaluate rrz 
wage evaluate wlz 
HT_model Generalised Harris-Todaro model 
ws_star solving equilibrium wage of skilled labour 
urb_lab evaluate lUz 
dom_wat evaluate qH_barz 
qqH evaluate qHz 
it labour evaluate LI tz ; 
""-""" Declaration end '******* 
interest.. rrz+delta =e= beta("U"; 'K")/pcz("U")' 
( tau(U)*(ppz(U)-aij("U, R)*pcz(R)-aij(U,, I)* 
pcz("P'))"(beta("U', , L: ')/wUz)* beta("U", , L')"(beta("U", 'S")/ 
wSz)""beta("U. ',, S") )"(1/beta("U", 'K")); 
wage.. wlz =e= beta("P,, , L: ')"( tau("P')*(ppz("P')-aij("P', R")" 
pcz("R"}aij(P' U')"pcz("U°))"(betaC P', 'A°)/pAz)""beto(Iý"A)" 
(beta ("I", 'Q")/pwz)""beta("I°, 'Q")*(beta("I", 'IC')/pcz("U")/(rrz+delta))** 
beta('I', 'K°) )""(1/beta('T',, L")); 
HT model.. th_Ez =e= wcovz"phi Q/wUz*( wlz* 
(1-(1-wcovz)'zbar)+pz'gno'(1/wcovz-1) ); 
ws_star.. ((1-(1-wcovz)"zbar)"(1-IS)- 
1 /HHsize*(YRbar/tau("R"))"(1/beta("R", 'L"))'(1 /KRz)** 
(beta("R", 'K')Ibeto("R", 'L"))- 
(1/wSz)""(beta("U", °S")"(beta('T', 'K")+beta('T', 'L°))/beta(" 
beta("Lr'; 'K"))/HHsize"beta(' U"; 'K")/beta("I", 'W)*rnz*( tau("U-)* 
(PPz("U")-aij("U", , R")"pcz("R°)-aij("U", , P')"pczCl"))"(beta("U", "L')/wUz)- 
beta("U"; 'L")'beta("U", "S")"beta("U', ' S") )**((beta K') +beta(" 
beta("I", , L')/beta("U', , K"))'(1/tau("P, )/(ppz(°P, )-aij("P,,., R")"pcz("R°)- 
aij("P,, , U, )"pczC'U"))*(pAz/beta("I", , A")).. beta("i", 'A")"(pwz/ 
beta("P', , Q"))""betaC I, , Q°)"(beta("U", °K')Ibeta("P'I'K"))'. beta("I', "IC') )"" 
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(1/beta(P';, L")) )/ 
( (1-(l-wcovz)*zbar)*(1-beta("U", "K')/beta("U", "L')*beta("I", "L")/beta("I"; 'K')* 
wcovz**phi_Q)- 
(1/wSz)* (beta("U", "S")'beta("I"; 'IC')/beta(°I"; 'L")/beta("U", "K'))* 
beta("U", W')/beta("U'; 'L")/betaCT', "IN)*wcovz*"phi Q"pz*qno* 
(l/wcovz-l)*( tau("U, )*(ppz("U"}aij("U'; 'R")"pcz("R")-aij("U'; 'P, )* 
pcz("I"))"(beta("U'; 'L")/wUz)'*beta(°U'; 'L")"beta(°U,; "S, )"" 
beta("U", 'S") )". (beta("P'; 'K")/beta("I", "L")/beta("U';, K'))* 
( 1/tau (''I, )/(ppz(I")-aij("I", "R)"pcz("R"raij('. I", "U')"pcz(U"))* 
(pAz/beta("P', , A"))**betaCT', "N')"(pwz/betaCT'; 'Q"))". beta("P', "Q")* 
(beta ("U', , K")/beta("P'; 'K°))". beta(I'; K") )"(llbeta('l", , L")) )- 
beta("U", "L")'IS/beta("U", "S")/wUz*wSz/( wcovz**phi Q/wUz*pz*qno* 
(1/wcovz-1)+wSz'"(beta("U', "S")'beta("I", "IC')/beta( 
beta("U'; 'K"))'beta("I"; 'L")'wcovz*. phi Q/wUz"(1-(1-wcovz)*zbar)/( tau("U")* 
(ppz("U")-aij("U", . R")*pcz("R")-aij(U", "I")"pczC'I))" 
(beta("U';, L")twUz)". beta("U', 'L")"beta(°U'; 'S")**beta("U"; 'S") )** 
(beta("I", "K')Ibeta("I'. 'L")/beta("U', "K"))/( lttau(°P')/(ppz("P')- 
aij("I", "R")"pcz("R")-aij("I", "U")"pcz("U"))*(pAz/beta("I, R'))** 
beta(°P'; , A")"(pwz/beta("I", , Q"))"*beta("P'; 'Q"). (beta("U. , "K")/ 
beta("l', ' K"))". beta("1°, "K') )**(llbeta("I"; 'L°)) ) 
=e= 0; 
urb_lab.. lUz =e= 
( (1-(l-wcovz)'zbar)'(l-IS)-beta("I", ' L")/beta("I"; 'K")* 
pcz("U")*(rrz+delta)/wlz'mz-l /H Hsize*(YRbar/tau("R"))** 
(1/beta("R", "L"))"(l/KRz)"'(beta("R", "K")Ibeta('R", 'L")) )/ 
( (1-(l-wcovz)*zbar)-beta("I"; 'L")/beta("I"; 'K")*pcz("U")*(rrz+delta)/wlz* 
( 1/tau('U")/(ppz(U. )-aij(U, , , R)"pcz(R)-aij("U", , I")*pcz("1))" 
(wUz/betac'U", "L°))""(1-beta("U', 'S°))*(wSz/beta("U", "S"))** 
beta("U"; 'S") )"*(l/beta("U"; 'K"))'th_Ez ); 
dorr wat. gHbarz=e= phi_Q/pz* 
(1+(1-ta)(_h)"rrz-(l+nyu)'((l+(l-tax h)*rz)/(1+rho))**(l/sigma))* 
( pcz("U")*mz+(1-tax h)/((1-tax h)*rz-nyu)*(wUz*th_Ez*lUz+wSz* 
IS+wlz*(1-lUz-IS)"(1-(1-wcovz)*zbar)+oth_inc+pz*qno*(l-lUz-IS)"(1-wcovz)/(1-tax h))+ 
omega bar*YRbar/nVHHsize'(ppz("R")-aij("R"; 'I")"pcz("I")- 
aij ("R", "U')'pcz("U"))- 
b_R/HHsize/((1-tax h)*rrz*(1+(l-tax_h)*nz))*(YRbar/tau("R"))** 
(1 /b_R)*((1-ta)_h)'wlz/beta("R", 'L"))**(beta("R", 'L")/b_R)*(pcz("U')* 
((1-tax h)'nz+delta)Ibeta("R""K°))"(beta("R", 'IC')/b R)- 
1 /HHsize/(1 +(1-tax_h)*rrz)*((1-tax_h)*wlz'(YRbar/tau("R"))** 
(1 /beta("R", "L"))*(1 /KRz)**(b etaC"R", 'K")Ib etaC"R", "L'))- 
(1-delta)'pcz("U")'KRz) ); 
qqH.. qHz =e=( qHbarz-qno*(1-IUz-IS)*(1-wcovz) )/(wcovz+(IUz+IS)* 
(1-wcovz)); 
it labour.. LI tz =e= 
N'HHsize*(1-IS-lUz)*(1-(1-wcovz)*zbar)-N*(YRbar/tau("R"))** 
(l/beta("R", 'L"))'(1 /KRz)**(beta("R", "K')/beta("R"; 'L")); 
"'" initial guesses and ranges 
th_Ez. l = th E c; 
th_Ez. lo = epsi; 
th_Ez. up = 1-epsi; 
IUz. 1= IU C; 
lUz. lo = epsi; 
lUz. up = 1-epsi; 
wSz. 1= wS c; 
wSz. lo = wU; 
wlz. l = wl c; 
wlz. lo = .1 *wI c; 
rrz. l = rr c; 
rrz. lo = epsi; 
rrz. up = 1-epsi; 
Appen dix B 259 
qHbarz. lo = qno; 
gHz. lo = qno; 
Ll_tz. lo = epsi; 
Model equilb / interest. rrz, wage. wlz, HT model. th_Ez, ws_star. wSz, urb Iab. lUz, 
dom_watqHbarz, qqH. qHz, it Iabour. Ll tz 
m(first) = m0; 
KR(first) = KRO; 
""" loop start """"' 
Loop(t, 
HHsize=(1+nyu)'"(ord(t)-1); 
mz=m(t); 
KRz=KR(t); 
wUz = wUmin(t); 
wcovz = wcov(t); 
pz=p(t); 
pwz=pw(t); 
pAz=pA(t); 
pcz(sec)=pc(sec, t); 
ppz(sec)=pp(sec, t); 
Solve equiib using MCP; 
IP(t) = (1-tax h)'( rrz. i'm(t)+oth inc/pc("U", t)+(wUz*th Ez. l*IUz. I+wSz. I'IS+wlz. I* 
(1-IUz. I-IS)"(1-(I-wcovz)"zbar))/pc("U", t) )- 
qHbarz. l*pz/phi Q/pc("U", t)+pz"gno*(1-IUz. I-IS)*(1-wcovz)/pc("U", t)+ 
(1-tax 
_h)/H 
Hsize"o me g a(t)"YRb ar/pc("U", t) "(pp ("R", t)-aij ("R", "I")" 
pc(', I.., t)-aij("R", , U"). pc(U.,, t))- 
1/HHsize" 
( (YRbar/tau("R"))"(1/b_R)*(beta("R", "K')'(1-tax_h)'wiz. l/beta("R', "L")/ 
pc("U', t)/((1-tax h)*rrz. l+delta))"(beta("R", 'L")Ib_R)+ 
(1-tax h)'wlz. 1/pc("U", t)'(YRbar/tau("R"))"(1/beta("R", 'L°))'(1/KR(t))'" 
(beta("R"; 'K")/beta("R"; 'L"))-(1-delta)"KR(t) ); 
m(t+1) =(IP(t)+m(t))/(1+nyu); 
KR(t+1) =(YRbar/tau("R"))"(1Ib_R)*( beta("R", W')*(1 -tax H)* 
wlz. l/(beta("R"; 'L")"pc("U", t)'((1-ta)H)'rz. l+delta)) 
(beta("R", "L")/b R); 
th_E(t)=thEz. l; 
IU(t)=IUz. l_ ; 
qH(t)=gHz. 1; 
qHbar(t)=gHbarz. 1; 
rr(t)=rrz. l; 
wI(t)=wlz. l; 
wS(t)=wSz. l; 
LI t(t)=LI tz. l; 
""' loop end """'" 
cu_hat(t) = gHbar(t)'phi("U')"p(t)/phi Q/pc("U", t); 
c hat(t) = gHbar(t)'(p(t)/phi Q)"(1-phi Q)"(phi("R")/pc("R", t))**phi("R")* 
(phi ("I")/pc(''I", t))*phi (I"). (phi(''U., )/pc(U, t))""phiC'U"); 
AI_t(t)= beta("I"; 'A")*wI(t)*LI t(t)/beta("I", "L")/pA(t)/1000; 
QI t(t) =beta("I"; 'Q")'wl(t)'LI t(t)/beta("I"; 'L")/pw(t)/1000000; 
qHlcd(t) = qH(t)/365.1000'N/popl 994; 
real int(t)=rr(t)*100; 
unempioy(t)=(1-(th_E(t)'IU(t)+IS)/(IU(t)+IS))" 100; 
M tot(t)= ( 
((1+subs("R"))/(1+tar(°R")))""s M("R")"(d MC'R")/(1-d_M("R")))'"s M("R°)" 
(1-SAM("R', "ROW')'(l+subs_c("R"))/rev_t("R")/(1+tax_p_c("R")))"omega(t)"YRbar'N'p_bar("R")+ 
((1+subsC'I"))/(1+tar(I,. ))).. s M(I). (d M("I)/(1-d 
(1-SAM("P,, "ROW')"(1+subs c("P'))/rev_t("I")/(1+tax_p c("ß')))' 
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wI(t)*LI t(t)/beta(°f', , L")/(pp("I", t)-aij("f', , R")" 
pc("R", t)-aij("P', "U")"pc("U", t))'p bar(I")+ 
((1+subs(''U))/(1+tar(''U"))).. s M(U). (d M('U")/(1-d M("U")))**s M(', Uo)* 
(1-SAM("U", "ROW')'(1+subs c("U"))/rev t("U")I(1+tax p c("U")))* 
wS(t)"N"(1+nyu)""(ord(t)-l)'IS/beta(°U", , S")/(pp("U', t)-aijC'U", "R")* 
pc("R", t)-aij("U", "I")'pc("I", t))"p bar("U") )"re(t)/1000000; 
E tot(t) =( 
SAM("R", ROW')'(l+subs("R"))/sum(iprod, SAM(iprod, "R"))/(1+tax p_c("R"))* 
omega (t) "YR ba r" N "p_b a r("R")+ 
SAM('l", "ROW')'(1+subs("I"))/sum(iprod, SAM(iprod, "I"))/(1+ta)Lp-c("I"))" 
wI(t)*LI t(t)/beta("I"; 'L")/(pp("I", t)-aij("I", "R")* 
pc("R", t)-aij("I, "U'). pc('U", t))'p bar("I")+ 
SAM("U', "ROW')'(l+subs("U"))/sum(iprod, SAM(iprod, ' U"))/(1+tax_p c("U"))* 
wS(t)'N*(1+nyu)""(ord(t)-l)"ISlbeta("U", 'S")! (pp(°U", t)-aij("U", R")" 
pc("R", t)-aij("U', "I")'pc('I", t))'p_bar("U") )'re(t)/1000000; 
$libinclude XLDUMP chat dyn_opt2. xls c 
$libinclude XLDUMP real int dyn opt2. xls re 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP unemploy dyn opt2. xls un 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP E jot dyn_opt2. xls E 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP M jot dyn_opt2. xls M 
Appendix B3 GAMS code for simulations of the applied model 
$Ontext 
Policy simulation of the applied model 
Satoshi Kojima, University of York 
$Offtext 
Set 
t total time period/ 1'15 / 
/ cv critical values 11 *7 
first(t) starting year 
gsec government sector /gr, gt, gil ; 
first(t) = YES$(ORD(t) EQ 1); 
""" Policy variables """" 
Parameters 
theta(gsec, t) budget allocation [dmnl) 
safe_S(gsec) safety factor for supply capiacity [dmnl] / gt= . 85, gi= . 85, gr= . 851 
safe G safety factor for govememnt budget [dmnll /. 98 / 
""" International aid """ 
aid(gsec) multiplier to GO [dmnl] / gt = 5, gi = 1.5, gr = 1.5 / 
'Trade regime '"' 
tariff tariff reduction rate [dmnlj /1/ 
taxrev fraction of Import tax revenue invested in public capital [dmnlJ / 0.2 / 
'"" Climate change """ 
CC cv coefficient of variation of production risk factor [dmnl] /. 366 / 
'"" Minimum wage "' 
MW coef reduction rate of minimum wage [dmnl] /1/ 
G0(gsec) initial stock of public capital [million unit in 1994] 
/gr-694.0, gt = 187.3, gi=776.6/ 
multi(gsec) multiplier for initial price [dmnl] / gr =2.1, gt = 2.6, gi =2.1/ 
multi _r multiplier 
for initial if [dmnl] /1/; 
""" Investment policy 
theta("gr', t) = 0.43; 
theta("gt", t) = 0.285; 
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theta("gP,, t) =1-theta("ge', t)-theta("gt', t); 
"" Static calibration part is omitted (see Appendix B2) """'" 
ºººH.... H.. N... 1. ºNN N.. NNN.. N. N. H 
""" 1st part: Policy plannning "'º"º" 
Parameters 
tar(sec) import tariff (dmnl] 
tax_p(sec) product tax (dmnl) 
tax h Income tax (dmnl] 
subs(sec) export subsity [dmnl) 
wUmin(t) urban minimum wage [DH per labourer per year] 
GOmod(gsec) Increased Initial stock (million unit in 1994] ; 
""" Tax and subsidy policy "": 
tar(sec)=tariff"tar c(sec); 
tax_p(sec)=tax_p c(sec); 
tax h=tax h c; 
subs(sec)=subs c(sec); 
"'" Minimum wage policy "": 
wUmin(t) = MIN coef'wU c; 
"'" International aid policy''': 
GOmod(gsec) =aid(gsec)'G0(gsec) ; 
Scalars 
HHsize Normalised household size In loop statement (t =1 -> HHsize = 1) 
omega bar Expectation of production risk factor / 0.9 / 
wUz wUmin(t) in equation [DH per labourer per year] 
wcovz wcov(t) In equation [dmnlj 
mz m(t) In equation [ unit per capita 
KRz KR(t) in equation [ unit per household ] 
Rz raw water production R(t) In equation [ million m3 ] 
Oz treated water production Q(t) In equation [ million m3 ] 
AzA(t) In equation [ 1000 ha ] 
loan prc external loan principal In foreign currency [million 1994 USD] 
i_rate loan interest rate [per annum] / 0.07 / 
loss_Hz loss-H(t) In equation (dmnlj 
loss_IRz loss_IR(t) In equation [dmnlj 
"" Sustainable production function construction """' 
""'" for SCbase "'" 
"$ontext 
Parameters 
GR(cv) [million unit) / 1=772.51,2= 1250,3 = 1827,4=2757,5= 3855,6=6417,7=8000 / 
FR(cv) [million m3 per year] /1= 11071.05,2 = 11816.16,3=13573.46,4= 14267.06, 
5=14968.06,6=16069.06,7=16600 / 
aR(cv) 
bR(cv) /6=0.01 / 
cR(cv) /1=0.0085,2=0.008,3=0.0025,4=0.0015,5=0.0003 / 
GT(cv) [million unit) /1=178.27,2=503,3=903,4=1200,5=10000,6=10000,7=10000/ 
FD(cv) [million m3 per year] / 1= 333.45,2 =524.16,3=593.15,4= 650 / 
aT(cv) 
bT(cv) / 3= 0.3 / 
cT(cv) /1=0.012,2=0.0031 
GI(cv) [million unit] /1=519.96,2=685,3=914,4=1429,5=1979.81,6=10000,7=10000/ 
FA(cv) (1000 ha) / 1= 578,2 = 653.01,3=763.18,4= 890.54,5=942.04 / 
al(cv) 
bl(cv)/4=0.1/ 
cl(cv) / 1=. 003,2=. 007,3=. 007 / 
a_wcov parameter of wcov(t) / 0.931194 / 
b wcov parameter of wcov(t) / 0.000811 / 
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a IossH parameter of loss H(t) / 0.250217 / 
b IossH parameter of loss_H(t) / 0.001299 / 
a IossiR parameter of loss IR(t) / 0.304277 / 
b losslR parameter of loss IR(t) 10.000705 / 
Loop(cv$(GR(cv) <6417), 
bR(cv)=(FR(cv)-FR(cv+1)) /(FR(cv)'exp(-1 *cR(cv)*GR(cv+1))-FR(cv+1)" 
exp(-1' cR(cv)'GR(cv))); 
aR(cv)=FR(cv)/(1-bR(cv)'exp(-1' cR(cv)"GR(cv))); ); 
aR(6') = (FR('7. ), FR("6. ))/(GR(T')"bR(., ö')-GR("6").. bR(6)); 
cR("6") = aR("6")'GR("6")"bR("6")-FR("6"); 
Loop(cv$(GT(cv) < 903), 
bT(cv)=(FD(cv)-FD(cv+1)) /(FD(cv)'exp(-1'cT(cv)"GT(cv+1))-FD(cv+1)' 
exp (-1'cT(cv)'GT(cv) )); 
aT(cv)=FD(cv)/(1-bT(cv)'exp(-1' cT(cv)'GT(cv))); ); 
aTC'3") = (FD("4")-FD("3"))/(GT(°4")""bT('3")-GT("3")""bT(°3")); 
cT("3") = aT("3")'GT("3")"bT("3"}FD("3"); 
Loop(cv$(GI(cv) < 1429), 
bl(cv)=(FA(cv)-FA(cv+1)) /(FA(cv)'exp(-1'cl(cv)'GI(cv+1))-FA(cv+1)" 
exp(-1'cl(cv)'GI (cv))); 
al(cv)=FA(cv)/(1-bl(cv)'exp(-l' cl(cv)'GI(cv))); ); 
al("4") = (FA("5"}FA(°4")Y(GI("5')""bl("4°)-GI("4")""bl("4°)); 
cl("4") = al("4")'GI("4")"bl("4")-FA("4"); 
*$ofttext 
****for SC1 
$ontext 
Parameters 
GR(cv) [million unit) / 1=927,2= 1500,3 = 2193,4=3309,5= 4626,6=7700,7=10000 / 
FR(cv) [million m3 per year) /1= 11071.05,2 = 11816.16,3=13573.46,4= 14267.06, 
5=14968.06,6=16069.06,7=16580 / 
aR(cv) 
bR(cv) /6=0.01 / 
cR(cv) /1=0.0085,2=0.008,3=0.0025,4=0.0015,5=0.0003 / 
GT(cv) [million unit) /1=213.92,2=604,3=1084.4=1400,5=10000,6=10000,7=10000/ 
FD(cv) [million m3 per year] / 1= 333.45,2 =524.16,3=593.15,4= 645 / 
aT(cv) 
bT(cv) / 3= 0.3 / 
cT(cv) /1=0.012,2=0.0031 
Gl(cv) [million unit) /1=624.2=853,3=1097,4=1715,5=2376,6=10000,7=10000/ 
FA(cv) [1000 ha) / 1= 578,2 = 653.01,3=763.18,4= 890.54,5=942.04 / 
al(cv) 
bl(cv)/4=0.1 / 
cl(cv) / 1=. 003,2=. 007,3=. 007 / 
a_wcov parameter of wcov(t) / 0.931194 / 
b_wcov parameter of wcov(t) / 0.000811 
a IossH parameter of loss H(t) / 0.250217 / 
b IossH parameter of Ioss_H(t) / 0.001299 / 
a IossIR parameter of loss IR(t) / 0.304277 / 
b IosslR parameter of loss -113(t) 
10.000705 / 
Loop(cv$(GR(cv) < 6417), 
bR(cv)=(FR(cv)-FR(cv+1)) /(FR(cv)"exp(-1'cR(cv)"GR(cv+1)}FR(cv+1)" 
exp(-1' cR(cv)'GR(cv))); 
aR(cv)=FR(cv)/(1-bR(cv)'exp(-1' cR(cv)'GR(cv))); ); 
aR("6') _ (FR('7. ). FR("6"))/(GRC7')* bR(ö')-GRC'6)**bR(6")); 
cR(6, ) = aR(' '). GR('6).. bR("6"). FR(6. '); 
Loop(a$(GT(cv) <903), 
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bT(cv)=(FD(cv)-FD(cv+1)) /(FD(cv)*exp(-1 *cT(cv)*GT(cv+1))-FD(cv+1)* 
exp(-1 *cT(cv)*GT(cv))); 
aT(cv)=FD(cv)/(1-bT(cv)*exp(-1*cT(cv)*GT(cv))); ); 
aT(, '3") = (FD("4, )-FD("3, ))/(GTC'4, )., bTC'3")-GT(3").. bT("3")); 
cT("3") = aT("3")*GT("3")**bT("3")-FD("3"); 
Loop(cv$(GI(cv) < 1429), 
bI(cv)=(FA(cv)FA(cv+1)) /(FA(cv)*exp(-1 *cI(cv)*GI(cv+1))-FA(cv+1)* 
exp(-1 *cl (cv)*GI (cv))); 
al(cv)=FA(cv)/(1-bI(cv)*exp(-1*cl(cv)*GI(cv))); ); 
aI("4") _ (FA("5")-FA("4"))/(GI("5")**bl("4")-GI("4")**bl("4")); 
cI("4") = aI("4")*GI("4")**bi("4")-FA("4"); 
$offtext 
**" End of sustainable production function parameters "**** ** 
Parameters 
p(t) domestic water price [DH per m3] 
pw(t) irrigation water price [DH per m3] 
pA(t) irrigation land price [OH per ha] 
th_E(t) probability to get urban job [dmnl] 
rr(t) real interest rate [ per year ] 
wl(t) irrigation sector wage rate [ DH per year] 
wS(t) skilled labour wage rate [ DH per year] 
IU(t) labour allocation to urban sector [dmnl] 
eta_M(sec) consumer price coefficient [dmnl] 
ppl(sec, t) producer price of product [DH per unit] 
pc1(sec, t) consumer price of product [DH per unit) 
ppz(sec) pp(sec t) in equation 
pcz(sec) pc(sec t) in equation 
qHbar(t) per capita average water consumption [m3 per capita per year] 
qH(t) per user piped water consumption [m3 per user per year] 
Ll_t(t) aggregate irrigation labourer [person per year] 
m(t) optimal private capital stock in year t [unit per capita] 
KR(t) rainfed capital stock per household [unit per household] 
IP(t) per capita private capital stock investment [unit per capita per year] 
G(gsec, t) public capital stock in year t [million unit] 
MG(t) total government revenue [ million DH per year ] 
MG HH1(t) government revenue from income tax [ million DH per year ] 
MG tradel(t) government revenue from trade tax ( million DH per year ] 
MG_prodl(t) government revenue from production tax [ million DH per year ] 
IG(gsec, t) public capital investment [million unit per year] 
A(t) aggregate irrigation land supply [1000 ha] 
R(t) raw water supply capacity [million m3 per year] 
Q(t) treated water supply capacity [million m3 per year] 
loss_H(t) domestic water loss rate [dmnl] 
wcov(t) public water supply coverage in rural area [dmnl] 
loss 
_IR(t) 
irrigation water loss rate [dmnl] 
repay(t) repayment of external loan [million DH per year] ; 
eta_M(sec) = (1+subs(sec))*( d_M(sec)**s_M(sec)*(1+subs(sec))**(s M(sec)-1)+ 
(1-d_M(sec))**s_M(sec)*(1+tar(sec))**(s_M(sec)-1) )/ 
(d M(sec)**s M(sec)*(1+subs(sec))**s M(sec)+(1-d_M(sec))**s M(sec)* 
(1+tar(sec))**s_M(sec) ); 
ppl (sec, t) = (1+subs(sec))/(1+tax_p(sec))*p_bar(sec)*re_c; 
pc1(sec, t) = (1+tar(sec))*eta_M(sec)*p_bar(sec)*re_c; 
Ioan_prc = sum( gsec, (aid(gsec)-1)*pc1("U", 1")/re_c"GO(gsec) ); 
repay(t) = i_rate *1oan_p rc*re_c$(ord(t) le 5)+ 
(0.1*Ioan prc"re c*(1+(15"ord(t))*i_rate))$(ord(t) gt 5); 
Positive variables 
th_Ez probability to get urban job [dmnlj 
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rrz real interest rate [ per year ] 
wiz irrigation sector wage rate [ DH per year] 
wSz skilled labour wage rate [ DH per year] 
lUz labour allocation to urban sector [dmnl] 
qHbarz per capita average water consumption [m3 per capita per year] 
qHz per capita piped water consumption [m3 per user per year) 
LI tz aggregate irrigation labourer [ person per year] 
pz domestic water price [DH per m3] 
pwz irrigation water price [DH per m3] 
pAz irrigation land price (DH per ha] ; 
Equations 
interest evaluate rrz 
wage evaluate wlz 
HT_model Generalised Harris-Todaro model 
ws_star solving equilibrium wage of skilled labour 
urb lab evaluate lUz 
dom wat evaluate qH barz 
qqH evaluate qHz 
it labour evaluate LI tz 
raw raw water balance in million m3 per year 
treat treated water balance In million m3 per year 
irrig irrigation land balance in 1000 ha ; 
interest.. rrz+delta =e= beta("U", "K')lpcz("U")* 
( tau("U")*(PPz("U")-aij(''U", R")*pcz("R")-aij("U",, l")* 
pcz("P'))*(beta("U", , L")/wUz)**beta("U", 'L')*(beta("U", "S)/ 
wSz)**beta("U°, "S") )**(1Ibeta("U°, "K")); 
wage.. wlz =e= beta(°I°, "L")*( tau("P')*(ppz("P')-aij("P', R")* 
pcz("R")-aij(°I", "U")*Pcz(U,. ))*(b eta(I , "N')/pAz)**beta("1", "N')* 
(beta("I°, °Q")/pwz)**beta("I", 'Q")*(beta("I", 'IC')/pcz("U")/(rrz+delta))** 
beta(' l' ,' K') )**(1/beta("l'' L")); 
HT model.. th_Ez =e= wcovz**phi_Q/wUz*( wlz* 
(1-(1-wcovz)*zbar)+pz*qno*(1/wcovz-1) ); 
ws_star.. ((1-(1-wcovz)*zbar)*(1-IS)- 
1 /HHsize*(YRbar/tau("R"))**(1 /beta("R", "L"))*(1 /KRz)** 
(beta("R", 'K')/beta("R", 'L"))- 
(1 /wSz)**(beta("U", "S"). (beta("P', "K°)+beta("P', °L'))IbetaCT', "L')/ 
beta("U"; 'K"))/HHsize*beta("U"; 'K")/beta("I"; 'IC')*mz*( tau("U")* 
(ppz("U")-aij(' U', "R")*pcz("R")-aij("U", I")*pcz(°P')). (beta(°U", "L')/wUz)** 
beta(°U", "U')*beta("U", "S")*. beta(°U", S°) )**((beta("P', "K")+beta(°P', 'L'))/ 
beta("P', 'L")/beta("U", 'K°))*(1/tau("I")/(ppz("P')-aij("I",, R")*pcz("R")- 
aij (" P', "U°)*pcz(°U"))*(pAz/b eta("I", "N'))**beto("P', 'A")*(pwz/ 
beta("P', 'Q")). "beta("P', "Q")*(beta("U", 'K')/beta("P', 'K'))*. beta("I "K") )** 
(1/beta(°P', "L")) )/ 
( (1-(1-wcovz)*zbar)*(1-beta("U"; 'IC')/beta('U", "U')*beta("I", "L")/beta("I", "K")* 
wcovz**phi Q)- 
(1 /wSz)**(b eta("U", "S")*b eta('T', 'K")/b eta("I", "L")/b eta(" U", "K"))* 
beta("U", K")/beta("U", "L')/beta(1 , 'W)*wcovz**phi Q*pz*qno* 
(1 /wcovz-1)*( tau("U")*(ppz("U")-aij("U°, "R")*pcz("R")-aij("U", "I")* 
pcz("P')). (beta(°U", ' L')/wUz)**beta("U", "L')*b eta ("U", "S")** 
beta("U"; 'S") ).. (beta("I", "K")/beta("I", "L')/beta("U", "K"))* 
( 1/tau(I. )/(ppz(. I. )-aij(,. I.,,, R)*pa(. R"Yaij(, 'I", "U")*pcz("U., ))* 
(pAz/beta("P', "A"))*"beta("P', "A")*(pwz/betaC'I", "Q"))**beta("P', "Q . )* 
(beta("U", "K")/beta("P', 'K'))**beta("P', "K') )**(1/betaCi , °L))) - beta("U", "L")*IS/beta("U", "S")/wUz*wSz/( wcovz**phi Q/wUz*pz*qno* 
(1/wcovz-1)+wSz*. (beta("U", "S")*beta("I", "K")/beta('9", "L")/ 
beta("U", "K"))*beta("I", "L')*wcovz**phi Q/wUz*(1-(1-wcovz)*zbar)/( tau ("U")* 
(ppz("U")-aij("U", "R")*pcz("R")-aij("U", 1")*pcz("P'))* 
(beta(' U', 'L')/wUz)*. beta(' U°, 'L°). beta(' U", 'S")**beta(U", "S") )** 
(beta ("I", "K°)/beta("P', "L°)/beta("U°, "K"))l(1/tau(°I")/(ppz(' I )- 
aij("I", "R")*pcz("R")-aij("I", "U)*pcz("U"))*(pAz/beta(.. I" ,A ))** beta("I", "A")*(pwz/beta("P', "Q"))**betaC'I", "Q")*(beta("U", "K")/ 
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beta('T', "K"))**betaK") )**(1/beta("P', "L")) ) 
=e= 0; 
urb_lab.. IUz =e= 
( (1-(1-wcovz)*zbar)*(1-IS)-betaC'I", "L')/beta("I", "K')* 
pcz("U")*(rrz+delta)/wlz*mz-1 /H Hsize*(YRbar/tau("R"))** 
(1/beta("R", "L'))*(1/KRz)**(beta('R", 'K')Ibeta("R°, 'L")) )/ 
( (1-(1-wcovz)*zbar)-beta("I"; 'L")/beta("I"; 'K")*pcz("U")*(rrz+deita)/wlz* 
( 1/tau("U. I)/(ppz("U)-aij(U, I, , R")*pcz(R)-aij(" U", 'To)*pcz(I., ))* 
(wUz/b eta(" U", °L°))**(1-beta("U", "S"))*(wSz/b eta("U", "S"))** 
beta("U", "S°) )**(1/beta("U", 'K"))*th_Ez ); 
dom wat. qHbarz=e= phi Q/pz* 
(1+(1-tax 
_h)*rrz-(1 
+nyu)*((l+(1-tax_h)*rrz)/(1+rho))**(1/sigma))* 
( pcz("U")*mz+(1-tax h)/((1-tax_h)*rrz-nyu)*(wUz*th Ez*IUz+wSz* 
IS+wlz*(1-lUz-IS)*(1-(1-wcovz)*zbar)+pz*qno*(1-lUz-IS)*(1-wcovz)/(1-tax h))+ 
o mega_bar*YRbar/nz/HHsize*(ppz("R")-aij("R", "I")*pcz("I")- 
aij("R, , U'')*pcz(, 
U"))- 
b_RIHHsize/((1-tax h)*rrz*(1+(1-tax h)*rrz))*(YRbar/tau("R"))** 
(1/b_R)*((1-tax h)*wlz/beta("R", 'L'))**(beta("R", "L")/b_R)*(pcz("U")* 
((1-tax h)*rrz+delta)(beta("R", "K'))**(beta("R", 'K')/b_R)- 
1/HHsizel(1+(1-tax h)*rrz)*((1-tax_h)*wlz*(YRbar/tau("R"))** 
(1/beta("R", "L'))*(1lKRz)**(beta(°R", "K')Ibeta(°R", 'L'))- 
(1-delta)*pcz("U")*KRz) ); 
qqH.. qHz =e=( gHbarz-qno*(1-lUz-IS)*(1-wcovz) )/(wcovz+(IUz+IS)* 
(1-wcovz)); 
it labour.. Ll tz =e= 
N*HHsize*(1-IS-lUz)*(1-(1-wcovz)*zbar)-N*(YRbar/tau("R"))** 
(1/beta("R", "L'))*(l /KRz)**(beta('R", "K')/beta('R", 'L")); 
raw.. safe S("gr")*Rz - 
(qHz*N*HHsize*(wcovz+(IUz+IS)*(1-wcovz))/(1-loss_Hz)+ 
beta("I", "Q")*wlz*LI tz/beta("I"; 'L")/pwz/(1doss IRz) )/1000000 
=g=0; 
treat.. safe S("gt")*Qz - 
qHz*N*HHsize*(wcovz+(IUz+IS)*(1-wcovz))/(1-loss Hz)/ 
1000000 =g= 0; 
irrig.. safe S("gi")*Az - 
beta("I"; 'A")*wlz*LI tz/beta("I", "U')/pAz/1000 =g= 0; 
*** initial guesses and ranges 
th_Ez. l = th_E c; 
th_Ez. lo = epsi; 
th_Ez. up = 1-epsi; 
IUz. I = IU-c; 
IUz. lo = epsi; 
IUz. up = 1-epsi; 
wSz. l = WS -c; 
wSz. lo = wU c; 
wlz. l = wl c; 
wlz. lo=. l*wl c; 
rrz. l = multi _r*rr c; 
rrz. lo = epsi; 
rrz. up = 1-epsi; 
gHbarz. l =1*gHbar c; 
qHbarz. lo = qno; 
qHbarz. up = 20*gHbar c; 
gHz. l = qH_c; 
qHz. lo = qno; 
Ll tz. l = LI_tc; 
LI tz. lo = epsi; 
pwz. lo =. I *pw c; 
pz. lo = . 1'p_c; 
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pAz. Io = .1 *pA_c; 
pz. I=multiC"gt, )*p c; 
pwz. I=multi("gr')'pw c; 
pAz. I=multi ("g i")*pA_c; 
Model equilb / interest. rrz, wage. wlz, HT model. th Ez, ws_star. wSz, urb lab. lUz, 
dom_wat. qHbarz, qqH. qHz, it labour. Ll tz, raw. pwz, treat. pz, irrig. pAz 
%; 
m(first) = m0; 
KR(first) = KRO; 
G(gsec, first) = GOmod(gsec); 
**- loop start 
Loop(t, 
HHsize=(1+nyu)**(ord(t)-1); 
wcov(t) = 1-a_wcov/exp(b_wcov"G("gt", t)); 
Ioss_H(t) = 0.08+a IossH/exp(b IossH"G("gt', t)); 
loss_IR(t) = 0.1 5+a IosslR/exp(b IosslR*G("gi", t)); 
*for SCbase 
*$ontext 
R(t) = aR("1")*(1-bR("1")/exp(cR("1")*G("ge', t)))$(G("ge', t) It 1250)+ 
(G("gr', t) ge 1250)*aR("2")*(1-bR("2")/exp(cR("2")*G("gr", t)))$(G("gr", t) It 1827)+ 
(G("gr', t) ge 1827)*aR("3")*(1-bR("3")/exp(cR("3")*G("gr", t)))$(G("gr", t) It 2757)+ 
(G("gr', t) ge 2757)*aR("4")*(1-bR("4")/exp(cR("4")*G("ge', t)))$(G("gr', t) It 3855)+ 
(G("gr", t) ge 3855)'aR("5")*(1-bR("5")/exp(cR("5")*G("ge', t)))$(G("ge', t) It 6417)+ 
(G("ge', t) ge 6417)*(aR("6')*G("gr', t)'*bR("6")-cR("6")); 
Q(t) = aT("1")'(1-bT("1")/exp(cT("1")*G("gt', t)))$(G("gt', t) It 503)+ 
(G("gt", t) ge 503)*aT("2")*(1-bT("2")/exp(cT("2")*G("g ', t)))$(G("gt', t) It 903)+ 
(G("gt", t) ge 903)*(aT("3")*G("gt', t)**bT("3")-cT("3")); 
A(t) = aI("1")*(1-bl("1")/exp(cl("1")*G("gi", t)))$(G("gi", t) It 685)+ 
(G("gi", t) ge 685)*al('2")*(1-bI("2")/exp(cl("2")*G("gi", t)))$(G("gi", t) It 914)+ 
(G("gi", t) ge 914)*al("3")*(1-bI("3")/exp(cI("3")*G("gi", t)))$(G("gi", t) It 1429)+ 
(G("gi", t) ge 1429)*(al("4")*G(°gi", t)""bl("4")-cl(°4")); 
*$offtext 
*for SC1 
$ontext 
R(t) = aR("1")*(1-bR("1")/exp(cR("1")*G("gr', t)))$(G("gr", t) It 1500)+ 
(G("gr', t) ge 1500)'aR("2")'(1-bR("2")/exp(cR("2")'G("ge', t)))$(G("ge', t) It 2193)+ 
(G("gr', t) ge 2193)'aR("3")'(1-bR("3")/exp(cR("3")'G("gr", t)))$(G("gr", t) It 3309)+ 
(G("gr", t) ge 3309)"aR("4")'(1-bR("4")/exp(cR("4")'G("gr", t)))$(G("gr", t) It 4626)+ 
(G("gr", t) ge 4626)*aR("5")"(1-bR("5")/exp(cR("5")'G("gr", t)))$(G("gr", t) It 7700)+ 
(G("gr", t) ge 7700)'(aR("6")'G("gr', t)"bR("6")-cR("6")); 
Q(t) = aT("1")'(1-bT("1")/exp(cT("1")'G("gt', t)))$(G("gt", t) It 604)+ 
(G("gt", t) ge 604)'aT("2")'(1-bT("2")/exp(cT("2")'G("gt", t)))$(G("gt', t) It 1084)+ 
(G("gt', t) ge 1084)*(aT('3")*G("gr', t)"bT("3"}cT("3")); 
A(t) = al("1")"(1-bl("1")/exp(cI("1")"G(°gi", t)))$(G("gi", t) It 853)+ 
(G("gi", t) ge 853)*al("2")*(1-bI("2")/exp(cI("2")*G("gi", t)))$(GC'gi", t) It 1097)+ 
(G("gi", t) ge 1097)*aI("3")*(1-bI("3")/exp(cIC'3")*G("gi", t)))$(G("gi", t) It 1715)+ 
(G("gi", t) ge 1715)*(aI("4")"G(°gi°, t)""bl("4°)-cI("4")); 
$ offtext 
mz=m(t); 
KRz=KR(t); 
wUz = wUmin(t); 
wcovz = wcov(t); 
loss_Hz = Toss H(t); 
loss 
_IRz = 
Toss IR(t); 
Rz = R(t); 
Qz = Q(t); 
Az = A(t); 
pcz(sec)=pcl (sec, t); 
ppz(sec)=ppl (sec, t); 
Solve equilb using MCP; 
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th_E(t)=th_Ez. l; 
IU(t)=IUz. l; 
qH(t)=gHz. l; 
gHbar(t)=gHbarz. l; 
rr(t)=rrz. l; 
wi(t)=wlz. l; 
wS(t)=wSz. i; 
LI t(t)=LI tz. l; 
p(t)=pz. l; 
pw(t)=pwz. l; 
pA(t)=pAz. I; 
* trade tax revenue 
M G_tradel (t)= ( 
tar(R)"((1+subs("R"))/(1+tar("R")))"*s M(R)"(d M("R")I(1-d M(., R")))**s_M("R)* 
(1-SAM("R"; 'ROW')*(1+subs c("R"))/rev_t("R")/(1+tax-p("R")))*omega_bar"YRbar*N*p_bar("R")+ 
tar('T')"((1+subs("P"))/(1+tar("P')))""s M("P, )*(d_M("P')/(1-d M("I")))**s M("I")" 
(1-SAM('T', "ROW')"(1+subs c("I"))/rev_t("I")/(1+tax_p("P')))" 
wl(t)*LI t(t)/beta("I"; 'L")/(ppz("I")-aijc"I", "R")" 
pcz("R")-aij(I", "U. I)"pcz("U"))*p bar("I)+ 
tar("U')*((1+subs(' U"))/(1+tar("U")))""s M(°U")"(d M("U")/(1-d M("U)))""s_M("U)" 
(1-SAM ("U', ' ROW')'(1+subs c("U"))/rev_t(U")/(1+tax_p("U")))* 
wS(t)*N"HHsize*I S/beta("U", "S")/(ppz("U")-aij("U", 'R")* 
pc z("R")-aij("U", ' I")"pcz("I"))"p_bar("U") )*re_c/1000000; 
I P(t) = (1-tax _h)"( rrz. 
l"m(t)+(wUz*th Ez. i"IUz. I+wSz. I*IS+ 
wlz. l'(1-IUz. I-IS)'(1-(1-wcovz)*zbar))/pcz("U") )- 
gHbarz. l"pz. l/phi Q/pcz("U")+pz. I"qno*(1-IUz. I-IS)*(1-wcovz)/pcz("U")+ 
(1-tax 
_h)/HHsize'omega 
bar*YRbar/pcz("U")'(ppz("R")-aij("R", "I")* 
p cz("I ")-a ij ("R", "U")"pcz C, U) )- 
1/HHsize"( (YRbar/tau("R"))""(1/b_R)*(beta("R", "K")*(1-tax 
_h)*wlz. 
I/ 
beta("R", "L")/pcz("U")/((1-tax_h)*rz. l+delta))*"(beta("R", "L')/b_R)+ 
(1-tax 
_h)*wlz. 
l/pct ("U", t)'(YRbar/tau("R"))"*(1/beta("R", 'L"))"(1 /KRz)** 
(beta("R", "K")/beta("R"; 'L"))-(1-delta)"KRz ); 
m(t+1) =(IP(t)+m(t))/(1+nyu); 
KR(t+1) =(YRbar/tau("R"))"'(1/b R)*( beta("R", "K")*(1-tax H)* 
wlz. I/(beta("R", "L")'pcz("U")'((1-tax H)*rrz. I+delta)) 
(beta ("R", ' L")/b_R ); 
MG(t) = (pz. I"gHz. I*N"HHsize"(wcovz+(IUz. I+IS)*(1-wcovz))+ 
(beta("I", "A")+beta("I", "Q"))*wlz. I"LI tz. ilbeta("I", "L") )11000000+ 
taxrev'MG trade 1(t)-repay(t); 
IG(gsec, t) = safe G"MG(t)/pcz("U")"theta(gsec, t); 
G(gsec, t+1) = IG(gsec, t)+(1-delta)'G(gsec, t); 
loop end 
2nd part: Policy implementation simulation 
"M ºº ýf "11 M *"M *"H"º Mº* H""H iý M""H *"H *"N ** N""N"" 
Set 
run Monte-Cairo trial /1 *100 /; 
Scalar 
n_run total number of trial / 100 / 
Table cbase(run, t) q _hat 
base value for EV calculation 
*** Base case result table is omitted due to limited space "`* 
"** Generate random shocks 
Parameter 
omega(t, run) random production risk [dmnl] 
rd_re(t, run) random shock for exchange rate [dmni] 
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re(t, run) real exchange rate [1994 constant DH per 1994 constant USD] 
pp(sec, t, run) producer price of product [DH per unit] 
pc(sec, t, run) consumer price of product [DH per unit] 
wUs(t, run) urban unskilled labour wage rate [DH per year] 
repays(t, run) repayment of external loan [million 1994 DH per year] ; 
Loop(run, Loop(t, 
omega(t, run)=normal(1, CC_cv); 
rd_re(t, run)=normal(1,. 09); 
); ); 
re(t, run)=re_c*rd_re(t, run); 
pp(sec, t, run) = (1+subs(sec))/(1+tax_p(sec))*p_bar(sec)*re(t, run); 
pc(sec, t, run) = (1+tar(sec))*eta_M(sec)*p bar(sec)*re(t, run); 
*inflation slide minimum wage 
wUs(t, run) = wUmin(t)*rd_re(t, run); 
repays(t, run) = i_rate*Ioan_prc*re(t, run)$(ord(t) le 5)+ 
(0.1 *Ioanprc*re(t, run)*(1+(15-ord(t))*i_rate))$(ord(t) gt 5); 
Parameters 
th_Es(t, run) probability to get urban job [dmnl] 
rrs(t, run) real interest rate [ per year ] 
wls(t, run) irrigation sector wage rate [ DH per year] 
wSs(t, run) skilled labour wage rate (DH per year] 
lUs(t, run) labour allocation to urban sector [dmnl] 
LI ts(t, run) aggregate irrigation labourer [person per year] 
LÜ ts(t, run) aggregate urban labourer [person per year] 
LR_ts(t, run) aggregate rainfed labourer [person per year] 
LS_ts(t) aggregate skilled labourer [person per year] 
ms(t, run) optimal private capital stock in year t [unit per capita] 
KRs(t, run) rainfed capital stock per household [unit per household] 
IPs(t, run) per capita private capital stock investment [unit per capita per year] 
MG_trade(t, run) government revenue from trade tax [ million DH per year ] 
GSAV(t, run) government saving account [million DH per] 
R_dem(t, run) raw water demand [million m3 per year] 
Q_dem(t, run) treated water demand [million m3 per year] 
A_dem(t, run) irrigation land demand [1000 ha per year] 
BalR(t, run) surplus supply of raw water [million m3 per year] 
Ba_l_Q(t, run) surplus supply of treated water [million m3 per year] 
Bal_A(t, run) surplus supply of irrigation land (1000 ha per year] 
deficit(t, run) counter of GSAV deficit 
unsust(t, run) counter of nonsustainable year 
ratio_def(run) probability to fall in deficit 
ratio uns(run) probability to violate SC 
c_hat(t, run) per capita consumption of satisfaction [unit per capita per year] 
gHlcd(t, run) per user public supplied water consumption [Icd] 
cR_hat(t, run) per capita consumption of rainfed product [unit per capita per year] 
cl_hat(t, run) per capita consumption of irrigation product [unit per capita per year] 
cU_hat(t, run) per capita consumption of urban product [unit per capita per year] 
gHbars(t, run) per capita average water consumption [m3 per capita per year] 
gHs(t, run) per user piped water consumption [m3 per user per year] 
YR(t, run) total rainfed output [unit per year] 
YI(t, run) total irrigation output [unit per year] 
YU(t, run) total urban output [unit per year] 
ppR(t, run) producer price of rainfed product [DH per unit] 
ppl(t, run) producer price of irrigation product [DH per unit] 
ppU(t, run) producer price of urban product [DH per unit] 
pcR(t, run) consumer price of rainfed product (DH per unit] 
pcl(t, run) consumer price of irrigation product [DH per unit] 
pcU(t, run) consumer price of urban product [DH per unit] 
unemploy(t, run) nationwide unemployment rate [dmnl] 
access(t, run) nationwide safe water access [dmnl] 
EV(t, run) equivalent variation [DH per capita per year] 
NPV EV(run) net present value of EV(t run) 
Gtot(t) total public capital stock [million DH] ; 
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Model implement / interest. rrz, wage. wlz, HT model. th_Ez, ws_star. wSz, urb lab. lUz, 
dom_watqHbarz, qqH. qHz, it Iabour. Ll tz /; 
**** Outer loop start ****** 
Loop(run, 
*counters reset 
deficit(t, run)=0; 
unsust(t, run)=0; 
*** initial guesses and ranges **** 
gHbarz. l = 1*gHbar c; 
qHbarz. lo = qno; 
qHbarz. up = 20*gHbar c; 
gHz. I = qH_c; 
gHz. Io = qno; 
LI tz. l = LI tc; 
LI tz. Io = epsi; 
pwz. lo = .1 *pw c; 
pz. I o= .1 *p_c; 
pAz. lo = . 1*pA_c; 
pz. I=mu Iti ("gt")*p_c; 
pwz. I=multi("gr")*pw c; 
pAz. I=multi ("gi")*pA_c; 
ms("1", run) = m0; 
KRs("1", run) = KRO; 
G(gsec, "1") = GOmod(gsec); 
****** **** Inner loop start 
Loop(t, 
HHsize=(1+nyu)**(ord(t)-1); 
pz. fx = p(t); 
pwz. fx = pw(t); 
pAz. fx = pA(t); 
mz=ms(t, run); 
KRz=KRs(t, run); 
wUz = wUs(t, run); 
wcovz = wcov(t); 
loss_Hz = loss H(t); 
loss 
_IRz = 
loss_IR(t); 
Rz = R(t); 
Qz = Q(t); 
Az = A(t); 
pcz(sec)=pc(sec, t, run); 
ppz(sec)=pp(sec, t, run); 
thEz. l = thE c; 
th_Ez. lo = epsi; 
th_Ez. up = 1-epsi; 
IUz. I = IU_c; 
IUz. lo = epsi; 
lUz. up = 1-epsi; 
wSz. l = wS_c; 
wSz. Io = wU_c; 
wlz. l = WI_c; 
wlz. lo = .1 *wl_c; 
rrz. l = multi_r*rr_c; 
rrz. lo = epsi; 
rrz. up = 1-epsi; 
Solve implement using MCP; 
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* trade tax revenue 
MG_trade(t, run)= 
tar(°R°)*((1+subs("R"))/(1+tar(°R°)))**s M("R")*(d_M("R°)/(1-d M("R")))**s M("R")* 
(1-SAM("R", "ROW')*(1+subs("R"))/rev_t("R")/(1 +tax_p("R")))*omega(t, run)*YRbar*N*p_bar("R")+ 
tar("I")*((1+subs(' I"))/(1+tar("I")))**s_M("I")*(d M("I")/(1-d M("I")))**s M("I")* 
(1-SAM ("I", 'ROW')*(1+subs("I"))/rev_t(' I")/(1+tax_p("I")))* 
wlz. I*LI t(t)/beta("I", "L")/(ppz("I")-aij("I", "R")* 
p Cz (R " 
-)-a ij ( I ,.,  U") *p cz ("U f)) *p_b a r(I )+ 
tar("U")*((1+subs("U"))/(1+tar("U")))**s M("U")*(d_M("U")/(1-d M("U")))**s M("U")* 
(1-SAM ("U"; 'ROW")*(1 +subs("U"))/rev_t("U")/(1 +tax_p("U")))* 
wSz. I*N*HHsize*I S/beta("U"; 'S")/(ppz("U")-aij("U", "R")* 
pcz("R")-aij("U", "I")*pcz("I"))*p_bar("U") )*re(t, run)/1000000; 
IPs(t, run) = (1-tax _h)*( rrz. 
I*mz+(wUz*th_Ez. l*IUz. I+wSz. IlS+ 
wlz. l*(1-IUz. I-IS)"(1-(1-wcovz)*zbar))/pcz("U") )- 
gHbarz. l*p(t)/phi Q/pcz("U")+p(t)*qno*(1-IUz. I-IS)*(1-wcovz)/pcz("U")+ 
(1-tax 
_h)/HHsize*o 
mega(t, run)*YRbar/pcz("U")*(ppz("R")-aij("R", "I")* 
pcz("I,. )-aij(R. U.. )*pcz(,. U., ))- 
1/HHsize*( (YRbar/tau("R"))**(1/b_R)*(beta("R"; 'K")*(1-tax_h)*wlz. l/ 
beta("R", "L")/pcz("U")/((1-tax_h)*rrz. I+delta))**(beta("R", "L")/b_R)+ 
(1-tax 
_h)*wlz. 
I/pcz("U")*(YRbar/tau("R"))**(1 /beta("R", "L'))*(1 /KRs(t, run))** 
(beta("R", "K")/beta("R", "L"))-(l-delta)*KRs(t, run) ); 
ms(t+l, run) =(IPs(t, run) +ms(t, run))/(1+nyu); 
KRs(t+l, run) =(YRbar/tau("R"))**(1/b_R)*( beta("R", "K")*(1-tax_H)* 
wIz. I/(beta("R", "L")*pcz("U")*((1-tax H)*rrz. I+delta)) )** 
(beta("R", ' L')/b_R ); 
GSAV(t, run)$(ord(t)=1)= (p(t)*gHz. I*N*HHsize*(wcovz+(IUz. I+IS)*(1-wcovz))+ 
(beta ('T', "A")+beta("I", "Q"))*wIz. I*LI tz. I/beta("I", "L") )/1 000000+taxrev* 
MG trade(t, run)-pczCU')*sum(gsec, IG(gsec, t))-repays(t, run); 
GSAV(t, run)$(ord(t) ne 1) = GSAV(t-1, run)+(p(t)*gHz. I*N*HHsize*(wcovz+(IUz. I+IS)* 
(1-wcovz))+(beta("I", "A")+beta("I", "Q"))*wlz. I*LI_tz. I/beta("I", "L') )/1000000+ 
taxrev*MG trade(t, run)-pcz(' U')*sum(gsec, IG(gsec, t))-repays(t, run); 
deficit(t+l, run)=deficit(t, run)+1$(GSAV(t, run) It 0); 
R_dem(t, run) =( qHz. I*N*HHsize*(wcovz+(IUz. I+IS)*(1-wcovz))/(1-loss _Hz)+ 
beta("I", "Q")*wlz. I*LI tz. I/beta("I"; 'L")/pw(t)/(1-1oss_IRz) )/1000000; 
Bal_R(t, run) = R(t)-R_dem(t, run); 
Q_dem(t, run) =( qHz. I*N*HHsize*(wcovz+(IUz. I+IS)*(1-wcovz))/(1-Ioss_Hz) )/1000000; 
Bal_Q(t, run) = Q(t)-Q dem(t, run); 
A_dem(t, run) = beta("I", "A")*wlz. I*LI tz. llbeta("I"; 'L")/pA(t)/1000; 
Bal_A(t, run) = A(t)-A_dem(t, run); 
unsust(t+l, run)=unsust(t, run)+1$( (Bal_R(t, run) It 0)+ 
(Bal_Q(t, run) It 0)+(Bal A(t, run) It 0) ne 0 ); 
th_Es(t, ru n)=th_Ez. 1; 
IUs(t, run)=IUz. I; 
qHlcd(t, run) = gHz. I/365*N*HHsize/popl994*1000; 
qHbars(t, run)=gHbarz. I; 
rrs(t, run)=rrz. 1; 
wls(t, run)=wlz. 1; 
wSs(t, run)=wSz. I; 
LI ts(t, run)=LI tz. I; 
*** Inner loop end "*** 
ratio_def(run) _( deficit("15", run)+1$(GSAV("15", run) It 0) )/15; 
ratio_uns(run) =( unsust("15", run)+1$((Bal R("15", run) It 0)+ 
(Bal_Q("15", run) It 0)+(Bal A("15", run) It 0) ne 0) )/15; 
**** Outer loop end "*"* 
*raw output 
c_hat(t, run) = qHbars(t, run)*(p(t)/phi Q)**(1-phi_Q)*(phi("R")/pc('R", t, run))**phi('R")* 
(phi ("I")/pc("I", t, run))**phi("I")*(phi ("U")/pc("U", t, run))**phi("U"); 
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cR_hat(t, run) = gHbars(t, run)*phi("R")*p(t)/phi Q/pc("R", t, run); 
cl_hat(t, run) = gHbars(t, run)*phi("I")*p(t)/phi Q/pc("I", t, run); 
cU_hat(t, run) = qHbars(t, run)*phi("U")*p(t)/phi Q/pc("U", t, run); 
EV(t, run) = (c hat(t, run)-cbase(run, t))*((1-tax h)*rrs(t, run)-nyu)* 
(p(t)/phi_Q)**phi Q*prod(sec, (pc(sec, t, run)/phi(sec))**phi(sec))/ 
( 1+(1-tax 
_h)*rrs(t, 
run)-(1+nyu)*((1+(1-tax_h)*rrs(t, run))/(1+rho))**(1/sigma) ); 
YR(t, run) = omega(t, run)*YRbar*N; 
YI(t, run) = wls(t, run)*LI_ts(t, run)/beta("I", "L")/(pp("I", t, run)-aij("I", "R")* 
p c(" R", t, ru n)-a ij (" I", "U") *pc (" U", t, ru n)) ; 
YU(t, run) = wSs(t, run)*N*(1+nyu)**(ord(t)-1)*IS/beta("U", "S")/(pp("U", t, run)- 
aij("U", "R")*pc("R", t, run)-aij("U", "I")*pc("I", t, run)); 
ppR(t, run) =pp("R", t, run); 
ppl(t, run) =pp("I", t, run); 
ppU(t, run) =pp("U", trun); 
pcR(t, run) =pc("R", t, run); 
pcl(t, run) =pc("I", t, run); 
pcU(t, run) =pc("U", trun); 
LU_ts(t, run) = N*(1+nyu)*"(ord(t)-1)*IUs(t, run)*th_Es(t, run); 
LS_ts(t) = N*(1+nyu)**(ord(t)-1)*IS; 
LR_ts(t, run) = N*(YRbar/tau("R")/KRs(t, run)**beta("R"; 'K'))**(1/beta("R", "L")); 
access(t, run) = wcov(t)+(IUs(t, run)+IS)*(1-wcov(t)); 
unemploy(t, run) = IUs(t, run)*(1-th_Es(t, run)); 
Gtot(t)=sum(gsec, G(gsec, t)); 
$libinclude XLDUMP c hat rawtab. xls c 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP gHlcd rawtab. xls gHlcd 
$libinclude XLDUMP ms rawtab. xls m 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP KRs rawtab. xls KR 
$libinclude XLDUMP wis rawtab. xls wl 
$libinclude XLDUMP wSs rawtab. xls wS 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP GSAV rawtab. xls GSAV 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP th_Es rawtab. xls th_E 
$libinclude XLDUMP wcov rawtab. xls wcov 
$libinclude XLDUMP EV rawtab. xls EV 
$libinclude XLDUMP access rawtab. xis acces 
$libinclude XLDUMP unemploy rawtab. xls unemp 
$libinclude XLDUMP G rawtab. xls G 
$libinclude XLDUMP Q rawtab. xls Q 
$Iibinclude XLDUMP R rawtab. xls R 
$libinclude XLDUMP A rawtab. xis A 
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